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Abstract 
The independence of letters of credit and demand guarantees from the underlying 
contract of sale that gave rise to them is fundamental to the integrity of the market 
in which they operate and is the core of the economic certainty provided by the 
product. In the absence of material fraud, stakeholders expect the separation 
between the two to be maintained. However, the application by courts in three 
countries of the principles of unconscionable conduct to lift the veil of autonomy 
separating the two has given rise to some concern about the efficacy of the 
independent instrument product. 
The use of unconscionability to ground injunctions preventing the benefit of an 
instrument from flowing to its beneficiary is perceived to increase uncertainty and 
transactional risk. This thesis argues that this need not be the case – that a 
properly-formed category of independent instrument unconscionability that is 
tailored to the specific attributes of independent instruments will provide judicial 
stability and stakeholder assurance while reflecting contemporary market 
expectations of commercial behaviour. 
The use of unconscionability as a basis to restrain a demand-right or payment 
obligation has struggled to achieve consistency within and across jurisdictions 
because, it is posited herein, the jurisprudential basis for the doctrine has not been 
appropriately developed with specific reference to the independent instruments to 
which it is being applied. The relationship between the characteristics of 
independent instruments and the elements for proving independent instrument 
unconscionability have not been clarified in the courts or the literature. The result 
is a mash of procedural and substantive unconscionability principles being applied 
to adjudicate allegations of unconscionable conduct. 
This thesis is predicated on the proposition that independent instrument 
unconscionability is necessary, reasonable, and justifiable for protecting applicant 
parties from the economic distress caused by abusive demands for payment.  
This thesis examines the law of unconscionable conduct (procedural and 
substantive), the development of independence in trade finance instruments, and 
analyses the case law in both Singapore and Australia where unconscionable 
conduct has been alleged. This aggregation and analysis is used to distil the 
elements of independent instrument unconscionability into the framework provided 
in Chapter Six. 
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Chapter 1. Project Scope and Legal Fundamentals 
Section A. Thesis 
1.0 Research Question 
Given the unique legal character of independent instruments, how would a 
category of unconscionable conduct specific to their use be framed in law? 
2.0 Hypothesis 
That, properly described under law, there exists a special category of independent 
instrument unconscionability which, with sufficient materiality, is sufficient to 
ground an injunction. 
3.0 Rationale 
Abusive demands on independent instruments 1 cannot be priced by the party 
carrying nearly all the downside risk to the primary underlying contract: the 
applicant account holder. An abusive demand cannot be presumed. The risk of an 
abusive demand cannot be offset nor insured against. The risk of an abusive 
demand will not generally be contractually offset under the (underlying) contract 
given the inequality of the parties’ bargaining positions.  
The raison d’être for the ‘autonomy principle’ rests with its contribution to the risk 
mitigation properties of the instrument. The application of any exception to that 
principle fundamentally contradicts the precepts of party autonomy 2 in international 
private commercial law. In some jurisdictions, courts have allowed concepts of ‘fair 
behaviour’ to negatively impact the relative commercial certainty provided by the 
independence of Documentary Credits and Demand Guarantees.  
The only relief typically available for unconscionable demands on independent 
instruments is the equitable remedy of injunction. Equity will not suffer a wrong 
without a remedy;3 an abusive demand is not an event that a party can presume 
                                                     
1  See Usage, p.18. 
2  By “party autonomy” it is meant that the parties to a commercial contract have an arguable right to choose the 
rules that will determine the operation of the contract entered into, including apropos, the rules that allow the 
agreement to be set aside, ie party autonomy is the capacity of parties to a “business contract [being] free to 
choose the governing law” and rule sets for incorporation into the transact ion. See: H Watt, '"Party Autonomy" In 
International Contracts: From The Makings Of A Myth To The Requirements Of Global Governance' (2010) (3 
ERCL) Columbia University Alliance Program Papers  at <www.columbia.edu/cu/alliance/Papers/Article_Horatia-
Muir-Watt.pdf> 
3  Ashby v White (1703) 92 ER 126: “Ubi jus, ibi remedium…If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a 
means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it ”. 
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and is therefore a wrong. Under Australian statute, the doctrine of 
unconscionability in relation to independent instruments remains to be fully formed. 
In Singapore the courts’ equitable jurisdiction provides the head of power to 
ground injunctions and enjoys much greater clarity.  
The protection of the independence principle and the inherent risk -allocation value 
of independent instruments in the market is paramount. Inept application of the 
notion of unconscionability on the integrity of the independence principle can 
damage the reputation of the product and cause rational users to consider 
alternate products. The obligation on issuers to honour a complying presentation 
should never be tampered with; it is argued herein that restraint must always lie 
against the beneficiary. 
Where abusive demands are enabled by the court and serious economic and 
possibly social harm results from such a demand, the danger to the product’s 
reputation and use profile is arguably greater. Unconscionable conduct in relation 
to demands on independent instruments have not been comprehensively framed 
due to a paucity of explanation available on how the special character of 
independent instruments juxtaposes with the law of unconscionable conduct as it 
exists and is developing. Therefore, a state of dissonance exists in this area of law 
that requires address. 
This thesis inter alia posits that pleadings of unconscionability with respect to 
demands on independent instruments require sufficient materiality to restrain a 
demand, ie egregious unconscionable conduct needs to be proven prima facie to 
ground an injunction. This does not include a requirement to demonstrate any 
moral obloquy.  
This thesis also provides support for the proposition that to set aside the 
independence of demand guarantees, and their equivalents, a lesser degree of 
materiality should be required than for letters of credit. This is proposed subject to 
the condition that the obligation to honour held by the issuer is not interfered with; 
that only the demand-right held by the beneficiary is restrained. 
It is the object of this research to demonstrate that the intersection of 
unconscionable conduct and the commercial law can be successfully managed 
within a clearly defined, inter-jurisdictionally acceptable nomothetic framework. It 
must be designed to provide guidance for circumscribing the range of behaviours 
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allowed to negatively impact commercial undertakings and the elements that need 
to be considered to found a pleading of sufficiently egregious unconscionable 
conduct. 
Section B. Research Contribution, Assumptions and Methodology 
1.0 Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
This dissertation contributes original research in the discipline of international 
letter of credit and demand guarantee law by:  
(1) Providing a complete analysis of the jurisprudence in every superior 
court case dealing with unconscionable conduct in relation to demands 
on letters of credit and demand guarantees in both Australia and 
Singapore;  
(2) Compilation and discussion of all major letter of credit and demand 
guarantee governing rules relating to the independence principle;  
(3) Providing a framework of elements for independent instrument 
unconscionability supported by law and analysis.  
2.0 Caveat Regarding Reader’s Prior Knowledge 
This thesis has been researched and written at a doctoral level. Given the 
character of this study of letters of credit and demand guarantees, it presumed tha t 
the reader will have a complete knowledge of the principles of usage and the 
terminology of the discipline.  
It is presumed that the reader will be familiar with the fundamental rule sets 
operational throughout the industry, and the major organisational stakeholders:  
➢ Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
(currently UCP600)4 
➢ Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG758) 
➢ International Standby Practices (ISP98) 5 
➢ International Standard Banking Practice (ISBP2013) 6 
                                                     
4  J Byrne (ed), LC Rules & Laws: Critical Texts for Independent Undertakings  (Institute of International Banking 
Law & Practice, Inc., 6th ed, 2014), p.2.  
5  <https://iiblp.org/resources/isp98/> 
6  Byrne, n4, 103. 
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➢ UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(PICC)7 
➢ Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) 8 
➢ Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 9 
➢ United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Standby Letters of Credit (UN-CIGSLC)10 
➢ Uniform Commercial Code (USA) (UCC)11 
➢ Trade Practices Act/Australian Consumer Law (AUS) 
(TPA/ACL)12 
➢ The Rules Sets of the Supreme People's Court Concerning 
Hearing Letter of Credit Cases (SPC-LCC)13 
➢ International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
➢ Institute of International Banking Law and Practice (IIBLP) 
➢ United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) 
From this point, no footnote reference will be made with respect to any of the 
above except where specific sections/articles are addressed.  
It is also presumed that the reader will be familiar with the various legal systems in 
which independent instrument law operates and the hierarchies of the court 
systems. 
For more detailed explanations, the reader might refer generally to Ellinger and 
Neo,14 or Vout’s excellent tome on the laws  of unconscionable conduct in 
Australia.15 Many terms are extensively defined in the various international rule sets 
that frame documentary credit usage as the reader will be aware.  
                                                     
7  <www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf> 
8  <http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract .principles.parts.1.to.3.2002/> 
9  <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html>  
10  <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/1995Convention_guarantees_credit.html> 
11  <https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc> 
12  Trade Practices Act (Cth) 1974: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/> and Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2 - The Australian Consumer Law: 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/caca2010265/sch2.html>  
13  Rules Concerning Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Cases  (PRC), 2002; Rules of the 
Supreme People's Court Concerning Hearing Letter  of Credit Cases  (PRC), 2005; Independent Guarantee 
Provisions of the PRC Supreme People's Court (PRC) 2017: 
<http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/potspcosicttocodoloc1163/> 
14  E Ellinger, and D Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Cred it (Hart Publishing, 1st ed, 2010) 
15  P Vout (ed), Unconscionable Conduct : The Laws of Australia  (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2009). 
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3.0 Methodology 
The research will use material drawn from the case law and both academic and 
judicial commentary. 
The theoretical research to describe this hypothesis will be doctrinal in nature, and 
therefore qualitative. The research will consider the black-letter law of the statute, 
case law and the rule sets on which international commercial law and independent 
instrument transactions are founded.  
Analysis will be conducted in context with the general principles of unconscionable 
conduct: 
a. within equity broadly;  
b. considering the general concepts of good faith; 
c. as defined in statute proscribing Unconscionable Conduct; and  
d. statutory interpretation. 
The method for studying ‘black-letter’ law: 
focuses heavily if not exclusively, upon the law itself as an 
internal self-sustaining set of principles which can be accessed 
through reading court judgements and statutes with little or no 
reference to the world outside the law. 16 
The ‘scientific method’, described by Karl Popper as the ‘hypothetico -deductive’ 
method, has been employed in this thesis. 17 Donley states: 
Deductive research begins with a theory…that leads to the 
development of a research question or hypothesis to be tested 
through data that is then collected and analysed…[The] theory 
generates hypotheses; hypotheses point to certain kinds of data 
required to test them; data is analysed to determine whether they 
support a hypothesis or not. 18 
This thesis commences with the hypothesis that a properly-framed category of 
independent instrument unconscionability can operate to provide injunctive relief 
against sufficiently material abusive demands while maintaining the integrity of the 
                                                     
16  M McConville, and W Chui (ed), Research Methods For Law  (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 4. Also E.L. 
Rubin, “Law and the Methodology of Law” (1997) Wisconsin Law Review  525. 
17  K Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery  (Routledge, 2nd ed, 1992). 
18  A Donley, Research Methods  (Publ: Facts On File, 2012), 9. 
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independence principle and the commercial value of independent instruments 
themselves. It then sets out to demonstrate that this is so with reference to an 
international body of law and opinion.  
Section C. Terminology, Syntax and Vocabulary 
1.0 Usage in This Thesis 
Both letters of credit and demand guarantees are ‘independent  instruments’ but 
the rights and obligations of each operate quite differently and have had their 
‘independence’ treated differently by different courts.19 Letters of credit are widely 
referred to as ‘Documentary Credits’, 20 although the latter term could include other 
independent instruments. 
For most purposes the terms ‘Demand Guarantee’, ‘Independent Guarantee’, ‘Bank 
Guarantee’, ‘Bank Bond’, ‘Demand Bond’, ‘Performance Bond’, ‘Financial 
Guarantee’, and ‘Standby Letter of Credit’ are functionally identical and are often 
interchanged or used incorrectly. 
Throughout this dissertation these instruments are referred to jointly and severally 
as ‘independent instruments’ when being discussed in a general context. They will 
be referred to separately as ‘letters of credit’ and ‘demand guarantees’ when it is 
necessary to differentiate between them. ‘Demand guarantee’ will be used when 
referring to all similar instruments unless discussing a specific instrument related 
to a specific case, such as a ‘performance guarantee’. Original terms will be used 
in all extracts. 
Where the analysis is dealing with specific aspects of unconscionability that only 
affect demand guarantees, as opposed to letters of credit, notice will be given in 
the footnotes. 
For the purposes of this thesis the term “abusive demand” is a generic which refers 
to a demand for payment on an independent instrument or similar bank instrument 
that is prima facie fraudulent, unconscionable, oppressive 21 or illegal.22 
  
                                                     
19  For example: JBE Properties Pte Ltd v Gammon Pte Ltd  [2010] SGCA 46 [10] (JBE (No.2)). 
20  For example, UCP600 does not refer to ‘Letters of Credit’.  
21  GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd  [1999] 4 SLR 604 [20] (GHL). 
22  See generally: N Enonchong, 'The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees' (2007)  Lloyds Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly  83. 
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2.0 Independent Instrument Naming Conventions 
The word “guarantee” is widely used for an extensive array of instruments and 
other fiscal relationships. This thesis does not attempt to formulate any kind of 
meaningful taxonomy to classify them all. The word now has the nature of a 
generic. In documentary credit law, ‘Guarantee’ is used to describe both the 
obligation and the instrument. 
‘Guarantee’ is also used in the moniker of both dependent and independent bank 
obligations. The terms ‘unconditional’ and ‘independent’ are also interchanged 
when they mean quite separate things. 23 
US law prohibits banks providing ‘guarantees’ (in the strict banking law sense) and 
therefore called their ‘demand guarantee’ equivalent instruments ‘standby letters of 
credit’.24 ‘Guarantee’ is occasionally used to describe instruments that are in 
essence a ‘bond’. ‘Guarantee’ is also often modified by a descriptor relating to its 
function, such as ‘Performance Guarantee’ or ‘Financial Guarantee’. 
The Court has repeatedly stated that a Guarantee must be honoured “according to 
its terms”,25 meaning in part that it is irrelevant what the issuer or applicant call the 
instrument, its character will be drawn by the rights and obliga tions provided for in 
the ‘conditions’ of the instrument and, in the terms of the underlying contract when 
dependent, or otherwise lacking ‘independence’. Regardless of the name given the 
instrument, if it is not independent it is not strictly a Demand Guarantee in its 
commonly-used sense. 
Definition is also provided by the rules sets that govern independent instruments. 
For example, under UCP600, a ‘Credit’:  
is any arrangement, however named or described, that is irrevocable 
and thereby constitutes a definite undertaking of the issuing bank to 
honour a complying presentation.26 
A ‘Guarantee’ under the URDG means: 
any signed undertaking, however named or described, providing for 
payment on presentation of a complying demand. 27 
                                                     
23  See discussion p.30 under ‘The Nomenclature of Independence’.  
24  Ellinger, n14, 5. Chartered Electronics Industries Pte Ltd v Development Bank of Singapore [Unreported] Suit No 
485/1990 [1999] 4 SLR 655, 668[38]. 
25  Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159, 171-A. 
26  UCP600 [Art.2]. 
27  URDG [Art.2]. 
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The term ‘letter of credit’ has been defined as “a specialized commercial document 
arising from an agreement between a bank and its customer” and are “unique 
commercial instruments… governed by their own unique rules.” 28 There are no 
contradictions inherent in these two definitions.  
3.0 The ‘Contractual’ Nature of Independent Instruments  
Courts often refer to independent instruments as ‘contracts’. Strictly speaking, this 
is inaccurate. Both letters of credit and negotiable instruments such as cheques 
and Bills of Exchange are considered by some academics as “specialty contracts”, 
as opposed to ‘ordinary’ contracts. 29 
Wunnicke refuses to take a position either way but points out that the hybrid nature 
of these instruments makes for controversy. Wunnicke lists five principles of 
common law contract that have been applied to letters of credit by US courts:  
1. Ambiguity is construed against the issuer; 
2. Terms should be interpreted in a manner that is “fair and customary 
and which prudent persons would enter into”;  
3. The construction of terms should be interpreted to make the letter of 
credit operable if possible; 
4. Where a discrepancy exists, typed or handwritten provisions are to be 
preferred over those printed; 
5. Issuers of credits governed by UCC §5-102(a)(7) are subject to a duty 
of good faith.30 
What can be said with certainty is that some elements of contract law apply to 
independent instruments, but not all. Consideration is not required, there is an 
absence of privity of contract, and the beneficiary incurs any obligations or rights 
under the terms of the instrument that would normally accrue under a common 
contract.31  
                                                     
28  Western Surety Co v North Valley Bank  2005 Ohio 3453 (Ct. App.). 
29  G McLaughlin, 'Exploring Boundaries: A Legal and Structural Analysis of the Independence Principle of Letter of 
Credit Law' (2002) 119 Banking Law Journal  501, 501-503. For an analysis of the history of this term, see  
B Kozolchyk, 'The Legal Nature of the Irrevocable Letter of Credit' (1965) 14 American Journal of Comparitive 
Law 395, 412[IV]. 
30  B Wunnicke, D Wunnicke, and P Turner, Standby and Commercial Letters of Credit  (Wiley Law Publications, 2nd 
ed, 1996), 5-6. 
31  Kozolchyk, n29, 400. 
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None of the legislation or rule sets that govern independent instruments refer to 
such instruments as ‘contracts’, preferring such terms as “arrangement”, 32 “binding 
undertaking”,33 and “definite undertaking”.34 
4.0 Referencing, Punctuation and Grammar 
Due to the need to minimise word count, and the nature of legal references, an 
abbreviated form of AGLC referencing is used. Footnotes have been formatted to 
achieve minimum word count without sacrif icing comprehensibility. 
Section D. The Argument for Independent Instrument Unconscionability 35 
The purpose for this section is to address the reasoning upon which Chapter Six is 
premised. This author strongly supports the Courts’ prohibition of unconscionable 
conduct in relation to abusive calls on independent instruments. This thesis 
contends that the application of both statute and equity is valid, although its 
jurisprudential foundations have arguably not been sufficiently well reasoned in the 
courts or in the literature to date. 
Despite extensive research, almost no discussion exists in the literature with 
respect to the rights’ relationships in independent instruments.  
Kozolchyk in 1965 stated in relation to the study of commercial letters of credit:  
Discussions of the nature of legal institutions are infrequent in 
contemporary legal literature. Pragmatic inquiries into the use and 
application of legal institutions, as well as their casuistic evaluation, 
seem to have displaced their analytic treatment. 36 
The focus of almost all extant research is either on practice matters or examines 
defences to the status quo. Very little of the obiter or literature discusses 
unconscionability with respect to the rights and powers being affected.  
It is proposed here that the reluctance within the industry to accept a lower 
standard of fraud might reflect this lack of intellectual debate among scholars. It 
might to some extent be simply reactionary and an adherence to the status quo.  
                                                     
32  UCP600 [Art.2]. 
33  ISP98 §1.06(a). 
34  UCC-Revd.5 §5-102(a)(10). 
35  The expression “Unconscionability Exception” is a bespoke term in the documentary credit/demand guarantee 
paradigm that refers to the application of principles and law related to unconscionable conduct as an exception 
to the autonomy of letters of credit and demand guarantees.  
36  Kozolchyk, n29, 395. This remains the only extant work that thoroughly describes the rights and obliga tions of 
commercial letters of credit. 
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All law should develop and adjust to meet the demands of the market as they 
arise. The refusal to allow for a lesser standard of fraud can, it is posited, only 
serve to make demand guarantees less attractive to those called upon to provide 
them. 
It is posited in this thesis that the right to make a demand against an independent 
instrument – which is referred to herein as the “demand-right” – arises in the 
underlying contract, and not in the instrument itself. The reasoning in support of 
this postulation follows. 
The obligation undertaken by the issuer is unilateral, ie there is an absence of 
‘legal relations’ (privity) between the issuer and the beneficiary. The issuance of an 
independent instrument does not compel the beneficiary to meet any obligation or 
undertake any action with regard to the instrument.  
The obligation to honour a complying presentation does give rise to a right to sue 
for unlawful dishonour.37 It provides the beneficiary with the liberty to make a 
presentation, but the beneficiary has no obligation to do so. There is no demand-
right in the instrument itself because this right is founded on the express and 
implied obligations inherent in the underlying contract.  
This position is given strong support by analogy to the fraud exception, which is 
universally recognised by the courts in the major independent instrument user 
jurisdictions. The fraud exception allows the issuer to refuse to honour. The 
fraudulent conduct is completely removed from the instrument itself – it reflects a 
deliberate abrogation of the contractual commitments (express and implied) in the 
underlying contract. Where challenged, fraud allows the court to restrain the 
beneficiary’s right to make a demand. 38 
If the demand-right can be denied or restrained for fraud in the underlying contract, 
it follows that the demand-right arises pursuant to the proper performance of the 
beneficiary’s contractual obligations. It cannot exist anywhere else – the fraudulent 
conduct does not, in fact can not, occur in relation to the obligation to honour.  
                                                     
37  M Andrews, 'Hohfeld's Cube' (1982-83) 16(3) Akron Law Review  471: This follows Hohfeldian logic that an 
duty/obligation undertaken by one person generally gives rise to a right in another person.  
38  In Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Company Ltd [1998] 3 VR 380, 406 (Olex (No.1)) both the beneficiary and the 
issuer were subject to injunctions. The Court in Boral (No.2), n61 [91-92] only restrained the beneficiary. 
Board Solutions, n676 [5] saw both the beneficiary and the issuer restrained. It is argued here that Courts which 
restrain the issuer’s obligation to pay unnecessarily breach the independence of the instrument.  
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The instrument does not bestow upon the beneficiary any rights except the right to 
sue for wrongful dishonour. There is nothing therefore in the instrument upon 
which to found the restraint – here it’s proposed to be founded upon the breach in 
the underlying contract. 
That the demand-right is a substantive right that arises in the underlying contract 
was also recognised by the Court of Appeal in Mount Sophia: 
[A] finding of unconscionability is a conclusion applied to conduct 
which the court finds to be so lacking in bona fides such that an 
injunction restraining the beneficiary’s substantive rights  is 
warranted.39 
It is arguable whether independent instrument fraud is unlike fraud in the common 
law in that an allegation of independent instrument fraud can be proved without 
proving the necessary intention.40 Gao provides a thorough analysis of the different 
schools of thought on this, in addition to a study of the materiality of fraud. 41  
The standard of fraud that must demonstrated requires balance. As Gao notes:  
If the standard of fraud for the application of the fraud rule is set too 
low…it may lead to abuse of the rule by the applicant. Temptation to 
abuse always exists. 42 
The materiality may be important because ‘extent’ may be the only meaningful 
differentiation between independent instrument fraud and independent instrument 
unconscionability if an absence of intent is not fatal to an allegation of fraud.  
Independent instrument unconscionability might be seen as a part of a broad law 
of fraud in equity. In Dynamics Corp it was held that “fraud has a broader meaning 
in equity [than at law] and intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a 
necessary element.”43 
 
                                                     
39  BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd [2012] SGCA 28 [45] (Mount Sophia). Emphasis added. See 
discussion with respect to lifting the veil of autonomy and the parties restrained at p. 129. 
40  Ellinger, n14, 142 points out that “A potential problem concerns the degree of knowledge of fraud that is 
required of the beneficiary before he is infected by the fraud exception…actual kn owledge rather than 
constructive knowledge.”  
41  X Gao, The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit  (Kluwer Law, 2002), 67-73. 
42  Ibid 76-77. 
43  Dynamics Corp of America v Citizens & Southern Bank 356 F.Supp.991 (N.D.Ga 1973), 998-999. Emphasis 
added. 
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Typically independent instrument matters in common law jurisdictions alleging 
fraud are seeking injunctions to restrain the benefit of the instrument. The court 
will therefore be operating within its equitable jurisdiction and therefore it may 
consider fraud in equity, and unconscionable conduct. However, it is only with the 
greatest difficulty that the material difference between independent instrument 
fraud and unconscionable conduct can be made out by the court. 44 
There is little discussion of these matters anywhere in the literature and the overall 
impression is that the refusal to countenance independent instrument 
unconscionability is somewhat reactionary. 
It has not been settled why a demand-right exists in the contract only for the 
purposes of setting it aside for fraud, and not for any other purpose. If the demand-
right exists in the contract, as this author postulates, then it must also be 
susceptible to other remedies, such as those for acting unconscionably or (in civil 
law jurisdictions) failing to act in good faith. 45 The courts in Singapore, Australia, 
and Malaysia have recognised this, albeit without explaining the doctrinal 
underpinnings for it as detailed in Chapter Six.  
This thesis acknowledges that this view is contrary to independent instrument law 
and practice to date. However this thesis maintains that the law is – and must be – 
a living, evolving entity. A failure to grow and adapt is ultimately self-destructive 
and the accommodation of unconscionability and good faith is necessary to meet 
the changing demands of the market.  
It is also argued herein that the reason the courts in many jurisdictions have failed 
to allow bad faith and unconscionability as a means to restrain the demand-right is 
that it has not been argued within a logical framework.  
Finally, it is argued in this thesis that the term “unconscionability exception” is a 
misnomer where the restraint is laid against the demand-right, as opposed to the 
honour-obligation. Restraining the demand-right, it is posited herein, reinforces the 
independence of the instrument by refusing to interdict the legal obligation of the 
issuer to honour a complying presentation. 
                                                     
44  Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington  [1996] AC 669: “A person who takes property by means of fraud will have 
dealt unconscionably with it”.  Cited in A Hudson, Equity and Trusts  (E-Books Corporation, 8th ed, 2015) 
[Pt.4.12.1.1]. 
45  For a detailed discussion on contractual good faith, see G Kuehne, 'Implied Obligations of Good Faith and 
Reasonableness in the Performance of Contracts' (2006) 33 University of Western Australia Law Review  63, 65. 
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Some courts have failed to recognise the difference, and some have gone so far 
as to say that they are one and the same thing. 46 With respect, this thesis will argue 
that this position fails to properly recognise the right which is being restrained and 
is not sustainable.  
Only where the obligation to honour is restrained does the court reach through the 
veil of autonomy and interfere with the independence of the undertaking – the 
abusive behaviour is generally within the underlying contract to which the issuer 
has no privity. This, in addition to the court’s reluctance to undermine the integrity 
of the instrument itself, must ultimately make the instrument more attractive to 
rational users. 
While fundamental to the overall argument in this thesis, the jurisprudential basis 
for unconscionability as grounds to restrain the demand-right is only a relatively 
small part. The courts in Singapore, Australia and Malaysia have determined that 
unconscionability can in appropriate cases be thus applied. It is the the lack o f a 
complete portrait of the character of this doctrine that this thesis seeks to address. 
The courts in those jurisdictions have applied unconscionability, and other 
jurisdictions have considered it. None have satisfactorily described it in any 
manner that comprises a fully-formed doctrine. 
Section E. Chapter Summary 
Chapter Two analyses and explains the independence principle – one the 
fundamental pillars of independent instrument law. Chapter Three examines the 
law of unconscionable conduct in equity and statute. From these, in conjunction 
with the independent instrument unconscionability case analyses in Chapters Four 
and Five, the necessary characteristics of ‘independent instrument unconscionable 
conduct’ can be extrapolated and framed in law in Chapter Six.  
Chapter Six consolidates the academic and the judicial analyses on the subject 
provided in Chapters Two through Five to propose a complete description of the 
Doctrine of Independent Instrument Unconscionability.  
                                                     
46  See discussion p.129. 
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Chapter 2. The Independence Principle – Context, 
Exceptions, Case Law and Legal Analysis 
Section A. The Independence Principle 
1.0 The Independence Principle in Context 
This chapter analyses and explains the terminology and application of the doctrine 
of independence. This process begins with study of the independence principle , its 
historical context and economic effect, and its character and scope in light of the 
extant academic analysis and judicial pronouncements.  
A complete table of rules pertaining to independence is provided.  
The ‘risk allocation’ purpose for independence is discussed in conjunction with a 
brief examination of the two other ‘exceptions’ to independence, fraud and 
illegality, for purposes of context and completeness. 
In conjunction with the studies on unconscionable conduct provided in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five, the scope of the doctrine of independence and its legal 
enforceability are examined in the face of abusive demands. 
1.1. Origins and Development of Independence 
The law of independent instruments evolved from the lex mercatoria or ‘merchant 
law’ which developed over centuries to facilitate international trade and to regulate 
cross-border disputes between traders. 47 With its foundations based in ancient 
Rome, where ius gentium “regulated the economic relations between foreigners 
and Roman citizens”, lex mercatoria evolved over centuries and has proven itself 
remarkably robust. Traces of an ancient lex mercatoria have been identified in the 
middle east.48 
Much trade law was developed in England during its ascendency as a world 
trading power in the mid-eighteenth century. London was for a time the world’s 
largest commercial and naval centre; its law literally “ruled the seas”. 49 Major 
clearing banks emerged in London,50 and the first global trading house, the East 
India Company, was quartered there during the three hundred years it dominated 
                                                     
47  McLaughlin, n29, 553. 
48  A Rodriguez, 'Lex Mercatoria' (2002) 2(2) Retsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift 46, 46. 
49  Reference to the British national air, “Rule, Britannia! ”.  
50  E Ellinger, Ellinger's Modern Banking Law  (Oxford Press, 5th ed, 2011), 5[2(i)].  
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global naval trade.51 Relatively large private organisations such as Lloyds of 
London also emerged in the United Kingdom to finance and insure cargo and 
ships, which fuelled economic growth and trade: 52 
With innovative responses from financial intermediaries and 
cooperation between the Treasury and the Bank of England a wider 
and deeper capital market developed in London to service the 
financial needs of agriculture, internal trade, and commerce 
overseas alongside the provision of credit and loans for the state. 53 
The lex mercatoria continues to develop internationally to address ongoing 
developments in trade, finance and technology. Contemporary examples of user-
defined trade law include the various rule sets governing independent instrument 
usage developed by such organisations as the ICC. 54 
However, trade rules per se are constrained as to enforcement. They rely on 
domestic law and judicial systems to decide and enforce dispute settlements. 
Corte notes: 
[T]he classical theory of the lex mercatoria as an autonomous 
system of law finds its own limits at the enforcement stage…(it) 
depend(s) upon national law, because at the moment of truth, 
legitimate enforcement remains a monopoly of the governments of 
nation states.55 
Enforcement aside, there has always been a demand for safe and reliable methods 
of monetary transfer. Bills of exchange and letters of credit arose early to deal with 
this,56 and demand guarantees were developed more recently to address new 
market needs.57 The associated usage rules were developed and refined over 
                                                     
51  E Erikson, Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The East India Company, 1600-1757 (Princeton University Press, 
2014), 31: “The period in which the English East India Company grew and expanded [stretched] roughly from 
1500 to somewhere between 1750 and 1800.”  
52  B Allen, 'Lloyd's of London' (1980) 22(5) Education+Training  152, 152. 
53  L Neal (ed), The Cambridge History of Capitalism: From Ancient Origins to 1848  (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), Ch.12; O'Brien, P., The Formation of States and Transitions to Modern Economies , 367. 
54  See Ch.1 Sect.C.2.0 above. 
55  C Corte, 'Lex Mercatoria, International Arbitration and Independent Guarantees' (2015) 3(4) Transnational Legal 
Theory 345, 347. 
56  J Bentley (ed), The Cambridge World History: The Construction of a Global World  (Cambridge University Press, 
2015), Ch.6, F. Trivellato, The Organisation of Trade In Europe and Asia, 1400-1800, 176. 
57  Trafalgar House Construction v General Surety and Guarantee Co [1996] 1 AC 199, 206, per Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle who also observed: “In recent years there has come into existence a creature described as an ‘on 
demand bond’ in terms which the creditor is entitled to be paid merely on making a demand for the amount of 
the bond.” 
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relatively long periods of time, including how these instruments would interface 
with other elements of the transaction to which they relate.  
As a means to deal with fraud in arm’s-length transactions, financial instruments 
assuring payment were separated in principle from the contracts of sale; the 
principal was fundamentally reliant on honest brokers to make payment to a named 
beneficiary strictly on the basis of agreed-to documents. The system also relied on 
a strong, impartial judicial environment capable of enforcing contractual 
agreements. 
Merchants developed the independence principle and it has merged with the 
growing body of recognised rules comprising modern lex mercatoria through 
mention in multiple rule sets and court opinions. Carr explains: 
Although UCP600 is not law, and cannot of itself mandate the 
independence of a letter of credit absent law, with regard to 
independence it does reflect the law merchant. Under modern 
commercial law, virtually all legal systems give effect to the 
independent character of the letter of credit. 58 
Ultimately various trading instruments such as Bills of Exchange (which are also 
independent59), in company with their associated usage rules, became so widely 
used that codification became essential. 60  
The ‘independence’ of letters of credit and demand guarantees “is a cardinal 
principle in letter of credit law” 61 but needs to be avoided for the court to ensure the 
benefit does not flow to satisfy an abusive demand. Courts globally have 
contributed to the general understanding of the scope of the independence 
principle and in particular, framed the circumstances where the principle can be 
avoided. With respect to the integrity of the independence principle, the court 
ought to restrain the beneficiary from making a demand and not interfere with the 
bank’s obligation to pay. 62 This is partly to maintain market confidence in the 
instruments themselves and partly for public policy reasons.  
                                                     
58  J Byrne, UCP600 - An Analytical Commentary  (IIBLP, 2010), 296. 
59  I Carr, International Trade Law  (Routledge-Cavendish, 4th ed, 2010), 464: “The bill of exchange is an 
autonomous contract and is not affected by breach in the underlying contract”.  
60  Bills of Exchange Act (UK) 1882; Bills of Exchange Act (Cth) 1909; UCC-Revd.5, §3-302. 
61  Boral Formwork and Scaffolding v Action Makers Ltd [2003] NSWSC 713 [22] (Boral (No.2)): “an essential 
characteristic of a letter of credit that it is an autonomous contract ”. Also Wunnicke, n30, 20. 
62  See discussion with respect to lifting the veil of autonomy and the  parties restrained at p.129. 
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Ortego states that “[t]he rule of the independence of a letter of credit from the 
underlying transaction is based on two public policy considerations”:  
First, given that in the absence of privity, issuers have no control 
over the formation or content of the underlying contract, and 
therefore have no cause to assume any liability for its performance.  
Second, that the value of documentary credits to trade facilitation 
would be degraded if issuers were required to “look beyond the 
credit’s specific terms to [any] underlying contractual controversy”. 63 
Reliance on these public policy positions underpins the fortitude of the 
independence principle. 
The independence principle also has a very practical effect – it “gives the letter of 
credit its unique qualities as a swift, certain, flexible and economically efficient 
payment mechanism and contributes to its widespread acceptance in the 
international marketplace.” 64 
This economic efficiency, in addition to the reduction of risk 65 afforded by 
independence, makes these instruments more attractive to rational users in the 
market.66 For these reasons, courts are reluctant to interfere with the sanctity of 
financial instrument independence. 
There are however exceptions where the Court has seen fit to disregard instrument 
autonomy. The exceptions include fraud, illegality, and most recently 
unconscionability. The remainder of this chapter explains and defines the 
independence principle and its exceptions through the lens of academic and 
judicial reasoning. 
  
                                                     
63  J Ortego, and E Krinick, 'Letters of Credit: Benefits and Drawbacks of the Independence Principle' (1998) 115 
Banking Law Journal 487, 488. Research reveals no evidence to support this contenti on. 
64  McLaughlin, n29, 501. Emphasis added. 
65  To the beneficiary at least.  
66  McLaughlin, n29, 503. 
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2.0 Nomenclature of ‘Independence’ and ‘Autonomy’  
Within the documentary credit world, as with the law generally, adherence to 
specific terminology is often inconsistently applied in the courts and in the 
literature. The ‘Independence Principle’ is occasionally referred to as a ‘Doctrine of 
Independence’. The term ‘independence’ is often interchanged with ‘autonomy’, 
especially in academic literature. 67 
Of further concern is the use, oft-times by judges, of the term ‘unconditional’ to 
mean ‘independent’ when referring to the nature of the independent instrument. 68 
Kozolchyk points out: 
The bank's undertaking in an irrevocable letter of credit...may not be 
considered as an "unconditional promise in writing" since it is 
conditioned upon the presentation of documents or on the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of certain events. 69 
These examples are intermingled with terminological confusion regarding the 
appropriate appellation for the instruments themselves, as discussed above. 70 
‘Independence’ and ‘autonomy’, in the context of documentary credits and other 
independent instruments, refers to the character of the legal relationship between 
the obligations undertaken by the issuer and all other contractual relationships 
entered into between any parties related to that transaction, or any other 
transactional relationship: 
A transaction is independent if that transaction is abstracted from 
the transactions that gave rise to it so that the LC obligation is not 
linked to the performance of undertakings that may have given rise 
to it.71 
‘Independence’ in independent instrument terms means that the instrument is 
independent of the rights and obligations of the parties in all other relationships. 72 
                                                     
67  For example: R Garcia, 'The Autonomy Principle of Letters of Credit' (2010) 3(1) Mexican Law Review  67 or  
V Panicker, 'Autonomy, Unconscionability and Entitlement in the Operation of Performance Bonds in Australia' 
(2009) 25(4) Building and Construction Law Journal  230. See also Ellinger, n14, 138. 
68  For example Olex (No.1), n38, 389-390. The use of ‘unconditional’ stems from the fact that demands against 
independent guarantees are not ‘conditioned’ upon any requirement to demonstrate a breach of contract , a debt 
or other financial obligation, or damage. They are conditioned upon, at very least, the making of a demand.  
69  Kozolchyk, n29, 414. 
70  Chapter 1, Section B1.0, Terminology. 
71  Byrne, n58, 296. 
72  McLaughlin, n29, 503. 
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Much of the language of ‘independence’ is provided from the international rule sets 
under which many independent instruments are issued. 73 The language of 
independent instruments is the language of the user community and not the 
product of any particular court, jurisdiction, or organ of state. 74  
Both courts and academics often rely on the definitions and commentary provided 
in the rules sets for usage and clarity of meaning when discussing aspects of 
independence.75 
2.1. The Veil of Autonomy 
This thesis coins the term “Veil of Autonomy” 76 to describe the character of the 
legal fiction that exists between two interlinked legal positions or sets of legal 
obligations.77  
The fiction holds that where the instrument is independent, the Court is required to 
maintain a policy of non-interference with these obligations unless an established 
exception applies. 
When discussing the fictional legal firewall between agreements which include an 
independent instrument, the term ‘veil of autonomy’ is used throughout to describe 
it. 
  
                                                     
73  See the Table of Rules p.39. 
74  The committees and working groups who develop these rules sets are staffed on a pro bono basis by legal, 
logistics, insurance, and banking business exponents.  
75  Wunnicke, n30, 8-9. 
76  The term resonates with the well -known “corporate veil” metaphor, especially regarding the necessity for the 
Court to ‘lift’ or ‘pierce’ the veil to ascertain the factual matrix surrounding a demand alleged to be 
unconscionable (or otherwise).  
77  This contributes to the argument about whether independent instruments are in fact ‘contracts’. The obligation 
undertaken by an issuing bank cannot be objectively described as an ‘agreement’ given that the beneficiary 
makes no contribution to the terms of the undertaking nor does he adopt any obligations/duties. If the terms of 
the instrument itself are not compliant with the requirements set out in the terms of the underlying contract, the 
breach of contract would ground a refusal to perform it. Damages in contract might follow. However, this is 
speculative and flies in the face of both commercial reality and the fundamental power positions of the parties.  
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3.0 Theoretical Foundations for the Independence Principle 
“The notion of independence is at the heart of the modern letter of credit.” 78 The 
doctrine of independence for letters of credit and demand guarantees is a legal 
shield developed “to give to a seller the assurance that as long as he presented 
conforming documents, he would be paid”. 79 The effect of the recognised 
exceptions80 to the independence of these instruments is to prevent the shield 
being used as a sword in the form of abusive demands that take illicit advantage 
of the protection this principle affords the beneficiary. 81 
Much effort has gone into examining the general legal nature of let ters of credit 
and independent instruments82 to inform the market on how best to frame sound 
rule sets and control systems. Some of this analysis examines the two doctrinal 
pillars that underpin the law of independent instruments – the Doctrine of 
Independence and the Doctrine of Strict Compliance. 83 
The independence principle “plays a central role in letter of credit analysis” 84 and 
the “separation of the letter of credit from the sale transaction [is] regarded as 
sacrosanct”.85  Davidson refers to the princip le as the “backbone” of letters of 
credit,86 describing it as “fundamental, critical and essential to the operation of 
letters of credit and independent guarantees.” 87  
The courts agree. The US Bankruptcy Court in Texas for example held that “[l]etter 
of credit financing will cease to be a viable component of finance world-wide 
unless the independence principle is preserved.” 88 
McLaughlin suggests that, as a “specialty contract”, independent instruments are 
subject to bespoke rules and “[c]hief among these special rules is the so-called 
‘independence principle.’” 89 In a broad empirical study, he provides and analyses 
                                                     
78  J Byrne, 'The Four Stages in the Electrification of Letters of Credit' (2012) 3(2) Journal of International 
Commercial Law 253, 278[fn71]. 
79  Ellinger, n14, 138. 
80  Fraud, abuse, illegality and unconscionable conduct are all recognised to one extent or another.  
81  G Wells, 'The Doctrine of Unconscionability: A Sword As Well As A Shield' (1977) 29 Baylor Law Review  309, 
309: “The courts of equity have long recognised the doctrine of unconscionability as a ‘shield’ to prevent 
enforcement of a grossly unfair and unreasonable contract.”  
82  For example: Ellinger, n14; or Kozolchyk, n29. 
83  B Kozolchyk, 'Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document Checker' (1990) 56 Brooklyn Law Review  45. 
Also Carr, n59, 474-482. Strict compliance is not dealt with here.  
84  Boyd v Sachs 153 B.R. 510 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993), 515. 
85  Carr, n59, 476. 
86  A Davidson, A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of the Development of the Principle of Autonomy in the 
Neoteric Letter of Credit Transaction  (Doctoral Thesis, University of Queensland, 2002), 96. 
87  Davidson, n86, 143. Original hyperbole.  
88  In Re Originala Petroleum Corporation  (1984) 39 BR 1003 (Bankr ND Tex), 1008. 
89  G McLaughlin, 'Letters of Credit and Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the Independence Principle' (1989) 49 Ohio 
State Law Journal 1197, 1197. 
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twenty-three different letter of credit transactions, describing the different party 
transaction relationships, in order to demonstrate why independence is “so critical 
to the utility of the letter of credit in both the commercial and financial market 
places.”90 He describes the nature of the independence principle as “intra -
transactional”, meaning that the principle:  
separates the letter of credit obligation only from the other 
contracts and arrangements that are part of the one overall 
commercial or financial transaction. 91 
The corollary of this is that independence does not extend to any transaction or 
contract “outside its ‘intra-transactional’ boundaries”, ie any dispute “unrelated to 
the letter of credit”.92  
A strict enforcement of the separation of the independent instrument from the 
underlying contract is that once an independent instrument is issued:  
[i]t is not open to anyone (including the buyer) to argue that there 
has been a breach of the underlying contract of sale, and hence, 
deny the seller payment.93 
The most widely recognised exception to this rule is where there is fraud in the 
documents. In some jurisdictions, fraud in the contract will  also ground an order for 
non-payment.94 The UK and US courts also have different standards of proof for 
fraud with the former having a very narrow fraud exception and the latter allowing 
temporary restraining orders for a strong suspicion of fraud. 95 
The fundamental purpose of the independence principle with respect to trade 
finance instruments is to provide a legal demarcation between the underlying 
contract entered into between the applicant and the beneficiary, and the 
contracted-for instrument itself. This ensures that disputes between the contracting 
parties do not affect the inherent obligation on the issuer to honour the obligation, 
given a complying demand/presentation. 96  
                                                     
90  McLaughlin, n29, 528. 
91  Ibid 506. Emphasis added. 
92  Ibid 502-528. 
93  J Chua, Law of International Trade: Cross Border Commercial Transactions  (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed, 2009), 
535. 
94  J Browne, 'The Fraud Exception To Standby Letters of Credit In Australia: Does It Embrace Statutory 
Unconscionability?' (1999) 11(1) Bond Law Review  98, 101. The fraud exception is developed more fully below.  
95  C Murray, D Holloway and D Timson-Hunt (ed), Schmitthoff's Export Trade - The Law and Practice of 
International Trade (Sweet and Maxwell, 12th ed, 2013), 241[11-044,fn295]. 
96  Carr, n59, 477-478. 
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In the US, the Courts have made clear that it views the independence principle as 
essential to trade security, stating: 
It would be a calamity to the business world if for every breach of a 
contract between buyer and seller a party may come into a court of 
equity and enjoin payment on drafts drawn upon a letter of credit 
issued by a bank which owed no duty to the buyer in respect of the 
breach.97 
The independence principle developed in response to a need to:  
➢ ensure both parties to the underlying transaction are fully aware of 
where the transaction risk agreed to by the parties is allocated and 
that this allocation will be preserved in the case of a contractual 
dispute;98 and  
➢ insulate this mutually agreed-to allocation of risk from allegations by 
contractual disputants.99 
However, Carr is of the opinion that the independence principle does not provide 
equal rights to the parties. She points out: 
The principle of autonomy favours the banks…and the seller. Banks 
are not placed under an obligation to ensure that the cargo 
corresponds to the contract description. Risk is on the buyer, 
because he cannot involve the issuing bank to police [sic] the 
seller’s activities in the exporting country. 100 
Denning MR described a letter of credit as being “like a bill of exchange” 101 with 
respect to the independence of the obligation to pay from the underlying contract. 
The autonomy of independent instruments does reflect the autonomy in Bills of 
Exchange and other negotiable instruments – again, they’ve both been described 
as “specialty contracts” and this is therefore unsurprising. 102  
                                                     
97  Frey Son, Inc. v Sherburne Co.  (1920) 193 App. Div. 849 (N.Y. App. Div.), 854. 
98  J Dolan, 'Tethering the Fraud Inquiry in Letter of Credit Law' (2006) 21(3) Banking Finance Law Review 479, 
480. 
99  Ellinger, n14, 356: “The purpose of the principle [of autonomy] is to insulate the paym ent system from the 
transaction, rather than the other way around.” Also Originala, n88, 1007: “The independence principle 
preserves the allocation of risk to the issuing bank by requiring the issuing bank to h onor a draw request 
notwithstanding a dispute between the customer and the beneficiary as to an alleged breach of the underlying 
contract.” 
100  Carr, n59, 445. 
101  Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait  [1981] 1 WLR 1233, 398(II). 
102  McLaughlin, n29, 501-503. 
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In practice, the independence principle is given substance by the constraint on 
issuers to deal only with documents and not to concern themselves with the terms 
of, or disputes concerning, the underlying contract. 103 This operational restraint is 
also an element of the veil of autonomy that protects the beneficiary. However, the 
Court’s dealings with the independence principle is fraught with difficulty, 
circularity, and inherent contradiction. 
To begin, the independent nature of these instruments requires the issuer to 
honour a demand pursuant to a complying presentation and without reference to 
other matters.104 Contrary to this, applications for injunctions to restrain payment 
require the Court to analyse for example, the construction of the underlying 
contract, or conduct in relation to its terms, in order to ascertain whether the 
character of the demand itself or any beneficiary conduct during contract 
performance should ground restraint.  
A court may have to consider terms relating to the “central transaction” itself, 105 
terms relating to the demand process,106 or conduct in relation to either. Either way, 
any analysis of terms or behaviour confounds independence because a strict 
application of the independence principle provides that a complying presentation 
on an independent instrument must be met without reference to any other thing. 
Ergo, the inherent contradiction. 
While not expressly addressing this contradiction, McLaughlin explains the effect 
of the principle in practice. He first notes that the issuance of an independent 
instrument depends on the existence of a condition precedent within a contract or 
other arrangement. Typically an independent instrument’s existence is a condition 
precedent to the operation of an underlying contract. 107 Therefore in such cases the 
beneficiary of the obligation under the independent instrument that arises upon 
issue108 must be formally advised before any obligations under the contract of sale 
can arise. One acts a priori to the other. 
                                                     
103  Ademuni-Odeke, Law of International Trade  (Blackstone, 1999), 285. 
104  Issuers refer to their client’s instructions; the rule set under which it is issued (if  any); and international standard 
banking practice rules. 
105  For example Min Thai, n591, where a force majeure clause was held to operate.  
106  For example Asplenium(No.2), n212, where the parties had contractually agreed not to avail themselves of the 
unconscionability exception.  
107  McLaughlin, n29, 505. It is possible to construct a scenario where there is no underlying contract. For example 
where a party has an independent instrument issued to a beneficiary as a demonstration of good faith but in the 
absence of any underlying undertaking on the part of the beneficiary. Also demand guarantees are regularly 
issued between parent and subsidiary companies without a formal underlying contract: K Sindberg, 03 August, 
2017 correspondence with this author.  
108  UCP600 [Art.7(b)]: An issuing bank is irrevocably bound to honour as of the time it issues the credit.  
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McLaughlin explains: 
Once the letter of credit obligation becomes enforceable against the 
issuer, the independence principle in a sense "cuts the credit loose" 
from these prior enabling arrangements…"[A] letter of credit is 
traditionally an instrument of commerce that travels with no baggage 
except that which is acquired by its terms."109 
This is especially important with regard to developing an understanding 
independent instrument unconscionability. 
Byrne has expressed serious reservations about some court’s understanding of the 
independence principle.110 In a similar vein, he also expressed the view that “[s]ome 
courts, however, turn LCs into mush by treating LC rights and obligations like 
those under ordinary contracts or suretyship arrangements.” 111 
The independence principle not only acts to separate the obligation under the 
independent instrument from all other transactions, but also facilitates the 
operability of other fundamental elements of the rules that apply. For example, it is 
the efficacy of autonomy that enables banks to meet their obligations as to 
document examination and strict compliance within relatively tight time frames. 112 If 
banks were required to enquire further than the face of the documents presented 
under a demand, it would likely be impossible to meet any five banking-day113 or 
seven business-day114 examination limit, with the possible result that the issuer 
would be precluded from asserting any non-compliance.115 This efficiency dividend 
provides an economic benefit to the issuer with the knock-on effect that the 
instruments are less expensive to use. 
Independent instruments are arguably a unique type of arrangement and required 
specialised rules to manage the various obligations and rights among the parties. 
McLaughlin, while discussing the scope and limitations of the doctrine of 
independence, states: 
                                                     
109  McLaughlin, n29, 505. The case referred to: In Re Air Conditioning 72 B.R. 657 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Under UCP600 
[Art.7(b)] the obligation becomes enforceable immediately upon issue.  
110  J Byrne, 'Why Judges Should Keep Their Consciences Out of LC Fraud Issues' ( 2009) (April) Documentary 
Credit World 20. 
111  J Byrne, and C Byrnes (ed), Institute of International Banking Law & Practice Annual Survey  (Institute of 
International Banking Law & Practice, 1999), 35. Also Rickett, n329. 
112  McLaughlin, n29, 527. 
113  Inter alia, UCP600 [Art.14(b)]. 
114  Ibid [Art.16(f)]; UCC-Revd.5 §5-108(b). 
115  The ‘preclusion’ rule is provided inter alia in ISP98 [Art.5.03(a)]. 
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Exploring the boundaries of the independence principle requires not 
only careful statutory and rule analysis but attention to mercantile 
policies as well. One must always keep in mind that the 
independence principle is a rule of specialty contracts and grew out 
of the lex mercatoria.116 
In summary, the independence principle is a fundamental element to the function 
and strength of independent instruments. It enables swift and sure payment, and is 
economically rational. Once issued, the obligation rests with the issuer and the 
underlying contract no longer impinges on that obligation.  
4.0 Legal Regimes Grounding the Independence Principle  
As stated, the independence principle arose from the lex mercatoria  or ‘customary 
law’. Analogous to the law of equity itself, lex mercatoria has over time developed 
sophisticated sets of rules that are on an equal footing to other purpose-developed 
rule sets within national legal systems. 117  
However, over time the rules of practice have, to differing extents, been formalised 
and in some jurisdictions, legislated. Mandatory provisions have been enacted in 
the US and two rule sets have been decreed by the Chinese Supreme People’s 
Court.118 
Discussing historical trade usage of independent instruments, Corte states:  
[D]ue to practical, economic and political reasons, some of these 
terms, practices and usages of trade have become virtually 
universal…Due to their importance, and with a view to imbuing them 
with more certainty, these usages of trade have been collected and 
written, and to a certain extent codified and ‘positivised’, by 
international organisations of traders, such as, quintessentially, the 
International Chamber of Commerce.119 
In the process of ‘positivising’ the usage rules relating to ‘specialty 
contracts’, the independence principle has by necessity been formally 
                                                     
116  McLaughlin, n29, 553. 
117  Corte, n55, 351-355. 
118  Byrne, n4, 303. Within the Chinese LC economy, the UCP is “the norm in both law and practice.”  
119  Corte, n55, 356. 
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defined and explained in a number of legal ‘regimes’, 120 including those 
promulgated and endorsed by the ICC. 
These regimes are the jurisprudential footings for the principle and are drawn from 
independent instrument law internationally. 
The most significant ‘regimes’ 121 are: 
1. Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) 
2. Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
3. International Standby Practices (ISP98) 
4. United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby 
Letters of Credit (UN-CIGSLC) 
5. Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG758) 
In addition, of critical importance to global trade, in 2002 and subsequently in 2005 
the independence principle was recognised within Chinese law:  
6. Rules of the Supreme People’s Court of China  
The following legal regimes also support the Principle: 
❖ The Common Law122 
❖ The General Law123 
❖ Uniform Rules for Bank Payment Obligations (URBPO) 124 
❖ Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees (URCG) 125 
❖ Uniform Rules for Bank-to-Bank Reimbursements Under Documentary 
Credits (URR)126 
❖ United States Comptroller of Currency Interpretive Letter §7.106 127 
 
                                                     
120  Davidson, n86 discusses the regimes in his unpublished doctoral dissertation.  
121  The specific rules/articles relevant to the independence principle in these five ‘regimes’ are analysed in §5.0. 
below. 
122  This is with reference to the international legal systems which recognise the principle of stare decisis, such as 
members of the British Commonwealth, the United States and Canada.  They generally also have an equity 
jurisdiction. 
123  This refers to all legal systems not included under the ‘common law’ classification.  
124  Uniform Rules for Bank Payment Obligations  (URBPO), section 6(a): “A  BPO is separate and independent from 
the sale or other contract on which the underlying trade transaction may be based.” 
125  Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees (URCG325). Replaced by URDG458 but provided here for completeness. 
126  Uniform Rules for Bank-to-Bank Reimbursements under Documentary Credits  (URR725) [Art.3] which provides 
for independence between “a reimbursement authorization…[and]…the credit to which it refers”.  
127  Davidson has indicated that he does not agree with Dolan that this constitutes a separate regime as it fails to 
provide any additional authority other than that provided under the laws and rules al ready in place. Listed for the 
sake of completeness. See J Dolan, 'Weakening the Letter of Credit Product: The New Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits' (1994) 2 International Business Law Journal  149 [fn50]. 
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5.0 The Independence Principle in Documentary Credit Rule Sets 
A review and analysis of the independence principle in the most widely referred -to 
rule sets follows. 
5.1. Independence in Documentary Credit Rule Sets 
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5.2. Summary – Independence in Independent Instrument Rules Sets 
From the above independent instrument governance it’s clear autonomy is so 
fundamental that every major rule set incorporates reference to it. The 
independence principle makes these instruments functional and contributes to their 
unique commercial character in the world of international trade finance.  
6.0 Case Law on Independent Instrument Independence 
The disengagement of the obligations and rights under independent instruments, 
allows the parties to predetermine the allocation of risk in the event of dispute.128 To 
protect this contractual freedom as a matter of public policy, the principle requires 
judicial recognition and strict enforcement. 
Courts globally have provided this – “[t]he number of cases applying the 
independence principle is legion”. 129 The lex mercatoria-developed independence 
principle as it applies to letters of credit and demand guarantees has long been a 
widely-accepted principle of law. 130 The application of the principle is nuanced 
however, with independent instruments enjoying different degrees of strictness in 
enforcement.131 
The independence principle has a powerful pedigree. It has been addressed and 
affirmed in the world’s highest courts. It  is universally recognised in practice.  
As Mugasha notes:  
[T]he ethos among some judges seems to be moving away from 
applying strict commercial doctrine, which is the cornerstone of 
mercantile specialities such as letters of credit, towards enforcing 
broad standards of conduct which appeal to public perceptions of 
fairness and justice.132 
 
                                                     
128  R Johns, and M Blodgett, 'Fairness at the Expense of Commercial Certainty: The International Emergence of 
Unconscionability and Illegality as Exceptions to the Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Bank 
Guarantees' (2011) 31 Northern Illinois University Law Review  297, 306. 
129  Wunnicke, n30, 20[§2.7]. 
130  It is beyond the scope of this paper to do more than note a few relevant cases in the jurisdictions of Australia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, the UK, and the US. 
131  JBE (No.2), n19 [10]. Also K Loi, 'Two Decades of Restraining Unconscionable Calls On Performance Guarantees - 
From Royal Design to JBE Properties' (2011) 23 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  504, 505[II.2]. See 
discussion p.249. 
132  A Mugasha, 'Enjoining The Beneficiary's Claim On A Letter Of Credit Or Bank Guarantee' (2004) 1 Journal of 
Business Law 515 
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In the 1941 seminal US letter of credit fraud case, Sztejn, Shientag J stated: 
It is well established that a letter of credit is independent of the 
primary contract of sale between the buyer and the seller. The 
issuing bank agrees to pay upon presentation of documents, not 
goods. This rule is necessary to preserve the efficiency of the letter 
of credit as an instrument for the financing of trade. 133 
The independence principle was also specifically addressed in 1958 by the British 
Court of Appeal in Hamzeh.134 Jenkins LJ stated the Court’s view that a confirmed 
documentary credit: 
imposes upon the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective 
of any dispute there may be between the parties.135 
The Court’s view is quite clear from the outset that no contractual dispute  between 
the applicant and beneficiary is a considered variable for the issuer when 
determining whether to meet a complying demand. In the US, Smith  J held in 
Venizelos that "[t]he letter of credit constitutes the sole contract of the bank with 
the seller and is completely independent of the other contracts." 136 
In another seminal independent instrument case, Edward Owen Engineering, 
Browne LJ stated: 
It is well established that in the case of a confirmed irrevocable 
credit in respect of a contract for the sale of goods the confirming 
bank is not in any way concerned with disputes between the buyers 
and the sellers under the contract of sale which underlies the 
credit.137 
In 1979 Barwick CJ stated in Wood Hall: 
[T]here is no basis whatever upon which the unconditional nature of 
the bank's promise to pay on demand can be qualified by reference 
to the terms of the contract between the contractor and the owner. 
Equally, there is no basis on which the owner's unqualified right at 
                                                     
133  Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corporation   (1941) 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631, 633. Emphasis added.  
134  Hamzeh Malas and Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127 (Hamzeh). 
135  Ibid Jenkins LJ [2]. 
136  Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank  425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir.1970) [8]. 
137  Edward Owen, n25, 172[G]. 
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any time to demand payment by the bank can be qualified by 
reference to the terms or purpose of that contract. 138 
This statement provides for an autonomy principle with two distinct branches: 
1. the duty of the issuer to pay; and  
2. the right of the beneficiary to make a demand.  
This point is important insofar as the application for injunctions is concerned, 
because either the duty to pay or the right to demand (or both) can be enjoined. 
For the integrity of the independence principle, the demand-right which, it is 
posited in this thesis, arises out of the underlying contract, must be restrained and 
the issuer’s duty to honour left undisturbed. 139  
This is supported in Mount Sophia where the Court of Appeal stated that 
sufficiently material unconscionable conduct warrants “an injunction restraining the 
beneficiary’s substantive rights.”140 
The parties in Wood Hall aided the Court by having the issuer include 
independence as a condition: 
In each of the performance guarantees there was an express 
provision that the liability of the Bank should not be discharged or 
impaired by reason of any variation or variations in any of the 
stipulations or provisions of the contract or things to be done under 
it.141 
In Power Curber, the UK Court of Appeal led by Denning MR stated: 
It is vital that every bank which issues a letter of credit should 
honour its obligations. The bank is in no way concerned with any 
dispute that the buyer may have with the seller. 142 
 
                                                     
138  Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority (1979) 24 ALR 385, 387 (Wood Hall). 
139  Olex (No.1), n38, 396: “[by] restraining the bank from honouring that [letter of credit] undertaking...at all frequently, 
the value of all irrevocable letters of credit and performance bonds and guarantees will be undermined. ” Also 
see the discussion on the difference between enjoining the beneficiary versus the issuer, commencing at p. 128. 
140  Mount Sophia, n39 [45]. 
141  Wood Hall, n138, 395. Typically today no mention of the underlying contract is made in the independent 
instrument. 
142  Power, n101, 398. 
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In the US meanwhile, the Court examined the state Uniform Commercial Code in 
Colorado National Bank. After quoting from the authorities that the “independence 
of the letter of credit from the underlying contract has been called the key to the 
commercial vitality of the letter of credit”,143 the Court held: 
The letter of credit is essentially a contract between the issuer and 
the beneficiary and is recognized by [UCC Art.5] as independent of 
the underlying contract between the customer and the 
beneficiary…In view of this independen t nature of the letter of credit 
engagement the issuer is under a duty to honor the drafts for 
payment which in fact conform with the terms of the credit without 
reference to their compliance with the terms of the underlying 
contract.144 
In the 1983 appeal to the House of Lords in United(No.4), Lord Diplock affirmed the 
independence principle when describing the letter of credit transaction cycle by 
stating that “[i]t is trite law that there are four autonomous though interconnected 
contractual relationships involved.”145  
Of these his Honour expanded on the relationship between the issuer and the 
beneficiary and the importance of independence, noting that “autonomy of the 
documentary credit…is its raison d’etre”.146 The Court held that the “seller's right to 
payment by the confirming bank…[was independent of]…the buyer's rights against 
the seller under the terms of the contract for the sale of goods.” 147 
In 1990 Singapore, Thean J in the earliest ‘unconscionability exception’ case in 
that jurisdiction, Royal Design, followed Edward Owen, quoting that "from the point 
of view of the bank the underlying contract is irrelevant and the bank's contract 
with the seller is independent of it".148 Five years later, also in Singapore, 
Karthigesu JA in Bocotra noted that from “a comprehensive and judicious survey of 
the relevant case law” that “four principles may be extracted” including that under 
                                                     
143  Colorado National Bank v Board of County Commissioners  634 P.2d 32 (1981) [CNB]. 
144  Section 4-5-114, Official Comment 1, C.R.S. 1973. Cited in CNB, n143, 37. N.B.: C.R.S. = Colorado Revised 
Statute. Emphasis added. 
145  United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada  [1983] 1 A.C. 168 HoL, United(No.4), 183. Emphasis added. 
146  Ibid 185. 
147  Ibid 185. 
148  Royal Design Studio Pte Ltd v Chang Development Pte Ltd  [1990] SLR 1116 [16] (Royal Design) citing Edward 
Owen, n25, 26. 
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“[t]he ‘autonomy’ principle — the guarantee constitutes a separate contract from 
the underlying transaction”. 149 
Despite the statements made in Colorado National Bank heard twelve years 
earlier,150 Wunnicke describes the independence principle in the US as 
“unequivocally confirmed, applied, and clearly set forth in Optopics Laboratories”.151  
The independence of letters of credit under UCP500 Art.3 was confirmed in 
Montrod.152 The Court acknowledged autonomy as set down in those rules, holding 
that the issuer was obliged to make payment when the documents presented were 
compliant “on their face”153 irrespective of any other consideration. Potter LJ, 
following the finding in United(No.4), stated that Lord Diplock had in that matter 
“resoundingly affirmed the autonomous nature” of letters of credit  in relation to the 
underlying contract.154 
In the US in 2010, independence was held to survive bankruptcy of the applicant. 
In BankPlus,155 the issuer of the letter of credit refused to honour a complying 
presentation on the basis that their customer had filed for bankruptcy 156 and there 
was no likelihood that the issuer would be able to collect the funds owing.  
The Court relied on UCC Art.5, UCP600,157 and relevant case law to find that the 
obligation held by the issuer to the beneficiary was independent of any other 
matter, including the account holder’s bankruptcy:  
Insofar as letters of credit embody obligations between the issuer 
and beneficiary, such contractual rights and duties are entirely 
separate from the debtor's estate. 158 
Finally, as explained below, 159 in Boustead(No.1) the Court held that autonomy 
applied to a ‘Facilities Agreement’ between the Plaintiff and  his bank and 
subsequently extended along a chain of transactions which included guarantees 
and counter-guarantees: 
                                                     
149  Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd v A-G (No.2) [1995] 2 SGCA 51 [33(a)-(d)] (Bocotra). 
150  CNBD, n143. 
151  Optopics Laboratories Corp. v Savannah Bank of Nigeria 816 F.Supp. 898 (SDNY, 1993). Wunnicke, n30, 21. 
152  Montrod, n286 [22]. 
153  Ibid [37]. 
154  Ibid [45]. 
155  US Bank National Association v BankPlus (2010) WL 1416505 (S.D.Ala., 2010) (BankPlus). 
156  Ibid 7[IV.A]. 
157  [Art.15]. 
158  BankPlus, n155, 8[IV.A]. 
159  See discussion in Arab Banking Corporation v Boustead Singapore Ltd  [2016] SGCA 26 (Boustead (No.2)) p.180: 
“Applying the unconscionability exception to financial services agreements was a  considerable widening of its 
scope.” 
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The principle of autonomy posits that the underlying contract...is 
independent from the guarantee. The guarantee is, in turn, 
independent from the counter-guarantee...The corollary of the 
principle of autonomy is...that the issuer is concerned with 
documents and not external facts. This means that the guarantor or 
counter-guarantor pays against and only against a demand for 
payment accompanied by the presentation of specified 
documents…Apart from the conformity of the demand or documents, 
the guarantor or counter-guarantor is not concerned with the truth or 
accuracy of the statements contained within those documents. 160 
The case law demonstrably favours a resilient independence principle, holding 
that, with few exceptions, the obligation to pay is strict and autonomous from 
consideration of any other matter. 
Note on ‘The Status Quo” 
Courts, when explaining their decision to allow an ex parte injunction to stand, 
sometimes declare themselves to be maintaining the ‘status quo’. 161 The ‘status 
quo’ to which the parties contractually agreed is actually one where, in the case of 
dispute and in the absence of fraud, the issuer’s obligation to pay is absolu te upon 
receipt of a complying presentation. 162 
  
                                                     
160  Boustead Singapore Ltd v Arab Banking Corporation [2015] SGHC 63 (Boustead (No.1)) [52-53]. 
161  See Olex (No.3) discussion p.191. 
162  Note that the ‘status quo’ has wrongly been held to be the maintenance of the interlocutory injunction, which in 
fact breaches the status quo as represented in the rights afforded under the terms of the independent 
instrument. 
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7.0 Risk Allocation: The Practical Effect of the Independence Principle  
The allocation of risk provided by the autonomy principle 163 creates risk asymmetry 
in favour of the beneficiary, with the potential to facilitate abusive demands.164 As 
noted in Boral(No.2), independent instruments are “to protect the beneficiary from 
carrying credit risk during the course of a dispute”. 165 
The fewer documents of evidence that are required to constitute a complying 
presentation, the easier it may be for a beneficiary to make an abusive demand. 
While there is no empirical evidence available to suggest that this procedural ease 
significantly increases the likelihood of abusive demands, it is a reasonable 
proposition to make. Documentary credits for which a complying presentation 
requires only a simple demand with no additional documentation 166 are particularly 
at risk.167 
The Court in Singapore has repeatedly expressed concern about abusive 
demands, stating in GHL: “It should not be forgotten that a performance bond can 
be used as an oppressive instrument".168 It is in part to offset the risk of such 
oppressive behaviour that the Court in that jurisdiction developed the 
unconscionability exception to independence. 169 
Recognising this risk, the Court in Sumatec(No.3) stated: 
[T]he certainty of payment to the beneficiary under the autonomy 
principle has tipped the balance of risk heavily in favour of the 
beneficiary, sometimes resulting in inequitable result to the account 
party whilst achieving the desired commercial result. 170 
  
                                                     
163  Originala, n88, 1007: “The independence principle preserves the allocation of risk to the issuing bank by 
requiring the issuing bank to honor a draw request notwithstanding a dispute between the customer and the 
beneficiary as to an alleged breach of the underlying contract. ” 
164  Y Zhang, 'Documentary Letter of Credit Fraud Risk Management' (2012) 19(4) Journal of Financial Crime 343, 
344: “This instrument has two fundamental principles: the autonomy or independence principle and the doctrine 
of strict compliance. Such principles intending to  facilitate international transactions make L/C easy to be 
abused by fraudsters.” 
165  Boral (No.2), n61 [36]. 
166  Sometimes referred to as a ‘clean credit’ or ‘suicide credit’: Wunnicke, n30, 18. 
167  As Loi, n131, points out: “An employer who makes a call on the contractor's performance guarantee exerts 
enormous financial pressure on the contractor; calls, if abused, may be extremely oppressive. ” 
168  GHL, n21, [20]. 
169  T Rodrigo, 'Unconscionable Demands Under On-Demand Guarantees - A Case of Wrongful Exploitation' (2012) 
33 Adelaide Law Review  481, 484. 
170  Sumatec Engineering and Construction v Malaysian Refining Company [2012] 3 CLJ 401, 414[20] 
(Sumatec (No.3)). 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 48 of 270 
 
However, in defence, Johns and Blodgett assert: 
Despite this asymmetry in protection, the independence principle 
preserves the utility of these instruments by reducing payment and 
delivery risks to levels the parties nevertheless find acceptable.171 
The asymmetry in the risk allocation 172 is in part a reflection of the power 
asymmetry extant between transacting parties in almost every commercial 
transaction173 – it is relatively unusual for parties to have equal leverage in a 
bargain. The power imbalance in turn reflects the capacity of one party to offset 
their own risk relative to that of their trading partner through introduction of 
contractual terms such as those requiring provision of an independent instrument. 174 
Independent instruments in their various guises, while theoretically acting as a 
cash equivalent or to secure against breach or consequent damage, do not 
necessarily require proof that either has been suffered for a demand to be 
complying. 
However, if the instrument requires that the beneficiary make a statement to that 
effect, and it can later be proved that the beneficiary knew it was not true when it 
was made, a case of fraud can be made out more easily against that person. 175 
It is this very attribute, the ‘Veil of Autonomy’, that makes demand guarantees 
more attractive to rational users. 
Risk-laden transactions for the sale of goods, notably in international trade, are 
often facilitated by ‘commercial’ letters of credit .176 These are honoured on 
presentation of a complying document portfolio typically involving documents that 
verify and authenticate delivery, transport, and contractual performance. As a 
result these particular instruments have a far more balanced risk symmetry than 
                                                     
171  Johns, n128, 307. 
172  J Rindt, and S Mouzas, 'Exercising Power in Asymmetric Relationships: The Use of Private Rules' (2015) 48 
Industrial Marketing Management  202, 202: “[A]symmetric business relationships are those relationships where 
there is an imbalance of power between the counterparts...In asymmetric business relationships, the stronger 
party is likely to be able to dominate and exercise power over the conclusion of contracts and, thereby 
determine the processes and outcomes of the relationship". 
173  Burleigh Forest Estate Management v Cigna Insurance Australia [1992] 2 Qd R 54, 59: "Performance 
bonds...are really a risk distributing device agreed upon by the principal contracting parties."  
174  K Cowan, A Paswan, and E Steenburg, 'When Inter-firm Relationship Benefits Mitigate Power Asymmetry' 
(2015) 48 Industrial Marketing Management  140, 143: “…the more powerful, dominant firm takes on the 
leadership role to manage and distribute risks and benefits, ei ther equitably or opportunistically.” Also at 140: 
“[P]ower asymmetry and unequal distribution of benefits are a fact of ongoing inter -firm relationships”. 
175  Enonchong, n22, 89: “if the beneficiary makes such a statement know ing that those conditions have not been 
satisfied the false statement may amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation and therefore the fraud exception 
may apply." 
176  See Kozolchyk, n29, 398-400 for an exposition on the development of commercial letters of credit.  
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 49 of 270 
 
demand guarantees. The power to insist on an irrevocable commercial letter of 
credit is given to the seller.177 
In the construction industry, the use of independent instruments, particularly 
‘performance bonds’, ‘financial guarantees’, and also ‘standby letters of credit’ 
(essentially identical to ‘demand guarantees’ in Europe and other jurisdictions 178) is 
commonplace and has “a long and well-established history”179 as an offset to 
transaction risk.180 
These instruments serve to indicate the intention of the contracting parties (at 
formation) as to which of the parties have elected to carry the transactional risk in 
the event of a contractual dispute. 
Fundamental to risk mitigation is the engagement under contract of a third -party 
issuer (usually a bank) to ensure that the appropriate party 181 is paid once a 
compliant demand for payment has been presented. 182 
With demand guarantees, the developer or owner has the power to insert the 
condition precedent into the underlying contract requiring the contractor to accept 
a significant amount of the project risk. The contractor does so in order to compete 
for the work. It is not unknown however for sub-contracting builders in return to 
negotiate provision of a ‘financial performance guarantee’ from owner-developers 
to ensure payment undertakings are met. 
Where the power imbalance is less pronounced between the parties, it might be 
possible for the account party to have the instrument issued as actionable on 
documentary proof of default or have an express negative stipulation in the 
underlying contract making any demand on the guarantee subject to proof of an 
unmet obligation.183 These would not be independent instruments. 
                                                     
177  Wunnicke, n30, §3.7. 
178  Enonchong, n22, 83[fn3]: “The on demand bond is also known as a performance bond, performance guarantee, 
demand guarantee, first demand guarantee or independent guarantee. ” Also Wunnicke, n30, 39§2.14. 
179  D Barru, 'How To Guarantee Contractor Performance on International Construction Projects' (2005) 37 George 
Washington International Law Review  51, 61-62. 
180  Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (2008) 249 ALR 458 (Clough(No.4)), 494: “The wide 
purpose of the performance bank guarantees and their character [is] an allocation of risk and a provisio n of 
security to their holder”.  
181  This might be the beneficiary of the instrument or the confirming bank or a nominated bank.  
182  UCP600 [Art.2]: “Complying presentation means a presentation that is in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the credit, the applicable provisions of these rules and  international standard banking practice. ” 
[Art.15]: “When an issuing bank determines that a presentation is complying, it must honour. ” 
183  For example Boral (No.2), n61 [14]: The Standby LC provided by Boral , who was obliged to pay by cash transfer, 
held a negative stipulation stating that payment against the LC would only take place after "demand for 
payment...has been made by the beneficiary on Boral...and such demand has remained unsatisfied."  This 
proved influential on the outcome. 
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To offset the inequity that arises from independent instrument risk asymmetry, 
exceptions to independence have developed in a few jurisdictions that enable the 
Court to lift the veil of autonomy. The fraud exception has long been recognised 184 
but exceptions for illegality, abuse, and unconscionable conduct have also 
developed. 
It is to be expected that a doctrine grounded on matters as amorphous 185 and 
subjective as the character of behaviours that constitute unconscionable conduct 
will become extraordinarily complex. 
New applications to commercial transactions for this doctrine are being attempted 
in many jurisdictions 186 and “is an emerging preoccupation of the judiciary in the 
common law world”. 187 For beneficiaries, the risk of a disputed call being restrained 
for unconscionability is one that they must accommodate. 
The related pool of subject material is vast, complex and often contradictory or 
uncertain, especially where jurisdictional issues arise. Many attempts have been 
made, with some success, to categorise and rationalise the various findings of 
unconscionable conduct in case law to build a consistent legal framework around 
the vexatious and litigious issue of fairness in commerce.188 
From an understanding of the judicial policies behind the law of unconscionable 
conduct, it can be extrapolated that the unconscionability exception is a necessary 
by-product of risk management.189 The need to mitigate abusive demands on 
independent instruments lodged behind the protective veil of autonomy arises to 
give traction to those policies. 190  
Courts deal with transactional disputes that carry a diverse range of risks, and 
seek to ensure as far as possible that the allocation of risk remains as the parties 
contracted for. Risk fluctuates relative to the context in which transactions are 
conducted. 
For example, the jurisdiction element of the transaction affects a transaction’s risk 
profile – international trade is far more risk-rich than domestic trade in developed 
                                                     
184  Since at least 1765: see p.56.  
185  JK Integrated v 50 Robinson Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 57 [23] (JKI): “An amorphous concept…difficult to define.”  
186 M Kelly-Louw, 'Limiting Exceptions to the Autonomy Principle of Demand Guarantees and Letters of Credit' in 
Visser & Pretorius (ed), Essays in Honour of Frans Malan: Former Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal  (2014) 
197, 216. 
187  Parkinson, ‘Notion of Unconscionability’, in Vout, n15, 107. 
188  See Chapter 3B-1.4, ‘Categorising Unconscionable Conduct’ below.  
189  Johns, n128, 297-98. 
190  GHL, n21 [24]. 
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economies; trade transactions with certain individual jurisdictions also carry a 
higher risk profile than with others. 191 
Among the inherent risks of trade are those arising from the applicable law itself – 
the enforcement of contract and property rights for example –  and risks that arise 
from both jurisdictional recognition of specific legal principles and the conflict of 
laws that arises between jurisdictions.192 
Wunnicke notes some of the risks that independent instruments cannot always 
mitigate: 
1. Country of Issuer risk; 
2. Force Majeure risk; 
3. Issuer Insolvency risk; 
4. Issuer Reputation risk; 
5. Authenticity risk; 
6. Location risk; 
7. Document-related risk.193 
In order to successfully appraise risk exposure and to formulate mitigat ion 
strategies, lawyers must be fully cognizant of the nuance and difference in law and 
the effect of these on the risk profile of a particular transaction in a particular 
jurisdiction.194 
The business community finds it unsettling when breaches in uniformity arise 
where the law was thought well settled. 195 This state also affects practitioners who 
struggle to provide advice in such circumstances. 196 The development of the 
unconscionability exception to the independence principle was such a breach and 
now needs judicial clarity.  
 
                                                     
191  F Niepmann, T Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014) International Trade, Risk and the Role of Banks  (CESifo Working 
Paper No.4761) <www.CESifo-group.org/wpT>, 2-4. 
192  C Wallace, Legal Control of the Multinational Enterprise  (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 4-5. 
193  Wunnicke, n30, 4-5. 
194  S Gopalan, 'Transnational Commercial Law: The Way Forward' (2003) 18(4) American University International 
Law Review 803, 805-807. 
195  Y Zhang, 'Documentary Letters of Credit Fraud Exception Rules: A Comparative Study of English Law and 
Chinese Law' (2015) 30(4) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 210, 211: “It is widely 
acknowledged that a good commercial law shall be able to facilitate commerce and provide certainty and 
predictability for the commercial community.”  
196  A Mason, 'Foreward to "Contract: Death or Transfiguration?"' (1989) 12 UNSW Law Journal 1. 
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Concern as to whether the exception is deleterious to the efficacy of independent 
instruments has been widely expressed. 197 Much debate remains as to its actual 
effect in the market. Garcia points out that “practitioners argue that the disputes 
arising from L/Cs are very sporadic since the good faith and reliability of the 
parties play a distinctive role.” 198 
It is moot that transactional risk can never be entirely eliminated – at best it can 
only be limited in scope or effect. It is also wel l understood that risk increases as 
the number of variables affecting the transaction increases. It is reasonable then to 
suggest that any significant shifts in the law pertaining to a particular transaction 
introduces new variables and therefore new risk. The corollary of this premise is 
that greater understanding of any new variables will provide a greater 
understanding of any new risk the variable introduces.  
The fundamental purpose of independent instruments is to act to militate against 
performance risk in the underlying contract for the beneficiary. It broadly transfers 
that risk directly to the applicant in the form of the risk of an abusive demand. Yet 
the independence principle has been held to protect review of that underlying 
performance even in the face of unconscionable conduct allegations. Therefore,  an 
examination of the nature of any developing legal doctrine in relation to 
independent instruments is essential to developing an understanding of how that 
doctrine will affect the risk mitigation characteristics of the instrument itself. 
Risk mitigation can be found in virtually every aspect of business: ‘Director and 
Officer Liability Insurance’ provides against corporate malfeasance;199 credit default 
swaps were developed to hedge against the real isation of default risk in debt 
securities;200 and independent instruments201 are designed to alleviate the 
transaction risk emergent between trading parties who may fail to perform their 
contractual obligations.202 
                                                     
197  See Wunnicke, n30, 158. 
198  Garcia, n67, 96. 
199  J Olsen, J Dickey, A Goodman, and G McPhee, 'Current Issues in Director and Officer Indemnificat ion and 
Insurance' (2013) 27(7) Insights: The Corporate & Securities Law Advisor  12. 
200  M Glantz, and R Kissell, Multi-Asset Risk Modelling - Techniques for a Global Economy  (Elsevier, 2014), 381: 
“The CDS model functions similarly to an insurance policy, with the swap buyer paying the swap seller a 
premium to protect against losses resulting from a defined credit event such as bankruptcy, reorganization, 
moratorium, payment default, or repudiation. ” 
201  The term "performance bond" in Singapore, when used in  the context of credit instruments utilised in 
construction transactions, refers to an independent instrument. However, in the USA, the term “performance 
bond” refers to an instrument that is dependent of the underlying contract.  
202  H Bennett, 'Performance Bonds and the Principle of Autonomy' (1994) Nov Journal of Business Law  574, 574[6]. 
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The genesis of a specific transactional risk need not be complex. It can arise from 
a simple lack of confidence between the parties due to an absence of trading 
history or as a result of political or fiscal tensions within or between trading 
nations. The absence of an historical trading relationship creates the traditional 
problem of sellers who do not trust buyers to pay in full and on time, and buyers 
who cannot afford to trust sellers to provide the goods or services contracted for.  
To resolve this historical impasse, the risk of loss must be limited to an acceptable 
level203 and this can be effectively achieved by use of an independent mechanism 
through which the interests of each party can be adequately protected. 204 
The inherent value of independent instruments rests upon how confident the ‘user 
community’ is that the obligation to pay will be respected by the ‘issuer community’ 
and the judiciary alike. A failure by either body to recognise the independence of 
such instruments from their underlying contracts can only result in a deterioration 
in the efficacy of the instrument itself.205 
Presentation of a demand may be procedurally proper, ie it meets the terms of the 
instrument, but yet not be substantively proper inasmuch that the basis for the 
demand is not grounded in law and therefore that payment would result in the 
unjust enrichment of the beneficiary. Should this arise, the aggrieved party will 
usually attempt to obtain a temporary injunction or interdict, often ex parte, against 
either the issuer making payment or the beneficiary making a demand for payment, 
or both. 
It follows that if the plaintiff is initially successful, a full judicial hearing will 
eventuate to determine whether the injunction(s) should stand or be set aside. For 
this reason, such hearings may be determined subject to the law of injunctions,206 
not independent instruments, and are therefore lost for the purposes of examining 
exceptions to autonomy. 
However, the central point is the judicial respect for the autonomy of independent 
instruments from the underlying transaction. Quite often issuers who are joined in 
actions linked to substantively improper behaviour refrain from presenting a 
                                                     
203  Johns, n128, 307. 
204  E Guttman, 'Bank Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit: Moving Toward a Uniform Approach' (1990) 56(1) 
Brooklyn Law Review 167 at 168. 
205  Enonchong, n22, 94 “Demand Guarantees Will Lose Their Commercial Utility”.  
206  A Barclay, 'Court orders against payment under first demand guarantee used in international trade' (1989) 4(3) 
Journal of International Banking Law  110, 120. 
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judicial position to the Court other than a willingness to accede to the decision of 
the Court, once advised.207  
Logically, the value of the credit instrument as a means to mitigate risk is 
necessarily and positively correlated to the belief held by the beneficiary that (a) 
the independent third party is free of the control of the applicant and (b) judicial 
enforcement of the independence of the instrument is assured. 
Until relatively recently, the issuance of injunctions to stop payment on an 
independent instrument was predicated on fraud. 208 However, in Singapore 
particularly, the idea of ‘unconscionab le conduct’ as grounds to restrain a payment 
guarantee had, until more recently, the legal traction to potentially concern 
business users and the academic community.209 Davidson’s prediction in 2012 that 
it was “doubtful the decision would be followed outside [the] three jurisdictions” of 
Singapore, Malaysia and Australia210 appears to have been well-founded as the 
unconscionability exception has been either ignored or defeated 211 elsewhere. 
Furthermore, as shall be seen in Asplenium(No.2),212 the exception has in fact been 
weakened by the Singapore Court of Appeal and may no longer be a significant 
contributor to beneficiary transactional risk.  
  
                                                     
207  Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Company Ltd [1997] HCATrans 74 (Olex (No.3)), 74: For example, where the 
Court was advised that “the second respondent [Hong Kong Bank of Australia] does not wish to be represented 
at the hearing of the application for special leave to appeal and will submit to any order of the Court save as to 
costs.” This is the ordinary position of issuers in such proceedings.  
208  X Gao, and R Buckley, 'The Development Of The Fraud Rule In LC Law' (2002 ) 23(4) University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law  663. 
209  Johns, n128, 317: “Unconscionability and illegality damage the independence principle, in particular, and 
commercial certainty, in general”.  
210  A Davidson, 'Unconscionability in Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantee Transactions' (2012) 1(2) 
International Journal of Technology Policy and Law  183, 16. 
211  TTI Team Telecom v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd  [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 914. 
212  CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land Pte Ltd [2015] SGCA 24 (Asplenium(No.2)). 
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Section B. Exceptions to Independence: Fraud and Illegality 
1.0 Fraud in Brief 
As with all transactions between parties, the fraud exceptions 213 
ex turpi causa non oritur actio214 and fraus omnia vitiat 215 both apply to letters of 
credit and other independent undertakings. Given the focus in this work on the 
unconscionability exception, the following brief discussion on fraud in the context 
of trade finance instruments is for contextual purposes.216 Fraud as a ground to 
obtain an injunction or to set aside a contractual obligation can arise as part of the 
formation and/or execution of the underlying agreement, or as part of the process 
of making a payment demand against a credit instrument.  
Where some contention lies is whether the fraud exception is limited to fraud in the 
documents presented as part of the demand for payment, or whether it extends to 
fraud in the underlying contract. 217 An example of the former might be a false 
description of the shipped goods on the Bill of Lading. Of the latter, a shipment of 
goods that indicates a fraudulent attempt to avoid contractual supply obligations 
but are not falsely described in the documents presented. 218 
Loi points out that “[m]uch ink has been spilt over what amounts to fraud in the 
context of letters of credit” 219 and this area of law continues to be a vibrant subject 
for discussion as new case law arises. 220 The UN-CIGSLC points out that 
“allegations of fraud have a tendency to arise when there is a dispute as to the 
performance of an underlying contractual obligation.”221 
The ‘fraud exception’ to the independence principle in independent instruments 
was widely seen as being established in contemporary jurisprudence in the 
“landmark”222 case Sztejn v Schroder Banking, which saw the beneficiary’s demand 
                                                     
213  R Lee, 'Strict Compliance and the Fraud Exception: Balancing the Interests of Mercantile Traders in the Modern 
Law of Documentary Credits' (2008) 5 Macquarie Journal of Business Law  137, 162[B]. 
214  United(No.4), n145, 184: “From a dishonourable cause an action does not arise. ” 
215  “Fraud vitiates everything.” 
216  For substantial analysis of documentary credit fraud law: Gao, n41; Gao & Buckley, n208; Davidson, n210, 4-6; 
Gao, n292; and Browne, n94. 
217  Wunnicke, n30, 161: “Proponents of a broader interpretation of the fraud exception have argued that what is 
meant by fraud in the transaction in §5-114(2) is fraud in the underlying transaction.”  
218  J McDonnell, and J Menzies, 'Undermining the Certainty of International Trade Finance' (2015)   
<http://www.kwm.com/en/au/knowledge/insights/undermining-the-certainty-of-international-trade-finance-
20151109>. 
219  Loi, n131, 512. 
220  W Baker, 'Qingdao Metals: Is It Fraud If No One is Being Defrauded?' (2015) Jul/Aug Documentary Credit World 
36. Also UNCITRAL Secretariat, Recognizing and Preventing Commercial Fraud: Indicators of Commercial 
Fraud (2014). 
221  Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the UN-CIGSLC (1995) [45]. 
222  United(No.4), n145, 183. 
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against a letter of credit restrained on the basis that the beneficiary presented 
documents in support of their claim for payment which fraudulently misrepresented 
the content of the actual goods delivered. 223 The issuing bank was alerted to the 
fraud prior to making payment against the demand. The Court held:  
[W]here the seller’s fraud has been called to the bank’s attention 
before the drafts and documents have been presented for payment, 
the principle of the independence of the bank’s obligation under the 
letter of credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous 
seller.224 
The issue of independent instrument fraud was addressed by the English court as 
early as 1765.225 In the modern era, fraud was mentioned by the English court in 
1958 by Sellers LJ who noted in relation to the Court’s jurisdiction that “ the court 
would exercise jurisdiction…in a case where there is a fraudulent transaction .”226 In 
1977, this was affirmed in Edward Owen Engineering where the Court of Appeal 
held: 
[A] performance bond stood on a similar footing to a letter of credit 
and a bank giving such a guarantee must honour it according to its 
terms unless it had notice of clear fraud…The only exception is 
when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice.227 
The following year, in the first of four hearings, the British Court considered an 
allegation of fraud in United Merchants228 but distinguished the authorities on the 
facts. However, in doing so Diplock LJ held: 
The exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to 
avail himself of the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio or, if plain English is to be preferred, "fraud 
unravels all." The courts will not allow their process to be used by a 
dishonest person to carry out a fraud. 229 
                                                     
223  Sztejn, n133, 632. 
224  Ibid 634. 
225  Pillans v Van Mierop [1765] 97 Eng Rep 1035: “If there was any kind of fraud in this transaction, the collusion 
and mala fides would have vacated the contract.” 
226  Hamzeh, n134, 128. 
227  Edward Owen, n25, 171[A-B]. 
228  United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada  [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 267 (United(Nos.1~4)). 
229  United(No.4), n145, 184. With respect, a direct translation would be “No action arises from an unworthy cause”.  
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Earlier, the Privy Council in Gian Singh found that where a bank, in good faith, 
pays against fraudulent documents that for all purposes appeared to constitute a 
complying presentation, that bank is entitled to reimbursement from the applicant 
notwithstanding the fraud: 
[T]he fact that it [the bank] failed to detect that a document was a 
forgery did not prevent it from recovering from its customer. 230 
The bench in the English Supreme Court of Appeal in  Banco Santander looked at 
the effect of independence when fraud was detected – and the issuing bank 
alerted – after presentation of complying documents and confirmation of 
compliance, but before payment was due under a deferred payment obligation. 
Meanwhile, the confirming bank had negotiated and paid the Credit before the 
fraud was detected. 
The Court of first instance found that under the UCP500 “[t]he basic authority 
given by the Issuing Bank to the Confirming Bank in a deferred payment letter of 
credit is to pay at maturity”.231 This was affirmed on appeal.232 Subsequently the 
UCP600 removed the effect of this ruling.233 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales in Inflatable Toy followed the English 
authorities regarding fraud. While positing that United(No.4)234 was too narrow in one 
unstated sense, Young J held that “the concept of fraud must not be narrowly 
constrained.”235 The underlying question was whether documents that were 
technically incorrect to the knowledge of the applicant could be relied on as 
sufficiently fraudulent to ground an injunction to restrain payment.  
His Honour took a more nuanced approach, holding that he could not find the 
beneficiary’s uttering of the documents to be “a case of clear fraud” as the parties 
“were not too fussed that the documents might be contrary to what was actually 
happening, they both knew what the commercial reality was and were prepared to 
accept it.”236 
                                                     
230  Gian Singh & Co. Ltd v Banque de l’Indochine  [1974] 1 WLR 1234, 1235. 
231  Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd   [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 18 [Conclusions]. 
232  Banco Santander SA v Banque Paribas  [2000] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 776. 
233  [Art.7(c)]: An issuing bank undertakes to reimburse a nominated bank that has honoured or negotiated a 
complying presentation and forwarded the documents to the issuing bank. Reimbursement for the amount of a 
complying presentation under a credit available by acceptance or deferred payment is due at maturity, whether 
or not the nominated bank prepaid or purchased before maturity. Also Arts.8(c)&12(b). 
234  United(No.4), n145. 
235  Inflatable Toy Company Pty Ltd v State Bank of NSW (1994) 34 NSWLR 243, 251 (Inflatable Toy). Emphasis 
added. 
236  Ibid 252. 
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Courts have widely held that a mere suspicion or allegation of fraud by the bank is 
not a sufficient basis for the withholding of payment.237 The fraud must be evident 
and sufficiently egregious to ground relief.238 
Lee argues however that the fraud exception to the independence principle is no 
‘exception’ at all: 
As the credit deals with the documents that would be subject to the 
alleged fraud, there is no need to venture outside the four corners of 
the credit and violate the autonomy principle in order to reject 
fraudulent documents. The fraud “exception” is really no more than 
the expression of the bank’s general legal duty not to be part of any 
fraud on the applicant that it has knowledge thereof. 239 
This argument proposes that the bank carries a duty of care to its applicant -client 
to protect them from known fraud,240 which is a duty that overwhelms any other. 
Whether the fraud ‘exception’ to the independence principle operates as is 
generally thought or in fact constitutes an entirely different obligation separate 
from consideration of the principle is arguable. However, the capacity to allege 
fraud-in-the-documents as a means to restrain the benefit of the instrument has 
been recognised across multiple jurisdictions. 
Aitken says of fraud in this domain: 
The exception of obtaining injunctive relief by invoking "fraud" is a 
narrow one – it is difficult to make out on the facts, and at the level  
of balance of convenience an injunction against the financial 
institution to restrain it from paying on the obligation will likely be 
refused.241 
  
                                                     
237  Society of Lloyd’s v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce  [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 579, 581. 
238  Dolan, n98, 486. 
239  Lee, n213, 163. 
240  For example: Corporations Act  2001 (Cth), Part 2D.1, Div.1.Gen.Duties, sections 180-190. See A Herzberg, and 
H Anderson, 'Stepping Stones - From Corporate Fault to Director's Personal Civil Liability' (2012) 40(2) Federal 
Law Review 181 
241  L Aitken, 'The "fraud" exception, and other good reasons not to pay on a letter of credit or performance bond' 
(2014) 30(10) Australian Banking & Finance Law Bulletin  1 [Conclusion]. The assumption that the court is likely 
to restrain payment by the bank is difficult to understand as almost invariably, it is the beneficiary who is 
restrained from making a demand and thereby not to disturb the independence principle.  
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2.0 Illegality in Brief 
Enonchong states that “the illegality exception has the same juristic basis as the 
fraud exception”.242 In many cases where illegality has been discussed, the spectre 
of fraud has been closely examined as well. 243 The case law for this exception is 
sometimes conflicting244 and where the exception has been broached before 
English courts, the law as to the exception remains, to some extent, inconclusive. 245 
Illegality has also been canvassed by the court in Singapore, 246 Hong Kong,247 and 
Canada.248 
None of the rule sets governing letters of credit and demand guarantees addresses 
illegality directly. ISP98 specifically provides that “defences to honour based on 
fraud, abuse or similar matters…are left to the applicable law.” 249 The degree of 
illegality that will render the documentary credit void must ultimately be decided on 
the facts. 
In the US, Barnes has stated that “[t]he illegality defence is potentially more 
troublesome than the fraud defence” and expounds extensively on the very 
deliberate process of revising the UCC §5.0 in a manner that declines to 
countenance such an “extraordinary defence”. 250 Elsewhere he states: 
U.S. banks recognize an “illegality” defense where a court or 
government agency with appropriate jurisdiction orders dishonor of 
an LC obligation, but not on the basis of mere declarations of 
illegality in the underlying transaction. 251 
 
                                                     
242  N Enonchong, 'The Autonomy Principle of Letters of Credit: An Illegality Exception?' (2006)  Lloyd's Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly  404, 405. 
243  Similarly, academic discussions invariably include commentary on fraud and its relationship to illegality. This 
discussion is beyond the purview of this paper.  
244  For example, the lower and upper Court decisions in Mahonia, n265 & n258 leave much unsaid and some clearly 
unresolved questions with regard to what was decided.  
245  Enonchong, n242, 405, who states that despite the Court rulings to date, the response from the Court of Appeal 
has not been “authoritative” and points to similar misgivings in practitioner texts.  
246  Sinotani Pacific v Agricultural Bank of China  [1999] 4 SLR 34 (CA). 
247  Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA v Bank of China  [2004] HKCU 666. 
248  Standard Trust Co v Bank of Nova Scotia  (2001) NFCA 27 and Meridian Developments Inc v Toronto Dominion 
Bank (1984) 32 Alta LR (2d) 150. 
249  Rule 1.05(c). 
250  J Barnes, ''Illegality' as Excusing Dishonour of LC Obligations' (2005) 11(1) DCInsight republished in the IIBLP 
Annual 2006 Survey, n251, 23-24. 
251  J Barnes, and J Byrne, 'Survey of US Letter of Credit Case Law: 2004' in J Byrne (ed), 2006 Annual Survey of 
Letter of Credit Law and Practice  (International Institute of Banking Law and Practice, Inc., 2006) 19, referring 
to Mahonia(No.2), n258. 
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McLaughlin states that illegality as an exception to independence “has not yet 
been explicitly recognized in the United States.” 252 McDonnell also notes: 
In North America, the prevailing view is that no illegality exception 
exists...In Canada, courts have emphasised that LCs are not tainted 
by illegality in the underlying transaction. 253 
However the English courts have signalled a willingness to allow illegality “as a 
defence to a payment of a letter of credit obligation” 254 should the factual matrix 
favour such an outcome.255 
There are several possible scenarios 256 that would give rise to a general ‘illegality 
exception’ including: 
❖ whether the underlying contract is illegal through fraudulent 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure or a similar ground; 
❖ whether an otherwise lawful letter of credit issued pursuant to an 
illegal contract is thereby “tainted by illegality” 257 and therefore 
unenforceable.258 
Also possible, the underlying contract may be legal but the letter of credit may 
contain terms providing for payment under unlawful conditions or for an illegal 
purpose, such as breaching international trade sanctions, and therefore be 
unenforceable.259 
To complicate matters further, there are also jurisdictional issues to contend with. 
The contract may fall under one jurisdiction while the independent instrument falls 
under another – a determination of illegality and any cross-contamination will be 
relevant to the jurisdiction. 260 It may be that the terms of an independent instrument 
                                                     
252  McLaughlin, n89, 1197. 
253  McDonnell, n218, “The Illegality Exception”.  
254  Barnes, n251, 19. 
255  Examples include: Mahonia (No.2), n258; Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain  [1999] QB 674 (CA); 
Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd [1958] AC 301. 
256  Enonchong, n242, 406. 
257  Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1156 (Group Josi). 
258  Mahonia Ltd v JPMorgan Chase Bank [2004] EWHC 1938, 428 (Mahonia (No.2)): “the doctrine of taint could be 
seen to apply inasmuch as the L/C is analogous to a form of security for the performance of ENAC’s obligations 
and there is a stream of authority...where the courts have refused to enforce security given for an illegal 
contract.” 
259  Note: these scenarios are not concerned with whether the demand on a credit might be illegal for fraud; there is 
abundant case law to assist with determining such a situation.  
260  For example, graft and corruption is normalised behaviour in many jurisdictions but is statutory criminal 
behaviour in others. 
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provide for payment that breaches law within a particular jurisdiction but the 
contract giving rise to that obligation is lawful in its own jurisdiction. 261 
UN-CIGSLC also arguably makes provision for an illegality exception. A cross-
reading of Article 19 which deals with ‘Exception to payment obligation’, and 
Article 20(3) would suggest as much.  
Art.19(1)(c) provides that the issuer has a right to refuse payment where the 
demand has “no conceivable basis”, such as where “the underlying obligation…has 
been declared invalid by a court or tribunal”. Art.20(3) provides that the “use of the 
undertaking for a criminal purpose” empowers the Court to issue an order to 
withhold payment.262 Hence, a criminal purpose, being an ‘illegal’ one, is sufficient 
to restrain the receipt of any benefit from the independent instrument.  
The jurisprudential core of the illegality exception lies with the accepted difficulty 
of proving ‘egregious’ fraud.263 Where a contract is made unenforceable through its 
own illegality (being for the trade in illicit narcotics for example) then anything 
dependent on that contract is also unenforceable. 264  
The reasoning holds that there being no contract, no benefit can be drawn by any 
person from that contract. 265 However, McLaughlin reasons that the independence 
principle “cuts the credit loose” and therefore illegality in the underlying contract 
does not affect the payment obligation. 266 
It may be that, as has been suggested regarding fraud, 267 the bank simply owes a 
duty of care to its shareholders and other stakeholders not to facilitate illegal 
conduct of any kind, and this supersedes the independence principle.  
 
                                                     
261  C Hugo, and K Marxen, 'Documentary Credits and Demand Guarantees' (Paper presented at the Annual Banking 
Law Update, South Africa, 2013) state that it is “unlikely that a South African court will be willing to entertain a 
defence or injunction based on fraud or illegality in the underlying agreement, in circumstances where the fraud 
or illegality concerned must be established with reference to foreign law due to a choice -of-law clause.” 
262  Art.20(1) states that a court may “Issue a provisional o rder to the effect that the beneficiary does not receive 
payment”. This could mean either an order to restrain the beneficiary from making a demand or to restrain the 
issuer. 
263  B Kozolchyk, 'Drafting Commercial Practices and the Growth of Commercial Contr act Law' (2013) 30 Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparitive Law  423, [4-B]: "Only when the fraud perpetrated by the beneficiary is 
egregious enough to leave the banks with worthless paper are extraordinary or equitable remedies granted to 
the paying bank or its applicant, such as injunctions against payment". 
264  This effect on any dependent obligations that fall out a contract is widely accepted under the Civil Law of 
Obligations and is reflected in statute. Whether this principle extends to indepen dent instruments has not been 
tested in any significant case. 
265  Mahonia Ltd v JPMorgan Chase Bank [2003] EWHC 1927 (Mahonia(No.1)), [68]. 
266  McLaughlin, n29, 505. 
267  See discussion at p.58. 
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Enonchong argues “the illegality exception has the same juristic basis as the fraud 
exception [and] it should have a similar effect on the autonomy principle. ”268 Byrne 
however disagrees with this view, noting that “[t]he doctrinal source of illegality lies 
outside LC law, and illegality should be restricted in regards to its impact on LC 
independence.”269 
McLaughlin argues for illegality as an exception. He states that the fraud exception 
to the independence principle allows the Court to prevent a private injury from, for 
example, the supply of “worthless goods”. What follows, he argues, is:  
a fortiori, it should be permissible to breach the independence 
principle to prevent a serious public, as opposed to a serious private 
injury.270 
He cites the importation of dangerous drugs as an example of what might 
constitute a serious public injury. 
A contract that provides for a bank to transfer funds in breach of international 
monetary sanctions that prohibit fund transfers to a specific country 271 may be 
shown as illegal and unenforceable, with the result that the obligations in the 
underlying letter of credit may also be unenforceable. 272 It can be argued that this 
does not offend the independence principle – there is no lawful contract and 
therefore nothing exists from which the credit instrument can be found 
‘independent’. 
The ‘illegal’ behaviour required to ground a defence against the independence 
principle can be found in either the instrument itself and/or in the underlying 
contract.273 In either case an underlying purpose must be proven which shows that 
the payment obligation under the instrument is intended to be used as a means to 
circumvent the law or to promote some illegal purpose274 such that the Court is 
                                                     
268  Enonchong, n242, 411. 
269  Barnes, n251, 306[3]. 
270  McLaughlin, n29, 528. 
271  D Smith, 'Sanctions Disclaimers in Letters of  Credit' (2014) 5 Journal of International Commercial Law  2 
[II-A-iii]. 
272  Mahonia(No.1), n265, [10] where the issue for decision was “whether the principle that a letter of credit gave rise 
to an autonomous contract insulated from the underlying transaction in connection with which it was issued 
precludes the bank from declining to pay against presentation of a conforming document” . Note however that as 
a matter of public policy the Court in this case would not enforce the letter of credit where the underlying 
contract of sale was entered into for unlawful purposes in a foreign jurisdiction.  
273  Enonchong, n242 [406-II-A]. 
274  In United(No.4), n145, 169: “the contract of sale and purchase was a disguise for exchanging currencies and 
therefore that contract and the letter of credit were unenforceable ”. 
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compelled to restrain the payment obligation.275 Barnes however is not convinced, 
holding firm on the inviolability of the independence principle:  
Declarations that the underlying obligation is illegal and 
unenforceable will not do. In such cases, relief based on i llegality 
must be sought after the bank pays. 276 
It is possible for a letter of credit to be ‘legal’, ie issued in compliance with the law 
affecting independent instruments but “being used to carry out an illegal 
transaction” thereby rendering it unenforceab le.277  
In Group Josi,278 the applicant/plaintiff sought to have an injunction grounded on its 
own illegal behaviour,279 prompting  Staughton LJ to raise the question of whether 
“a letter of credit [can] be affected by illegality of the underlying transaction ”.280 His 
Honour found that while “illegality is a separate ground for non-payment under a 
letter of credit”281 the parties had not so acted in that case. 
For illegality to affect the independence principle:  
[T]here must be an illegality of such significance that for public 
policy and morality reasons, the letter of credit should not be paid in 
derogation of the independence principle. 282 
The illegality exception may still be evolving and Courts continue to test its 
boundaries,283 but one commentator argues that Group Josi acted to rule out 
illegality as an available defence, at least to reinsurers.284  
However, seven years after Group Josi the Court in Mahonia(No.1) held: 
If a beneficiary should as a matter of public policy (ex turpi causa) 
be precluded from utilising a letter of credit to benefit from his own 
fraud, it is hard to see why he should be permitted to use the courts 
                                                     
275  United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada  [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 604, United(No3),  633, where Griffiths LJ 
held that ‘when the issuer of a letter of credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in point of 
fact, false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognise such a document as complying with the terms of the 
letter of credit. ’. 
276  Barnes, n250, 24. 
277  J Reed, and R Enoch, 'Illegality Is No Longer A Defence' (1995) 3(12) International Insurance Law Review  436, 
436. 
278  Group Josi, n257. 
279  The plaintiff, Group Josi, alleged that it was not legally able to enter into reinsurance contracts under the 
Insurance Companies Act (Repealed)  1974 (UK) and therefore the letters of credit raised under those contracts 
were “tainted with illegality by reason of the illegality of the insurance contracts”: Reed, n277, 436. 
280  Group Josi, n257, 1159. 
281  Ibid 1163. 
282  Johns, n128, 330. Emphasis added. 
283  For example the South African case Dormell Properties v Renasa Insurance NNO  2011 (1) SA 70 (SCA). 
284  Reed, n277, 436. 
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to enforce part of an underlying transaction which would have been 
unenforceable on grounds of its illegality.285 
There has also been discussion as to whether from a public policy perspective 
there should be an illegality exception to autonomy outside of the fraud 
exception.286 
In the final analysis, the existence and development of an “illegality exception” 
remains uncertain with a considerable resistance in many jurisdictions to allowing 
behaviours in the underlying contract to penetrate the veil of autonomy.  
Section C. Summary of the Independence Principle and Exceptions 
The veil of autonomy which separates the underlying contracts from the 
independent instrument obligation has been tested in new and creative ways, 287 but 
has proved resilient. The veil of autonomy has largely been left intact by the courts 
as judges across all jurisdictions have consistently seen the perils of tampering 
with the agreed-to risk allocation embodied in the independence of the payment 
obligation.288 
Independence, as one of the elements that supports “the original allocation of 
transaction risk agreed to by the parties”, 289 assists with making the relevant trade 
instruments attractive to rational buyers.290 
Ellinger has posed the question whether a forum [court] “should apply the 
autonomy principle as a mandatory rule or fundamental public policy”. While 
suggesting that to do so might enhance the reputation of the forum in question “as 
an important centre for international trade”, he dismisses the idea on the basis 
that: 
(a) it is not an important enough principle; and 
                                                     
285  Mahonia(No.1), n265 [68] and Mahonia(No.2), n258. 
286  Enonchong, n242, 405-406 discusses whether the ‘illegality’ exception should go the way of the ‘nullity’ 
exception in British law which was declared untenable in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1954. 
287  See the decision to grant a new exception to autonomy in Dormell, n283 as described in Kelly-Louw, n300, 
204[III]. 
288  Dolan, n98, 485. 
289  Johns, n128, 306. 
290  B Horrigan, 'New Directions in How Legislators, Courts, and Legal Practitioners Approach Unconscionable 
Conduct and Good Faith' (2012)  Monash University Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013/38  
30 “What commercial parties seek to avoid is uncertainty or risk that cannot be priced or otherwise factored into 
contractual negotiations and drafting measures .” 
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(b) contracting parties have sufficient access to rule systems 
which provide for the independence principle. 291 
Fraud is the only widely agreed-to exception to independence, albeit with different 
standards applied across jurisdictions. 292 However, it is also argued that there is no 
‘exception’ where there is fraud. Regardless of where the fraud arises, the entire 
transaction is a nullity and therefore there is no contract upon which the 
independence principle can operate. 293  
One argument provides that the right to make a demand arises out of the 
underlying contract. If a fraud will set aside the contract either ab initio or from the 
time of the fraud, then the timing of the fraud event is highly relevant to whether 
the independent instrument was, at least, issued while the underlying contract was 
still on foot. 
This consideration then lends support for arguments for ‘procedural fraud’ and 
‘substantive fraud’.294 The former would be found in the corruption of the contract’s 
formation; the latter in its execution. Procedural fraud might arise from either 
knowingly deceitful or reckless misrepresentations being made during negotiations. 
Substantive fraud might be fraud in the underlying contract 295 or fraud in the 
documents comprising the presentation portfolio. Each occur at significantly 
different times and places, and can be complicated by fraud arising from third 
parties.296 
However, the reverse is true also. If the fraud is procedural and the contract is 
consequently void ab initio, then any financial instrument raised pursuant to that 
nullity contract ought not have a demand made against it. 297 
That is, if the demand-right arises out of the underlying contract then, where that 
contract has been voided at law, no demand-right ought to arise.298 The 
                                                     
291  Ellinger, n14, 356. 
292  X Gao, 'The Fraud Rule Under The U.N. Convention On Independent Guarantees And Standby Letters Of Credit' 
(2010) 1 Journal of International Commercial Law  48, 58. Also Enonchong, n242, 405. 
293  Lee, n239. There is also the question of procedural fraud and substantive fraud and whether the instrument was 
raised after or before the fraudulent event.  
294  These categorisations have not been mooted elsewhere and are suggested here after consultations with 
Dr A Davidson. Ellinger, n14, 142-143, discusses “Documentary Fraud versus Fraud in the Underlying Contract” 
but does not categorise them. The nature of each category mirrors t hat of ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ 
unconscionability, which are recognised categories of equitable fraud. See discussion in Chapter 3.B.1.2 below.  
295  Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] QB 84 (CA) (Themehelp). 
296  United(No.4), n145. 
297  See UN-CIGSLC [Art.19(2)(b)]. This has not been tested but is arguable. This is not to be confused with the 
‘Doctrine of Nullity’ that has been proposed but rejec ted by the Court in the UK: Montrod, n286. 
298  This clearly defies an independence principle that “cuts [the instrument] loose” from the underlying contract and 
to which no retrospectivity will apply.  
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independence principle is not offended nor is the bank’s obligation compromised 
because the bank has a primary duty of care to ensure that a fraudster does not 
benefit from their fraud. 
The difficulty that arises with this all-or-nothing approach is where there is partial 
or ‘immaterial’ fraud, ie where the fraud exists but is insufficiently material to 
restrain the benefit of the instrument. 299 
Illegality has been acknowledged by the Court in the United Kingdom but, given 
the paucity of case law, the exception has not as yet developed any guiding 
principles as to what constitutes ‘illegality’ and how far its scope extends in that 
jurisdiction. It is broadly resisted by academics and lawyers in most jurisdictions.  
The independence principle will always suffer stress from those who see its strict 
liability as an affront to ‘fairness’. As Kelly-Louw put the tension between the 
independence principle and the unjust enrichment of those who would game the 
system:  
[P]ublic-policy considerations in favour of the fraud and illegality 
exception require that in certain cases the principle of autonomy 
give way to the broader purpose of making sure that parties who 
engage in illegal or fraudulent transactions do not use the judicial 
process in furtherance of their unlawful or fraudulent purpose.300 
This reflects Enonchong’s view that it would not be wise for “ the [independence] 
principle [to] be allowed to become so rigid and inflexible that it undermines other 
important policy concerns of the law.”301 
Also in this vein, in Mahonia(No.1) Colman J held that it would “be wrong in principle 
to invest letters of credit with a rigid inflexibility in the face of strong countervailin g 
public policy considerations.” Again, the public policy under consideration (ex turpi 
causa) is whether a fraudster “should be precluded from utilising a letter of credit 
to benefit from his own fraud” 302 by allowing the fraudster’s right to make a demand 
hide behind the veil of autonomy. To this end the Court has consistently attempted 
to ensure that such is not the case. 
                                                     
299  Refer to Byrne, n4, p.247. The “Official Comment” to UCC-Revd.5, n11, §5-109 provides that “an insubstantial 
and immaterial breach of the underlying contract…would not justify an injunction.” A full examination of fraud in 
independent instruments is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
300  Kelly-Louw, n186, 216. 
301  Enonchong, n242, 405. 
302  Mahonia(No.1), n265 [68]. 
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McLaughlin argues for the extension of the independence principle, stating:  
Although by its own terms, the independence principle is not  
effective outside the one overall commercial or financial transaction 
that spawned it, still from a policy perspective, the independence 
principle should be extended to prevent applicants from seeking to 
block payment of the letter of credit by raising claims unrelated to 
the letter of credit.303 
The Courts have enforced recognised few exceptions to autonomy, and those few 
reluctantly and cautiously. They have generally taken a narrow view of the 
principle, even going so far as to disallow “the intervention of [an] applicant in 
proceedings between a beneficiary and a confirming bank.” 304 
Fraud is a well-established basis; illegality remains unsettled. It is however, 
unconscionable conduct with which this paper is concerned. 
The above analysis of the independence principle demonstrates the general points 
of consensus around it:  
❖ its integrity is essential to the product;  
❖ it is universally recognised by commercial parties, academia and the 
judiciary;  
❖ it is not absolute305 but transcends many fundamental contract law 
doctrine. 
In order to establish the legal basis for using unconscionable conduct as a ground 
to push aside the veil of autonomy, a full understanding is necessary on the history 
and character of the types of conduct being considered by the courts as 
‘unconscionable’ for that purpose. The next chapter will examine unconscionable 
conduct generally and proceed to identify the specific categories that may affect 
the independence of independent instruments. 
  
                                                     
303  McLaughlin, n29, 553. 
304  European Asian Bank AG v Punjab And Sind Bank [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 356 (CA) cited by Ellinger, n14, 
357[fn22]. 
305  It does not transcend the doctrine of fraud, for example. It is trite that independence is also subject to the 
Doctrine of Sovereignty and can be pierced under statute or in the course of acting pursuant to a statute.  
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This discussion will result in an understanding of  why certain categories of 
unconscionable conduct can reasonably be asserted to be sufficient to ground an 
injunction restraining a demand-right, and the common characteristics of those 
categories. Using that information, a jurisprudential framework to describe a 
category of unconscionable conduct specific to independent instruments can be 
described and founded.306 
  
                                                     
306  See Chapter 6, p.221. 
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Chapter 3. Unconscionable Conduct and The 
Unconscionability Exception 
Section A. Introduction to Unconscionable Conduct 
In conjunction with the dictates of the independence principle, the law dealing with 
unconscionability or unconscionable conduct must be examined to ascertain how a 
grant of relief can be grounded to restrain the benefit of an independent 
instrument. Equitable fraud, from which contemporary unconscionable conduct in 
part descends, has a long history and a broad ambit. 307 The elements and 
categories of unconscionable conduct have been widely studied and critiqued, and 
courts throughout the world have contributed to the understanding of the doctrines 
that have developed. 
In this thesis, a new category of unconscionable conduct specific to independent 
instruments is proposed and described. 308 The elements of this category of 
unconscionability are extrapolated from both the commentariat and the judicial 
pronouncements made in the resolution of disputes relating to these instruments. 
This chapter reviews the significant findings from the case law across multiple 
jurisdictions and draws out the fundamental elements to inform the description of 
independent instrument unconscionable conduct proposed in Chapter Six. 
The behaviour of commercial parties with respect to their contractual obligations 
can be fraudulent in the sense of tortious fraud or criminal fraud, or fraud in 
equity.309 Fraud in equity does not require the element of intent to be proved and 
“[m]any activities regarded as fraudulent were not done with an intention to cheat 
or deceive.”310 
The Court’s equitable jurisdiction extends to past acts done without “actual evil 
design or contrivance to perpetuate a positive fraud or injury” 311 and accounts for 
those actions that are unconscientious but lacking malice. Some independent 
                                                     
307  See generally: Vout, n15; and G Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts - Commentary and Materials  (Lawbook Co. - 
Thompson-Reuters, 5 ed, 2011), Pt.3. 
308  See Chapter 6, p.221. 
309  J Heydon, M Leeming, and P Turner, Equity - Doctrines and Remedies  (LexisNexus, 5th ed, 2015), Ch.12 for a 
full dissertation on the species of fraud. 
310  Heydon, n309, 435[12-005]. 
311  Heydon, n309, 435[12-005]. The authorities relating to unauthorised profits by fiduciaries is an example of 
“situations where there has been no conscious deception or sharp practice.” 
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instrument matters where demands were made with a bona fide belief that the 
demand-right could be exercised might be thus described. 312 
The law dealing with unconscionable conduct broadly is well understood, although 
it’s inter-relationship with commercial undertakings has not been settled in some 
respects. In particular, where unconscionable conduct impinges onto the law of 
independent instruments and challenges the independence of these instruments, 
the doctrinal basis for intervention becomes opaque .  
This chapter reviews the relevant law of unconscionable conduct with emphasis on 
independent instruments and, from that, develops a view on how the law of 
unconscionability affects the ‘independence’ of independent instruments. 
Specifically, Section B of this chapter limits its analysis to the fundamentals of 
common law unconscionable conduct, but also makes passing reference to the 
elements of American313 and English314 ‘good faith’ in commercial contracts.  
The relevant case law provides context, practical application and explanation of 
the principles.315 The associated principles of equity, contract law and the 
Australian statute are reviewed and contextualised within the broader legal 
framework of independent instrument law. It also looks at the elements of 
procedural and substantive unconscionability and how the timing of conduct can 
affect its applicability to allegations of unconscionability.  
Section C of this Chapter looks at the application of the doctrines of 
unconscionability to independent instruments (primarily in Singapore and Australia) 
and the lifting of the veil of autonomy. Referred to as the “unconscionability 
exception”, much criticism has been directed at this incursion of equity into the law 
of contract, and some confusion remains as to the scope and effect of the doctrine.  
This discussion also includes the application of the relevant statutory prohibitions. 
Finally, this chapter looks at whether there should be a special ‘category’ of 
unconscionable conduct that accommodates the unique milieu in which 
independent instruments operate. This requires consideration of how such an 
exception might be framed in law. This thesis supports an argument that posits 
the existence of a category of unconscionable conduct specific to 
                                                     
312  Renard Constructions v Minister for Public Works  (1992) 26 NSWLR 234, 275[D]. 
313  UCC-Revd.5, n11, §5-102(a)(7). 
314  See TTI Team, n211, 46[3]. 
315  See Ch’s.4&5 for full case analyses.  
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independent instruments that defines equitable intervention in Australia and 
Singapore.  
Also for discussion is the vexing contradiction that arises when the veil of 
autonomy must be lifted to consider whether the underlying issues support an 
allegation of unconscionable conduct – how a review of alleged behaviours does 
not constitute any determination of any issues that may arise. 316 How the Courts 
have dealt with this is discussed in advance of a review in Chapters Four and Five 
of the specific case authority where relief from unconscionable conduct has been 
sought in both Singapore 317 and Australia.318 
There is also the issue of how to accommodate and apply ‘substantive’ 
unconscionability, as opposed to procedural unconscionability, into commercial 
transactions.319 
It is discussed to the extent possible given the relative paucity of authority on the 
issue. Much of the case law appears to be a misapplication of procedural 
unconscionability principles to substantive issues. 
This discipline uses a range of vocabulary relating to the law and to the behaviours 
it governs. These include ‘equitable fraud’, ‘unconscionability’, ‘unconscionable’, 
‘unconscionability exception’, ‘unconscionable conduct’, and ‘unconscionable 
dealing’. The use of the term ‘unconscionable’ may be interchanged with 
‘unconscientious’.320  
Many of these terms can only be described in context, or by using broad principles 
that describe the general effect of certain behaviours. Court have consistently 
avoided any attempt to circumscribe what specific behaviours fall within these 
broad categorisations so to avoid unnecessarily restraining the equity. It is this 
restraint that allows a new category of independent instrument unconscionability to 
be found.  
Narrow definitions of unconscionable conduct have also been avoided by courts 
over many years, and there is general judicial agreement that no definition is likely 
to capture all possible miscreant behaviours brought before it. Courts tend to 
                                                     
316  Mount Sophia, n39 [47]. 
317  See Chapter 4. 
318  See Chapter 5. 
319  See §B1.2 below. 
320  Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 per Deane, J [22]. 
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‘describe’, rather than ‘define’, and typically use inclusive language or examples. 321 
As Mahoney J indicated in Antonovic, guidance in equity comes from “very wide 
general expressions”,322 noting also that unconscionability is “better described than 
defined.”323 
It is necessary to note that the timing of alleged unconscionable conduct in a 
specific transaction cycle may be as relevant to proving the allegation as the 
nature of the conduct itself. Timing of the conduct determines whether it is 
procedurally or substantively unconscionable in nature.  
Nowhere is this element more significant than when considering allegations of 
abusive demands on independent instruments. Substantive unconscionable 
conduct occurring after an independent instrument has been issued could not be 
argued as a basis to set aside that instrument itself.  
Unconscionability needs to be framed within a set of judicial parameters that have 
been laid down in the courts and the commentary provided from the academic 
community to enable a consistent doctrinal approach to be taken to matters 
alleging unconscionable conduct. This then informs the law of unconscionable 
conduct as it affects independent instruments – the unconscionability ‘exception’.  
The following sections address each of these in turn with a view to grounding a 
firm understanding of the law driving the unconscionability exception to 
independent instruments.  
Section B. Theoretical Foundations of Unconscionable Conduct 
1.0. Equity and the Development of Unconscionability 
“The common law principle of ‘freedom to contract’ gives little scope to redress 
imbalances in bargaining power between parties to a contract.”324 The lack of 
égalité between transacting parties often gives rise to inequality in bargaining 
power and consequently, the inequity in contractual relations can lead to an 
injustice suffered by the weaker party. 
                                                     
321  For an extensive list of conduct the court has found not to be unconscionable, see p.251. 
322  Blomley v Ryan (1956) HCA 81, 401. 
323  Antonovic v Volker (1986) 7 NSWLR 151, 165[A]. 
324  T Ciro, V Goldwasser, and R Verma, Law and Business (Oxford University Press, 2014), 311. 
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Recognition of this has contributed to the rise in common law jurisdictions of 
ameliorating doctrine 325 which “qualifies, moderates and reforms the rigour, 
hardness and edge of the law”.326 Equity does not however “arm the courts with a 
general power to set aside bargains simply for being unfair, unjust, onerous or 
harsh.”327 
The original unconscionability jurisdiction arose in part from a British judicial 
policy328 of protecting well-born heirs-apparent from the effects of their own 
excesses, paid for by using their future estate as collateral for loans taken before 
they were invested with the property. 329 The authorities for this are generally 
referred to as the “catching bargains” cases.330 
The loans received in these matters were required to be ‘unconscientious’ to set 
aside the agreement, ie “financial need by itself [was] unlikely to constitute special 
disadvantage” and without more, was insufficient to set aside the contract. 331 While 
the Court of Chancery has allowed itself the right to review “unconscionable 
bargains”, these do not include “voluntary foolish bargains”. 332  
In one seminal British case, Earl of Chesterfield,333 the Court held that “where a 
bargain has become oppressive, it is in the discretion of the Court to relieve”334 the 
harshness of the bargain. 
Lord Hardwicke famously described ‘unconscionable contracts’ as “such as no man 
in his senses and not under delusion would make on one hand, and as no honest 
and fair man would accept on the other” and then found the Court "has an 
                                                     
325  Dal Pont, n307, 1[P.05-P.30]: “equity means fairness in the resolution of disputes through the application of 
good conscience…Equity grew…as a response to the inadequacies of the common law.” 
326  Lord Dudley v Lady Dudley (1705) Prec Ch 241, 244 per Lord Cowper. 
327  Dal Pont, n307, 293[9.05]. 
328  E Ellinger, and A Angelo, 'Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Approaches in England, 
France, Germany, and the United States' (1991) 14 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.  455, 461: “These cases involved 
more than the granting of a remedy against an oppressive bargain; they involved an attempt to protect the 
estates of the landed classes.”  
329  C Rickett, 'Unconscionability and Commercial Law' (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 73, 75. As 
the great wealth of the English nobility started to drastically decline toward the end of the 19 th century, this 
issue became so entrenched and difficult that it required Parliamentary intervention, resulting in the Sale of 
Reversions Act (1867) (UK). 
330  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 435[35.9.170]. See also Heydon, n309, 398. 
331  Dal Pont, n307, 293[fn1] and 297[9.35]: “Financial need may seriously affect a person’s ability to judge her or 
his best interests.” Dal Pont, 295[9.25]: Special disadvantage concerns a “weaker party’s ability to make an 
informed judgement as to her or his interests.”  
332  Pawlett v Pleydell (1679) 79 Selden Society 739. Cited by Fletcher, n339, 49. 
333  Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen  (1750-1) 2 Ves Sen 125 (Chesterfield). 
334  Cited in Adams, n408, 567-568. Chesterfield, n333, 126: “Oppression of this kind is almost of as ancient date as 
the use of money as a medium of trade”.  
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undoubted jurisdiction to relieve against every species of fraud" ,335 including 
equitable fraud.336 
In Evans, the Court attempted to frame the conduct in question by stating “ though 
there was no actual fraud, it is something like fraud, for an undue advantage was 
taken of his [the plaintiff’s] situation.”337 From this statement the Court was 
apparently looking at alternatives to common law fraud and attempting to scope 
those alternatives. 
It was however from the ‘disabilities’ of the ‘expectant’ British nobility 338 that other 
sufferers of disadvantage, such as the elderly, the young and the uneducated, 
ultimately found relief under the doctrines of unconscionability. 339 
In Fry v Lane, Kay J considered commercial  ‘unconscionable bargains’ holding:  
[W]here a purchase is made from a poor and ignorant man at a 
considerable undervalue, the vendor having no independent 
advice, a Court of Equity will set aside the transaction. 340 
The spirit of this equitable intervention was, much later, echoed again in the UK 
and also Australia, in Bundy341 and Amadio342 respectively.343 
The expansion of the application of unconscionability principles to general 
commercial matters is a relatively recent development. Prior to the early 20 th 
century, “the pursuance of self-interest [was] encouraged as a virtue” 344 in 
contractual matters. As Kessler notes “[t]he most striking feature of nineteenth 
century contract theory is the narrow scope of social duty which it implicitly 
assumed.”345  
  
                                                     
335  Chesterfield, n333, 155. Cited in Blomley, n322, 385. 
336  A Davidson, 'Fraud and the UN Convention' (2010) 1(1) George Mason Journal of International Commercial Law  
25, 41: “In equity, the term “fraud” not only embraces actual fraud, but also other conduct that falls below the 
standard demanded in equity.” See p.112 for a discussion on Lord Hardwicke’s categories of unconscionable 
conduct.” 
337  Evans v Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox 333, 340. Cited in Blomley, n322, 429.  
338  Blomley, n322 [11]: McTiernan J, discussing unconscionability, stated that “[t]his principle of relief is not limited 
to transactions with expectants.” His Honour also cited White and Tudor's Equity Cases , 7th ed. (1897) vol.1, 
p.313, affirming that relief “has been extended to all cases in which the parties to a contract have not met upon 
equal terms”. 
339  K Fletcher, 'Review of Unconscionable Transactions' (1973) 8 University of Queensland Law Journal  45, 48-49. 
340  Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch.D. 312, 322.  
341  Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326 (Bundy). 
342  Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio  [1983] HCA 18 (Amadio). 
343  All three cases bear striking similarity in their facts.  
344  Vout, n15, 114. 
345  F Kessler, G Gilmore, and A Kronman (ed), Contract Cases and Materials  (Little, Brown & Co., 3rd ed, 1986), 
1118. 
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The High Court of Australia also acknowledged this but pointed out: 
[I]n the early part of this century overriding importance attached to 
the concept of freedom of contract and to the need to hold parties to 
their bargains. These considerations, though still important, should 
not be allowed to override competing claims based on long standing 
heads of justice and equity. 346 
Kozlina describes this same period as experiencing a “decline in [the] ameliorative 
role” of equity, but points to a 20 th century “equitable revival within the law of 
contract” given the “frequent invocation of unconscionability as a basis for 
equitable relief”. 347 
Hard-line Victorian-era British judicial policy with respect to commercial 
unconscionable conduct was succinctly expressed by Wills J, when defending the 
sanctity of contract: 
Any right given by contract may be exercised against the giver…no 
matter how wicked, cruel or mean the motive may be which 
determines the enforcement of the right. 348 
Historically, neither the common law nor equity have entertained a role in ‘fixing a 
bad bargain’. In 1676, the English High Court Court held that “the Chancery mends 
no man’s bargain”349 and this has generally remained the position in courts of equity 
since. 
In Bridge, Radcliffe LJ said: 
‘Unconscionable’ must not be taken to be a panacea for adjusting 
any contract between competent persons when it shows a rough 
edge to one side or the other.350 
This view of unconscionable conduct becomes significant when considering 
independent instruments because of the character of the parties involved. They 
are, almost invariably, commercially sophisticated parties with access to 
appropriate advice and would therefore be unlikely to be able to make out a case 
under special disadvantage rules.  
                                                     
346  Legione v Hateley [1983] HCA 11 [40] (Legione). 
347  S Kozlina, Contract Law: Principles, Cases and Legislation  (Thomson Reuters, 2014), 27[1.160]. 
348  Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1, 46. 
349  Maynard v Moseley (1676) 3 Swan 651, 655. 
350  Bridge v Campbell Discount Co  [1962] AC 600, 626. 
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The Australian Parliament considered such circumstances could arise in relation to 
the TPA, with the Minister stating: 
In the vast majority of commercial transactions neither party would 
be likely to be in a position of special disability or special 
disadvantage, and no question of unconscionable conduct would 
arise.351 
The law relating to unconscionability in commercial matters in Australia has 
evolved into a unique blend of traditional equity and legislative guidance 
interpreted through a plethora of significant case law. Brennan J (dissenting) in the 
High Court stated in Stern that “[t]he courts have not sought a power to destroy the 
rights and obligations which the parties to a contract create.”  His Honour noted 
that “the concept of unconscionability is not a charter for judicial reformat ion of 
contracts”.352 
In the 1956 Australian ‘special disadvantage’ case Blomley, the full bench of the 
High Court addressed the scope and effect of commercial unconscionable conduct 
in detail. Kitto J described it as: 
[A] well-known head of equity. It applies whenever one party to a 
transaction is at a special disadvantage in dealing with the other 
party because illness, ignorance, inexperience, impaired faculties, 
financial need or other circumstances affect his ability to conserve 
his own interests, and the other party unconscientiously takes 
advantage of the opportunity. 353 
Judicial focus in Blomley concerned the procedural elements of the contract, with 
the court only looking at the terms of the contract for evidence of special 
disadvantage unconscionability.354  
In disputes concerning independent instruments, unconscionable conduct is 
invariably averred to occur in relation to the substantive terms of the contract or in 
the circumstance surrounding the making of the demand. A different approach to 
                                                     
351  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates , House of Representatives, 03 November, 1992, 2408 (John Button). 
The Honourable Minister appears to have only been considering procedural unconscionability with this provision. 
A consolidated discussion of Unconscionable Conduct under the statutes can be found on p.  80. 
352  Stern v McArthur (1988) 81 ALR 463, 479 (Stern). 
353  Blomley, n322, 415. 
354  See discussion “Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability”, Ch.3, p. 83. 
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unconscionable conduct in respect of independent instruments is therefore 
necessary.  
In 1992, the Australian Parliament amended 355 the TPA to include the first two 
sections of Part IVA. With this, the Commonwealth statutorily prohibited 
unconscionable conduct in relation to commercial matters without restraining the 
court to equitable principles. 356 Commentators at the time expressed concern about 
the reach of the provisions, 357 and were dubious as to the court’s capacity to 
properly interpret the legislation. 358 
The rules of equity for unconscionable conduct are not prohibitive; they are 
remedial, ie the rules are applied post hoc to provide relief against the harm done 
from such conduct. Equity does not prohibit unconscionable conduct; it provides 
relief from the effects of unconscionable behaviour. 359  
This is not the case with statutory unconscionability, which is prohibitive. In 
Berbatis(No.1), French J held: 
There is no rule of equity which prohibits unconscionable conduct. 
Rather there are remedies available to relieve against or prevent 
such conduct in certain classes of case. The Act, however, creates 
a prohibition…[i]t prohibits conduct in respect of which a judge in 
equity would have been prepared to grant relief. The imposition of 
the prohibition precedes any actual or notional judicial decision. 360 
To determine whether relief should be available under the Act, his Honour 
suggests that when asked to do so, his fellow judges ask themselves whether, 
under the same circumstances, relief would be granted under equity. 361 This 
solution might have been available with respect to s51AA(1) TPA but the law is not 
similarly restrained in applying s51AC TPA and a wider ambit might be 
applicable.362 
                                                     
355  Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cth), s51AA and s51AB (to replace s52A). See §2.0 below. 
356  A consolidated discussion of Unconscionable Conduct under the TPA/ACL can be found on p. 80, including a 
summary of the legislation introducing and amending the Acts. 
357  R Baxt, and J Mahemoff, 'Unconscionable Conduct Under The Trade Practices Act' (1998) 26 Australian 
Business Law Review 5, 24 (Baxt). 
358  Rickett, n329, 74-75. 
359  Hill v Van Erp [1997] HCA 9, 748: “In a sense it is true that much of equity is concerned with the  prevention, or 
unravelling of the consequences, of unconscionable conduct.”  
360  ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd  [2000] FCA 2 (Berbatis (No.1)), [42]. Emphasis added. 
361  “The judge deciding a case under s51AA will be asking himself or herself whether he or she would have been 
prepared to grant relief at equity on the basis of an assessment of the conduct in question as unconscionable. ” 
362  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 475[35.9.590] refers to the TPA. Applies equally to ss20/21 ACL. 
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The doctrines of equity are advancing into previously sacrosanct areas of 
commercial activity. This was acknowledged by Batt J in 1996 when he stated that 
there had been “considerable growth in [the] importance of unconscionability as a 
sword and a shield in Australian jurisprudence of late”. In passing, his Honour also 
acknowledged that unconscionability is not an absolute but a continuum, referring 
to “gross unconscionability falling short of actual fraud”. He then cast doubt 
whether it exists as a ground for injunction. 363 
Where a party alleges unconscionable conduct under the ACL, that party will be 
“required to to establish that such conduct [will] support the grant of relief under 
specific equitable criteria.” 364 
In Australia, many extensively-reasoned High Court cases over a twenty-year 
period formed a clear judicial view of unconscionable conduct in commerce, 
including Amadio (1983), Legione (1983), Waltons Stores (1988), Verwayan 
(1990), Samton (2002), and Berbatis (2003).365 
In the UK, the somewhat controversial 1975 case of Bundy, Denning MR looked at 
five categories of case where something other than fraud, misrepresentation or 
mistake apparently underlay the reasoning and sought “to find a principle to 
unite”366 them. He declared that all the reviewed cases rested on an inequality of 
bargaining power and that this then was to be a sufficient ground for relief.367 This 
position was largely refuted in a later Court of Appeal matter. 368 
However, despite that unconscionable conduct is recognised by the British court 
for some purposes, “it has not accepted that unconscionable conduct may be a 
defence to payment in respect of autonomous payment obligations.” 369 
In Australia, the majority of the High Court in Bridgewater discussed the similarities 
between unconscionable conduct and undue influence, much as was done in 
Bundy.370 The High Court noted: 
                                                     
363  Olex (No.1), n38, 400. 
364  Rodrigo, n169, 499. 
365  Amadio, n342; Legione, n346; Waltons, n1020; Verwayan, n320; Samton(No.2), n383; Berbatis (No.3), n382,  
respectively. Unconscionability cases relating to independent instruments specifically ar e discussed in Section 
B2.1. and Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
366  Bundy, n341 [15]. 
367  Ibid [24]. It should also be noted that Denning MR’s view was a minority finding.  
368  Alec Lobb (Garages) v Total Oil (GB) [1985] 1 W.L.R. 173 (CA), 181[H] (Lobb). 
369  D Horowitz, Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees - Defences to Payment  (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
130[6.01] (D.Horowitz). 
370  Bundy, n341 [19]. 
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Each doctrine may be seen as a species of that genus of equitable 
intervention to refuse enforcement of or to set aside transactions 
which, if allowed to stand, would offend equity and good 
conscience.371 
Somewhat incongruously, Bundy found favour many years later with the Malaysian 
Supreme Court of Appeal which stated that “[t]he principle concerning 
‘unconscionability’ was initially propounded by Lord Denning in…Bundy”. 372  With 
respect, this is true only in the broadest sense – the words “unconscionable” or 
“unconscionability” do not appear in either of opinions  handed down, nor was 
Denning MR in the majority. 373 
The Malaysian court in Sumatec(No.2) also mentioned Bundy, holding: 
This “unconscionable” category [outlined in Bundy] is said to extend 
to all cases where unfair advantage has been gained by an 
unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against a weaker 
[party].374 
With respect, this does not appear to be an accurate characterisation of the finding 
in Bundy. 
The doctrine dealing with ‘Catching Bargains’ or ‘Sale of Reversions’ cases 
developed into the Doctrine of Unconscionable Dealing 375 has continued to develop 
different classes of complaint. Different categories of unconscionability have 
emerged376 including recognition of the categories of procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.  
                                                     
371  Bridgewater v Leahy [1998] HCA 66 [73]. 
372  Sumatec Engineering and Construction v Malaysian Refining Company [2011] 7 CLJ 21, [25] (Sumatec (No.2)). 
Emphasis added. 
373  Cairns LJ agreed with Sir Eric Sachs that the appeal should be allowed on the basis of undue influence and 
pointedly disregarded Denning MR ’s view entirely.  
374  Sumatec (No.2), n372 [25]. If an imbalance of bargaining power were indeed a basis for unconscionable conduct 
affecting independent instruments, it might be argued that the very insistence on the supply of an unconditional, 
independent demand guarantee is unfair and procedurally unconscionable.  
375  Rodrigo, n169, 483: “the concept of unconscionable dealing has typically been used to determine whether there 
was some form of procedural unfairness in the bargaining process. ” Heydon, n309, 506[16-040]. The equity has 
since been replaced in statute in the UK and Australia: n329. 
376  In Blomley, n322, it is stated: "The jurisdiction to set aside unconscientious bargains is one which has not been 
limited by equity to cases where there is a relationship of influence. It is an old established ground for equitable 
relief", citing Chesterfield, n333. 
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Of the ‘genus’ categories other than Unconscionability, 377 perhaps only ‘Undue 
Influence’378 could be imagined as a possible grounds for injunction in relation to 
independent instruments – a procedural defect in the contract. 
The application of the principles of equity and equity-under-statute to independent 
instruments will continue to be plead, especially in Australia. As the above primer 
shows, unconscionability has developed significantly over time to address different 
categories of cases and, it is posited here, should be encouraged to continue 
doing so. 
2.0. Australian Statutory Unconscionability 
The Australian Trade Practices Act (TPA) was introduced in 1974, replacing its 
largely ineffective predecessor. 379 Certain provisions prohibiting unconscionable 
conduct in trade or commerce were introduced into the TPA and amended over 
time, finally resulting in Part IVA – Unconscionable conduct.380 
Sections 51AA and 51AB, set out prohibitions against unconscionable conduct in 
trade or commerce within the meaning of the unwritten law  and “identifie[d] a range 
of matters that the court may take into account when determining if conduct is 
unconscionable.”381 
The Second Reading speech introduced the unconscionability provisions. The 
Minister stated: 
Unconscionability is a well understood equitable doctrine...It 
involves a party who suffers from some special disability or is 
placed in some special situation of disadvantage and an 
'unconscionable' taking advantage of that disability or disadvantage 
by another. The doctrine does not apply simply because one party 
has made a poor bargain. 382 
                                                     
377  See p.119. 
378  There is some question as to whether using the threat of a demand against a documentary credit is 
unconscionable on the grounds that it amounts to undue influence. In Singapore, it has been held 
unconscionable; in Australia, it has been expressly ruled out. See Samwoh(No.2), n760 and Olex (No.1), n38. Also 
TTI Team, n211, 46[3]: “A breach of faith can arise in such situations as...a threatened call by the beneficiary 
for an unconscionable ulterior motive .” 
379  Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1971 (Cth) 
380  s52A was introduced in 1986; s51AA and s51AB (to replace s52A) were introduced in 1992; s51AC was not 
introduced until 1997. Section 51AC was introduced per the Trade Practices Amendment (Fair Trading) Act 1998 
(Cth). Section 51ACAA was added per the Trade Practices Amendment Act (No.1)  2001 (Cth). 
381  ACCC, Guide to Unconscionable Conduct  (2004) 2nd Ed. Commonwealth of Australia, 1. 
382  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates , House of Representatives, 03 November, 1992, 2408 (John Button) . 
Cited in ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd  [2003] HCA 18 (Berbatis (No.3)) [5]. Emphasis added.  
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However, in Samton(No.2), the full Federal Court (despite the Reading) rejected the 
defendant’s submission to the effect that the TPA was limited to the ‘special 
disadvantage’ doctrine of unconscionable conduct. It held: 
[T]he terms of the section are not limited to those categories. 
Although the section is confined by the parameters of the "unwritten 
law ", it is the unwritten law "from time to time". Neither the 
Explanatory Memorandum nor the Second Reading Speech can be 
treated as imposing qualifications which are not found in the words 
of s51AA.383 
The Competition and Consumer Act (CCA)384 superseded the TPA in 2010.385  Part 
IVA TPA, containing the unconscionability prohibitions, was removed to Schedule 
2 CCL: The Australian Consumer Law. A revised numbering protocol was 
implemented. There were many policy reasons given for the transition but the 
fundamental driver was to provide consistency and clarity to consumer and other 
laws Australia-wide, given the plethora of state and federal consumer regulations 
which existed prior to then.386 
It is important to note that despite its name, the ‘consumer law’ applies not only to 
business-to-consumer transactions but also to transactions with and between 
certain businesses.387 It is within this jurisdiction that the legislation captures 
allegations of unconscionable conduct in independent instruments.  
The changes to the Australian trade practices regime in the 2010 amendment 
included: 
[A] range of new enforcement powers, penalties and redress 
options…[and] introduces important new regimes dealing with unfair 
contract terms and consumer guarantees. 388 
 
                                                     
383  ACCC v Samton Holdings [2002] FCA 62, [50] (Samton(No.2)). The issue was finally resolved in 2011 when 
s21 ACL was amended to instruct the Court to expressly consider substantive unconscionability.  
See discussion p.82. 
384  J Paterson, 'Introducing the New, National Australian Consumer Law' (2011) 36 Alternative Law Journal  50, 
50-51 describes the “Competition and Consumer Act” as the “new name for the Trade Practices Act”.  
385  Two Acts were instrumental in the transition: Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No.1) 
2010 (Cth) and Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No.2) 2010  (Cth). These are 
supported by the Trade Practices (Australian Consumer Law) Amendment Regulations  2010 (No.1) (Cth). 
386  Baxt, n357, 7. 
387  Ibid 7. 
388  Paterson, n384, 50. 
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Because neither the underlying principles nor the legislative intent with respect to 
unconscionable conduct has changed, “the case law accordingly is not broken by 
the amendments over the years”, including the re-badging of the TPA.389 Therefore 
the case analysis in Chapter 5 below 390 comprises an unbroken line of authority on 
independent instrument unconscionability. 
The provisions relevant to independent instrument unconscionability are:  
Section 21 Unconscionable conduct in connection with 
goods or services 
(1)  A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with:  
(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person…;  
(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from a 
person…; 
engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable.  
In 2011 the Parliament amended the ACL,391 inserting three express interpretive 
principles: 
(4) It is the intention of the Parliament that:  
(a) this section is not limited by the unwritten law  relating to 
unconscionable conduct; and  
(b) this section is capable of applying to a system of conduct or 
pattern of behaviour, whether or not a particular individual is 
identified as having been disadvantaged by the conduct or 
behaviour; and  
(c) in considering whether conduct to which a contract relates is 
unconscionable, a court’s consideration of the contract may 
include consideration of:  
(i) the terms of the contract; and  
(ii) the manner in which and the extent to which the contract 
is carried out;  
                                                     
389  S McLeod, 'Statutory Unconscionable Conduct Under The ACL: The Case Against a Requirement for ‘Moral 
Obloquy'' (2015) 23(2) Competition and Consumer Law Journal  123, 124 (McLeod). 
390  See p.184. 
391  Competition and Consumer Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth). It is also this amendment that directly 
provides for Australian substantive unconscionabili ty in commercial matters. 
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These provisions expressly widen the scope of s21 beyond equitable principles 
and empower to the Court to include substantive unconscionability, in the terms 
and the performance of the contract, in their considerations. All of these are 
relevant to independent instrument unconscionability.  S22 enumerates a range of 
“matters the court may have regard to for the purposes of s21”.  
McLeod states: 
The effect of the [above] principles was to expressly state what had 
long been understood — that courts cannot solely rely on 
established equitable principles to inform the content of statutory 
unconscionable conduct.392 
However, the presence of the matters described is not necessarily indicative of 
unconscionable conduct. It has been held that the evidence of one – or even more 
than one – of those enunciated circumstances will “not be determinative in 
considering whether conduct has been ‘in all of the circumstances, 
unconscionable’”.393 
This thesis proposes development of a separate, new category of independent 
instrument unconscionability. If this is to be viable, it must accord with the 
parliamentary intent of the TPA/ACL unconscionability regime and the courts’ 
interpretations of that statutory regime. 394 The expression of category’s 
characteristics in Chapter Six relies on the case law where the TPA/ACL has been 
plead. 
The line of authority for independent instrument unconscionability in Australia 395 
considers both the original TPA and the more-recent ACL while acknowledging the 
independence principle, the veil of autonomy, 396 independent instrument rules of 
practice, and the obligations of the parties to the underlying contract.  
  
                                                     
392  McLeod, n389, 125. 
393  Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Scully (2013) 303 ALR 168, 181: “The presence of one or more of those 
matters, without more, does not mean that conduct has been unconscionable.” 
394  These provisions are reflected in a range of other statutes including s62B of the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW); 
s12CB and s12CC of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001  (Cth); s77 and s78 of the 
Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic); and s46A and s46B of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld).  
395  See Ch.5 below. 
396  Not in those words. 
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3.0. Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability 
When considering unconscionable conduct to ground judicial interference in the 
receipt of the benefit from an independent instrument, the timing of disputed 
conduct in the transaction cycle may be relevant. It is possible for unconscionable 
conduct to be found at various points in a commercial transaction cycle – 
formation, content/execution, or completion/termination 397 – and it will be necessary 
for courts to determine how conduct timing might affect which equitable doctrines 
apply. Simply, the timing of the conduct affects the categories of conduct that 
might apply to independent instruments. 398  
Apropos of the timing of the unconscionable conduct will be its classification as 
either ‘procedural’ or ‘substantive’.399 These classifications were coined originally by 
Leff in 1967 as a means by which he could “distinguish the two 
interests…bargaining naughtiness [and the] evils in the resulting contract”. 400 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedural unconscionability concerns the formation of the underlying contract 
from whence the dispute has arisen and “has been the traditional focus of legal 
doctrine, both at common law and in equity.” 401  
                                                     
397  This third distinction may be unnecessary depending on whether a demand against an independent instrument is 
seen as separate from the content and application of the terms or an extension of them. 
398  For example, procedural unconscionability would look to the doctrines of duress and undue influence; 
substantive unconscionability might look to relief from harsh insistence on a right or wilful misco nduct. The 
importance of this is that, in order to prove the beneficiary’s conduct unconscionable, a plaintiff must show how 
the alleged conduct satisfies the elements of one of these “established categories” and which it is ultimately 
depends on the timing of the conduct. 
399  Despite extensive research, no court in any jurisdiction dealing with an independent instrument matter has 
acknowledged this academic distinction or made mention of it in its reasoning.  According to Vout, when 
considering unconscionable conduct, Courts historically have tended to focus on procedural doctrines such as 
unconscionable dealing. 
400  A Leff, 'Unconscionability and the Code' (1967) 115 University of Pennsylvania Law Review  485, 487. This 
coinage takes place in context with UCC §2-302. 
401  Vout, n15, 117[35.5.200]. 
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Substantive unconscionability deals with the content of the bargain, “the fairness 
or otherwise of its terms”402 and how they are implemented403 to determine if the joint 
effect is an unconscionable outcome. However, in Australia unfair content or 
outcomes alone will not suffice to restrain an undertaking.404 Substantive 
unconscionability is concerned with the unconscientiousness of the  outcome from 
a transaction, such as the unjust enrichment of the beneficiary or another party.  
Procedurally speaking, the Court might consider that, if a debtor is at a significant 
disadvantage with respect to a lender, the formation of the loan agreement may be 
unconscientious. Consideration of such a disadvantage might address any of a 
range of personal circumstances in context with the formation of the agreement, 
including such matters as the debtor’s age, education or health. 405 
Substantively speaking, a term of exorbitant interest on the loan, or contractual 
terms that concern the title, valuation and/or disposition of the underlying assets 
might be regarded as unconscionable. 
The Court will determine whether a term is construed against one party to an 
extent that is unfair, eg a term which provides for rights to one party or an 
obligation on another for which there is no consideration, reciprocation, or appeal 
against.406 Again however, unfairness of itself is insufficient to find 
unconscionability. 407 
Early courts did not use the term ‘procedural unconscionability’ but that was their 
sole focus. Thurlow LC in Adams held that to determine whether a contractual 
obligation is unconscionable, regard is only given to the formation of the contract 
and not to any events that arise during the life of the contract, especially where an 
event alters the character of the agreement. In line with many similar judicial 
pronouncements his Honour also affirmed that “[w]here a bargain is good at the 
                                                     
402  Dal Pont, n307, 294[9.10]. 
403  Vout, n15, 116[35.5.190]: Substantive unconscionability refers to “cases in which the rationale for judicial 
intervention is founded upon the unconscionability of the outcome which would otherwise prevail”.  
404  Axelson v O'Brien (1949) 80 CLR 219 [13]: “…where parties have agreed on the terms the court will not refuse a 
decree of specific performance on the ground of unfairness.” Also Dal Pont, n307, 294[9.10]. 
405  Vout, n15, 117[35.5.200]: “The doctrines of undue influence, unconscionable dealing (or relief from ‘catching 
bargains’), unilatera l mistake, relief from fraud, misrepresentation and duress may all be explained on [this] 
basis.” 
406  It is possible that in some jurisdictions an argument could be made that an ‘Asplenium Clause’ [see p. 176] is 
inherently unfair if indeed the account party had no choice but to accept the condition. The syllogism would be 
circumlocutive: A term that sets aside the defence to unconscionable conduct behind the demand is in itself 
unconscionable because it is unfair to one party on the grounds that they felt they had no choice but to accept it 
and therefore, there was no freedom of contract.  
407  Eltraco International Pte Ltd v CGH Developments Pte Ltd  [2000] 4 SLR 290 (Eltraco), 299[30]. 
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commencement, but turns out a hard one afterwards, the Court will not decree a 
performance.”408 
McHugh JA referred to both forms of unconscionability in relation to unjust 
contracts, stating: 
a contract may be unjust under the Act because its terms, 
consequences or effects are unjust. This is substantive injustice. 
Or a contract may be unjust because of the unfairness of the 
methods used to make it. This is procedural injustice. Most unjust 
contracts will be the product of both procedural and substantive 
injustice.409 
Unconscionability is therefore found on either a procedural basis, wherein the 
borrower’s position at the time of contract formation is considered (eg 
unconscientious exploitation of a ‘special disability’), or on a substantive basis 
related to the unconscionable prosecution of the contract or transaction. 410 
On either basis, in independent instrument disputes alleging unconscionability, the 
Court has to decide whether the beneficiary’s demand should be restrained due to 
unconscionable behaviour. 
Much of the case law and the explanations and descriptions of 
‘unconscientiousness’, ‘unconscionability’ and ‘unconscionable conduct’ from the 
Bench either does not acknowledge the bifurcation or focusses on procedural 
unconscionability, where the formation of the contract is alleged to  be in doubt.411 
Independent instrument matters have given no judicial discussion to substantive 
unconscionability. Neither term is mentioned even in those independent instrument 
cases where it is clearly substantive matters that are being alleged as 
unconscionable. 
Early in the US history of contractual unconscionability, Wright  J in Williams held 
“in an oft-cited opinion”412 which has been widely followed: 
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an 
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
[procedural unconscionability] together with contract terms which 
                                                     
408  Adams v Weare (1784) 1 Bro. C.C. 567, 568. 
409  West v AGC (Advances) Ltd  (1986) 5 NSWLR 610, 620[G]. Emphasis added. 
410  Dal Pont, n307, 294[9.10]. 
411  This follows naturally from the doctrine of unconscionable dealing.  
412  C Horowitz, 'Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability' (1986) 33 UCLA Law Review  940, 941. 
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are unreasonably unfavorable to the other party [substantive 
unconscionability].413 
However, this conjunction of ‘unconscionabilities’ laid out in the Williams test was 
disregarded in a “significant minority of courts”  during the 1960s where contracts 
were set aside purely on issues of substantive unconscionability such as 
“excessive price”. 414 Legal enthusiasm for the doctrine waned thereafter; according 
to Horowitz, between 1971 and 1986, “no [US] court…declared a contract 
unconscionable solely on substantive unconscionability grounds.” 415 
In Australia Vout notes that with respect to substantive unconscionability, “courts 
have proceeded cautiously in this area…since without a focus on specific acts of 
wrongful conduct the notion of unconscionability can become too subjective. ”416 It is 
posited that his concern reflects an insufficient development of the necessary 
doctrine by which an allegation of substantive unconscionable conduct can be 
tested.417 
Perhaps part of the issue is that substantive unconscionability lacks a legal 
pedigree – it is a relatively recent legal development in response to shifting 
societal views. It is not founded on any historical doctrine of common law or 
equitable fraud. The question becomes the extent to which courts are willing to 
accommodate new developments in this area of law. The ramifications of such 
developments, as seen with independent instruments, can be significant.  
Dal Pont states that the Australian statutory unconscionability provision allows the 
Court to deal with both procedural and substantive unconscionability:  
Thus s51AB relates to unconscionability both in the process of 
effecting the contract (termed "procedural" unconscionability and 
typified by the equitable doctrine of unconscionability) and regarding 
the nature of its terms (what is called "substantive" 
unconscionability). 418 
                                                     
413  Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.  (1965) 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.Cir.), 449 (C.Horowitz). 
414  C.Horowitz, n412, 942. 
415  Ibid 942[fn14]. 
416  Vout, n15, 117[35.5.210]. Emphasis added. 
417  His view echoes Mason J’s concern regarding subjective interpretation of this area of law.  See p.106. See 
discussion “Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability”, Ch.3, p.83. 
418  G Dal Pont, 'The Varying Shades of Unconscionable Conduct - Same Term, Different Meaning' (2000) 19 
Australian Bar Review  135 [75]. Emphasis added. 
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Note here that Dal Pont does not ‘typify’ substantive unconscionability. That is to 
say, while procedural unconscionability is “typified by…unconscionability”, no 
indication is provided as to the jurisdiction for substantive unconscionability. This 
is problematic as: 
protection in equity will usually depend on finding an established 
head of the jurisdiction. These established heads evolved as 
responses to their current needs by application of a general 
principle.419 
This distinction aside, coverage under TPA was no accident – the Act was 
amended specifically to include both categories of unconscionability. In response 
to a Senate Committee Inquiry into the definition of unconscionable conduct, 420 the 
Government acknowledged “the belief among some stakeholders that the courts 
have not been willing to tackle what is called ‘substantive unconscionability’”. It 
concluded as a result that “there are many more unfair contract terms operating” 
than is desirable.421  
Substantive unconscionability is also given express recognition in Section 21(4)(c) 
ACL: 
It is the intention of the Parliament that:  
(c) in considering whether conduct to which a contract relates is 
unconscionable, a court’s consideration of the contract may 
include consideration of: 
(i) the terms of the contract; and 
(ii) the manner in which and the extent to which the contract 
is carried out; 
and is not limited to consideration of the circumstances relating 
to formation of the contract.  
                                                     
419  Heydon, n309, 441[12-045]. 
420  An attempt by the Senate Committee to have a definition of unconscionable conduct inserted into the Act failed, 
as did attempts to have a statutory duty of good faith included.  
421 Australian Senate Standing Committee on Economics, 'The Need, Scope and Content of a Definition of 
Unconscionable Conduct for the Purposes of Part IVA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 ' (2008), 3-5. 
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Dal Pont states: 
The statute empowers the court to consider not only the process 
whereby a contract was effected but also whether the terms of such 
contract generate an unconscionable result.422 
The statute does not provide specific guidance on how the ‘terms’, ‘manner’ or 
‘extent’ can be tested for unconscionability, leaving it to the court to determine on 
first principles. However the lack of historical jurisprudence to underpin substan tive 
unconscionability may be slowing judicial expression leaving abusive calls on 
independent instruments unaddressed. 
Tests for procedural unconscionability exist by examining the status of the victim 
or the behaviour of the defendant, or both. Development of a test for substantive 
unconscionability is now required for independent instruments because all such 
matters rest on substantive issues.  
No reported case in this domain has sought to have the underlying contract set 
aside on the grounds of ‘unconscionable dealing’ or its common law descendant – 
substantive unconscionability must be found to restrain a beneficiary’s 
demand-right. 
It would therefore assist for the judiciary to discover a philosophical foundation for 
the encroachment of substantive unconscionability on the contractually-agreed-to 
rights of parties. As Deane J stated with respect to estoppel, but which applies 
equally to substantive unconscionability:  
[T]he conceptual foundations of a legal doctrine constitute an 
essential basis of judicial decision...Those conceptual 
foundations can only be identified by reference to the essential 
content and operation of the doctrine. 423 
Dziedzic and Lindgren have questioned “to what extent this bifurcation [between 
procedural and substantive unconscionability] is desirable”424 given that substantive 
unfairness is dealt with in the equitable doctrines of relief against penalties and 
forfeitures. They do not however discuss the basis for their apprehension.  
                                                     
422  Dal Pont, n418 [75]. Emphasis added. It is difficult to ascertain from the authorities the character of an 
“unconscionable result”. An ‘unjust enrichment’ is likely to be one possibility.  
423  Verwayen, n320 [21]. 
424  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 441[35.9.220].  
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There is no clear answer to the question of the appl icability of substantive 
unconscionability in either the case law or the academic literature. The widening 
scope of the doctrine of unconscionability into the substantive terms of commercial 
transactions is taking place with a paucity of jurisprudence to underpin the case 
law. It is equity by stealth.  
What has so far been provided as guidance is descriptive, often accomplished by 
exclusion – describing what unconscionable conduct is not, eg it is not unfairness 
alone or it is not insufficient value alone, rather than how conduct might be tested 
to determine if it is substantively unconscionable.  
Furthermore, ‘defining’ unconscionability as ‘unfair’ is circumlocutive – it is akin to 
testing ‘big’ by asking whether it is ‘large’. Both terms are relative, sub jective and 
synonymic. 
Interestingly, the unconscionability section of the UCC, §2-302, has been said to 
suffer the same fate. The official comment to the Code has been criticised because 
it “continues the so-called ‘basic test’ which, in view of its defin ition of 
unconscionability in terms of itself, is an unhelpful tautology.” 425 
The issue with formulating a test for substantive unconscionability was succinctly 
put by Samuels JA (with which Kirby P agreed) in Antonovic: 
Both “unfair” and “unjust” assert fai lure to satisfy a standard of 
some sort and, unless the standard is itself defined, the nature and 
effect of the alleged departure may be difficult to gather. 426 
When a reliable standard is developed to evaluate the presence of substantive 
unconscionability, the Court will be able to lift the veil of autonomy to ascertain 
with greater consistency whether the demand on an instrument is abusive or the 
outcome unjust. 
The delineation between procedural and substantive unconscionability needs to be 
considered when developing a special category of independent instrument 
unconscionability. Allegations of unconscionable conduct will be required to 
                                                     
425  JHA, 'Unconscionable Contracts Under the Commercial  Code' (1961) 109 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 401, 404 (JHA). Emphasis added. [NB: The author’s full name is not provided in the article or in the 
Contents of the journal.] “The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the 
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one -sided as to be 
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. ” In other words, 
unconscionability is tested by reference to whether it is unconscionable. This is also a classic example of using 
substantive material to establish a procedural breach.  
426  Antonovic, n323, 157[C]. 
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consider almost exclusively substantive matters – either alone or in conjunction 
with procedural matters. 
Procedural matters can have probative value for establishing substantive 
unconscionability. 427 For example, evidence that the beneficiary put the applicant 
under duress as a means to gain leverage during negotiations might help establish 
the unconscionability of a later demand.428 
A special category of unconscionability for independent instruments will, it is 
posited, necessarily involve a court review of substantive matters surrounding the 
underlying contract to evaluate them for unfairness, harshness, or oppression, 
possibly in context with any outcome that would involve one party being unjustly 
enriched.429 
In Chapter Six a framework of elements for independent instrument 
unconscionability is provided. It includes a requirement to determine where 
unconscionable conduct is found in independent instrument transactions, i.e. 
whether it is procedural or substantive unconscionability. This distinction is 
important because the equitable relief available differs for each. 430 
4.0. Framing the Doctrine of Unconscionable Conduct 
This section sets out a range of judicial and academic opinions on behavioural 
unconscionable conduct to establish some view on the boundaries of the doctrine. 
The ‘mapping’ of these boundaries is vital to gaining an understanding of the 
doctrine’s application to independent instruments, given the added complexity 
afforded by the independence principle. An understanding of unconscionability, 
particularly the jurisprudence of substantive unconscionability, is essential to 
properly formulate a specific category of ‘independent instrument 
unconscionability’ as this paper puts forward in Chapter Six.  
  
                                                     
427  Dal Pont, n307, 294[9.10]. 
428  Crescendo Management v Westpac Banking Corp  (1988) 19 NSWLR 40 [44-45] (Crescendo): McHugh JA 
considered what is called "economic duress", stating that pressure will be illegitimate "if it consists of unlawful 
threats or amounts to unconscionable conduct". 
429  The term ‘unjust enrichment’ is used in its ordinary sense – the formal legal doctrine remains controversial in 
the Australian jurisdiction. See: J Edelman, 'Australian Challenges for the Law of Unjust Enrichment'  (2012) 
Speech to UWA Summer School . 
430  For example, procedural unconscionability attracts contractual avoidance and severance. Substantive 
unconscionability will attract relief by injunction, constructive trust, or damages. See Ch.6: ‘A New Category of 
Unconscionable Conduct’, p.221. 
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4.1. Describing Unconscionability 
‘Unconscionable conduct’ is not homogenous; the term is used variously and its 
meaning can only be drawn from context. 431 There can be no single, definitive 
description of unconscionable conduct that encompasses all varieties of behaviour 
that fall under the broad doctrine. “Unconscionability [is] an arcane, nebulous 
concept in contract law that courts had used to avoid enforcing contracts that 
‘shock the conscience.’”432 
Unconscionability can be framed in part by the many descriptions of exclusion; 
describing what unconscionability is not by reference to specific behaviours.433 
There can be no ‘unified theory’ of unconscionable conduct any more than there 
can be a unified theory of torts. 434 
In many jurisdictions where equitable concepts of fairness do not encroach on the 
principles of contractual freedom, there is often a doctrine of ‘good faith’, which 
superficially bears many of the same hallmarks. 435 In Renard, Meagher J noted “the 
considerable degree of interchangeability between the expressions ‘fairness’ and 
‘good faith’”, going on to note that “there is a close association of ideas between 
the terms unreasonableness, lack of good faith, and unconscionability.”436 
The terms ‘unconscionability’ and ‘good faith’ are widely used in relation to a 
diverse and disconnected range of legal disciplines, the effect of which has 
perhaps “masked rather than illuminated the underlying principles at stake”. 437 
The very term ‘unconscionable conduct’ is used in different senses as Mason  J 
explained in the seminal case of Amadio: 
Historically, courts have exercised jurisdiction to set aside contracts 
and other dealings on a variety of equitable grounds. They include 
fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, undue influence 
and unconscionable conduct. In one sense they all constitute 
species of unconscionable conduct.438 
                                                     
431  Rickett, n329, 90, states that “the notion of unconscionability in the unwritten law is itself uncertain. ” 
432  C McCullough, 'Unconscionability As A Coherent Legal Concept' (2016) 164(3) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 779, 781. 
433  See list p.251. 
434  S Hershovitz, 'The Search for a Grand Unified Theory of Tort Law (Review)' (2017) 130 Harvard Law Review  
942, 943-944. 
435  Kuehne, n45, 64-67. 
436  Renard, n312, 265[B] and 265[C]. 
437  J McGhee (ed), Snell's Equity  (Sweet & Maxwell, 30th ed, 2000), Preface. Cited in Berbatis (No.3), n382 [43]. 
438  Amadio, n342, 460. Emphasis added.  
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The term ‘unconscionable conduct’ therefore is used as both :  
1. a generic term that sweeps up the range of ‘unconscionable’ doctrine 
in equity,439 and  
2. as a specialised term to describe types of specific behaviours that 
respond to further categorisation. 440 
The first might be called ‘doctrinal-type unconscionability’; the second, 
‘behavioural-type unconscionability’. It is the second of these that the Court must 
identify and, to some extent, quantify in terms of its materiality. To accomplish this 
in independent instrument matters, the court will lift the veil of autonomy and look 
to the substantive matters to ground a restraint. 
Dal Pont describes equitable fraud as “conduct of a nature sufficient to invoke the 
intervention of a court of conscience”. It is also “the basis for relief for…undue 
influence and unconscionable dealing” but points out that these have “flourished 
into a ‘separate’ equitable doctrine” and no longer fall strictly under the banner of 
‘equitable fraud’.441 
Traditionally, equity was called upon to curtail rights where those rights were 
“exercised unreasonably or in bad faith”. 442 In Amadio, Gibbs CJ looked at the 
relative power positions of the parties, finding in the context of procedural 
‘unconscionable dealing’: 
A transaction will be unconscientious within the meaning of the 
relevant equitable principles only if the party seeking to enforce 
the transaction has taken unfair advantage of his own superior 
bargaining power, or of the position of disadvantage in which the 
other party was placed.443 
This is notable for the bifurcation between the behaviour of the beneficiary 
(“bargaining naughtiness”444) and the characteristics of the plaintiff (special 
disadvantage). This binary approach has been integrated into contemporary 
procedural unconscionability. 
                                                     
439  Berbatis (No.1), n360 [42]: “The term [‘unconscionability ’] is used across a broad range of the equity jurisdiction. ” 
Vout, n15, includes in this range Mistake, Misrepresentation, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable 
Dealing. 
440  This echoes the multiple uses for the term “common law” as a generic and a specific term to describe different 
jurisdictions in different contexts.  
441  Dal Pont, n307, 267. 
442  Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation [2007] FCA 881 [80(a)] (Clough(No.1)). 
443  Amadio, n342, 460. 
444  Leff, n400, 487. 
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The “exceptional” jurisdiction of ‘unconscionable dealing’, descendant doctrine of 
‘catching bargains’, has three elements. It arises from the concatenation of three 
elements: 
1. a relationship that places one party at a special disadvantage 
to the other; 
2. a knowledge of that special disadvantage in the stronger party; 
and 
3. unconscientious exploitation of the special disadvantage by the 
stronger party”.445 
None of these typically exist in independent instrument matters. 
Unconscionable dealing “focuses on unconscionability of a ‘procedural’ nature, 
namely on the conduct of the parties...leading to a transaction.”446 Unconscionable 
dealing is not concerned with substantive matters other than to the extent that they 
might be “probative of procedural unconscionability.” 447 It has not historically been a 
ground to restrain a demand on an independent instrument. 
Twenty years after Amadio, in Berbatis(No.3), the majority opinion of Gummow and 
Hayne JJ described “unconscionable” as: 
a description of various grounds of equitable intervention to refuse 
enforcement of or to set aside transactions which offend equity and 
good conscience.448 
Looking at the interpretation of the Australian statutory prohibition in s51AA TPA, 
Dal Pont advises that the better view is a narrow one, stating:  
Where there is a choice between ascribing to a word in legislation a 
narrow precise definition from case law or a broader loose one, the 
former should ideally be preferred. Had the legislature intended the 
term "unconscionable" to attract a wide definition, it would have 
included a list of factors such as those appearing in s51AB. 449 
Independent instrument unconscionability matters heard in Australia under these 
provisions have generally taken a narrow view of the legislation.  
                                                     
445  Dal Pont, n307, 293[9.05]. 
446  Ibid 294[9.10]. 
447  Ibid 294[9.10]. 
448  Berbatis (No.3), n382 [42]. 
449  Dal Pont, n418 [79]. 
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Determining unconscionability is “inherently fact-specific”.450 The factual matrix 
upon which any alleged unconscionable conduct is founded malleates the 
doctrine.451 “In each situation equity inquires into the conduct of the defendant, and, 
by the remedies at its disposal, will deny the defendant the right to obtain or retain 
any benefit from their unconscionable conduct.”452  
Various scholars have identified a range of recognised categories of 
unconscionability that reflect, to some extent, clusters of behaviours with common 
unconscionable objectives. 453 However, these categories are not universally agreed 
upon nor applied, and any attempt to totally reconcile the different categorisations 
would be problematic.454 
For the purposes of finding substantive independent instrument unconscionability, 
some acknowledged categories of unconscionable conduct will not suit because 
the required conduct is not possible in the transaction. 455 For example, a 
substantive inequitable denial of legal obligations is unlikely to arise  within the 
context of independent instruments. 
Procedurally, Amadio-type “special disability” unconscionable conduct would be 
unlikely to be alleged in a dispute involving “a major commercial transaction 
negotiated at arm’s length between between parties who have access to financial 
and legal expertise.”456 This is because commercial parties are unlikely to suffer 
‘special disadvantage’ infirmities likely to trigger accusations of procedural 
unconscionable conduct in the formation of any of the three relationships in the 
transaction.457 
Sir Anthony Mason stated in 1985 “there exists strong resistance in this country to 
the exposure of commercial transactions to equitable remedies”. 458 Four years later, 
his Honour described the Australian judicial mood toward more recent 
developments: 
                                                     
450  McLeod, n389, 124. 
451  It is because the range of possible factual scenarios is infinite that unconscionability defies succinct definition.  
452  Dal Pont, n418 [81]. 
453  Vout, n15, 121. 
454  See ‘Categorising Unconscionable Conduct’, §1.4 below. Some of the categories appear repeatedly, albeit using 
different phrasing. 
455  The ‘categories’ of unconscionability are discussed in detail below, commencing Parkinson, n559. 
456  Dal Pont, n307, 297[9.35]. 
457  Seller/Buyer; Buyer/Bank; Bank/Beneficiary.  
458  P Finn (ed), Essays in Equity - Ch.12: A Mason, Themes and Prospects  (Sweet & Maxwell, 1985), 243. This 
statement however was made prior to the advent of Part IVA TPA. 
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The development in doctrines based on unconscionability is partly 
explained by the fact that our sense of what is unconscionable 
conduct is today much more comprehensive than it used to be. We 
– and I suppose I am speaking of judges – are more easily shocked 
than we used to be by harsh conduct. 459 
Despite a broad shift in common law jurisdictions toward a more equitable view of 
commercial relationships, the sterner, 19 th century view could be found in some 
quarters until relatively recently. For example, in Renard, Meagher JA in 
discussing an imputation of reasonableness into a contract affirmed that “there is 
no reason why the principal should have regard to any interests except his own. ” 
His Honour noted with approbation the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the position that 
“the principal [need] not [be] burdened by any element of altruism.”460 
In Australia and abroad, judicial notions of fairness and equity and 
conscientiousness have expanded gradually into commercial matters to an extent 
previously unknown.  461 This expanded view has also been reflected in Australian 
statutory regimes at State462 and Commonwealth level that have incrementally 
brought equitable doctrine to bear on commercial transactions. 463  
Priestly J considered the rise in allegations of unconscionable conduct generally in 
the context of international comparative law: 
An important factor, in my opinion, in the growing willingness to use 
old unconscionability rules more freely, has been the steadily 
increasing use in Australia this century of expansive definitions of 
unconscionability in both state and Commonwealth statutes. These 
have authorised courts to interfere with contractual relations in a 
way almost scandalous to adherents of nineteenth century Anglo-
Australian doctrine.464 
                                                     
459  Mason, n196, 2. 
460  Renard, n312, 275[G] and 276[A]. 
461  Vout, n15, 107[35.5.10]: “It is an emerging preoccupation of the judiciary in the common law world, not only in  
Australia”. 
462  See for example the Contracts Review Act 1980  (NSW). 
463  For example the extension of the unfair consumer contracts regime to incorporate protection for small business 
in the Treasury Legislation Amendment (Small Business and Unfair Contract  Terms) Act 2015 (Cth). 
464  L Priestley, 'A Guide to a Comparison of Australian and United States Contract Law' (1989) 12(1) University of 
NSW Law Journal 4, 10. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 97 of 270 
 
The doctrine has its proponents. Defending the incursion of fraud and 
unconscionable conduct into the sanctity of the independent instruments. Loi 
states: 
Whatever commercial value might be attached to the autonomy 
principle, just as the courts will not countenance the law and the 
court’s own offices being perverted into instruments of fraud, the 
courts will likewise not allow the law or its offices to become 
instruments of unconscionable conduct. 465 
It is Loi’s view that where unconscionable conduct is alleged, it is the manifest duty 
of the Court to ensure the allegation is properly heard, the independence principle 
notwithstanding. Anything otherwise “flies in the face of the court’s duty to ensure 
justice is done…autonomy will not shield truly unconscionable conduct.” 466 
In Dynamics, the Court noted “there is as much a public interest in discouraging 
fraud as in encouraging the use of letters of credit.”467 The conundrum however, is 
how to properly and consistently identify the behaviours which must not be 
shielded, given that identification and accurate description of behaviours that 
constitute unconscionable conduct remains “notorious ly difficult to define with any 
precision”.468  
This has not stopped attempts being made. Finn sought to describe it in [he 
admits] very generic terms that might allow the Court to identify unconscionable 
behaviour: 
Unconscionable conduct can be said to be synonymous with the use 
of a manipulative power to induce or produce a course of conduct, 
in a way which offends the fundamental assumptions on which the 
making of a binding contract are premised.469 
Looking at one refined view of the doctrine, the Federal Court of Australia in 
Berbatis(No.1), affirming Legione,470 addressed the category of substantive 
unconscionable conduct in which most independent instrument cases would tend 
to fall if they were argued in equity. 
                                                     
465  Loi, n131, 511. 
466  Ibid 511. 
467  Dynamics, n43, 1000. 
468  Dal Pont, n418 [79]. 
469  P Finn, 'Unconscionable Conduct' (1994) 8(1) Journal of Contract Law  37, 49. 
470  Legione, n346. 
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French J stated: 
The fundamental principle according to which equity acts is that a 
party having a legal right shall not be permitted to exercise it in such 
a way that the exercise amounts to unconscionable conduct. 471 
This is a rewording of the category of substantive unconscionability which prohibits 
the harsh or oppressive insistence on the exercise of a right. 472 
In Singapore, Hoo JC in JKI recognised that unconscionability presents difficulty 
with categorisation, describing it as “easily identifiable, but difficult to define”. 473 
The Singapore Court of Appeal in Mount Sophia also noted that unconscionability: 
is a concept that has proven impossible to comprehensively define, 
and previous case law has instead preferred to indicate the 
elements of behaviour that would be caught by the label of 
unconscionability.474 
In the United States, the UCC addresses unconscionable conduct in a number of 
places,475 albeit not specifically in relation to independent instruments. Leff 
discusses the history of unconscionability in the UCC in some detail, specifically in 
reference to the current version of §2-302, noting that early versions of the section 
provided that “substantive imbalance” in the contract as a whole was the target of 
the unconscionability provision. 
Leff notes that “[t]his idea, that ‘unconscionability’ meant  something like overall 
contractual imbalance” was ultimately replaced. 476 Revisions and draft releases took 
place throughout the 1940s and early 1950s. 477  
  
                                                     
471  Berbatis (No.1), n360 [14]. 
472  See UN-CIGSLC Explanatory Note, n221 [46] “abuse of right”. See also PBS (No.2), n985, 587: “Broadly it may be 
said that the vendor will not be allowed to use his contractual right if it would be unconscionable in the 
circumstances to do so.” 
473  JKI, n185 [23]. 
474  Mount Sophia, n39 [41]. 
475  UCC-Revd.5, n11, §2-302 – Unconscionable Contracts; §2A-108 – Dealing with Unconscionable Leases; §2‐719 
– Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy. 
476  Leff, n400, 513. 
477  Uniform Law Commission <www.uniformlaws.org>: Due to the federalist nature of the law in the United States, 
“uniform laws” are drafted and released by the Uniform Law Commission which provides the states with “non -
partisan, well conceived, and well drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state 
statutory law.”  
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The current version states: 
§2-302 Unconscionable Contract or Clause 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of 
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made 
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result. 
Under this section the court is empowered to address both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability, and indicates that both the circumstances 
surrounding formation and the consequences are subject to wide powers of 
rescission and severance. 
Leff complains: 
[O]ne cannot tell from the statute whether the key concept 
[unconscionability] is something to be predicated on the bargaining 
process or on the bargain or on some combination of the two, that 
is, to use our terminology, whether it is procedural or substantive. 478 
Leff’s view is valid: the section is descriptive and not prescriptive. It does not 
provide for any sort of test for unconscionability, leaving to the courts the 
identification of the doctrine’s elements. 479 
The “Official Comment” to the section provides a purpose statement followed by a 
basic test to guide the court’s considerations:  
§2-302: This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to 
police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to be 
unconscionable…This section is intended to allow the court to pass 
directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause 
therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability. 
The basic test is whether, in the light of…[everything], the clauses 
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract .480 
                                                     
478  Leff, n400, 488. 
479  McLeod, n389, 125. 
480  UCC-Revd.5, n11, §5-109 Official Text With Comments. Emphasis added. 
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The expression “under the circumstances” equates to “given the factual matrix”, 
implying that there needs to be something more than just a bad bargain; there 
needs to be behaviour from which equity will provide relief. 
In order to find unconscionability it appears from the “basic test” that the Court 
must be informed as to how the clauses are “one-sided”. Unfortunately, no 
reference is made to the substantive issue of “any unconscionable result” in the 
Comment, with the court only directed to consider the procedural circumstances at 
formation. 
Elsewhere, the law of unconscionability has been addressed twice by the full Court 
of Appeal in Malaysia in Sumatec.481 For the most part, the Court found 
Singaporean and Australian precedent persuasive. In the first appeal, the Court 
found unconscionable conduct as a separate ground from fraud for the purposes of 
restraining the benefit of an independent instrument. The Court provided a test for 
the standard of proof carried by the plaintiff, finding:  
[T]o establish “unconscionability” there must be placed before the 
court manifest or strong evidence of source degree in respect of the 
alleged unconscionable conduct complained of, not a bare 
assertion.482 
To ground an injunction the appellate court went on to find that “this additional 
ground of ‘unconscionability’ should only be allowed with circumspect where 
events or conduct are of such degree such as to prick the conscience of a 
reasonable and sensible man.”483  
In the second appeal, the full bench of the Federal Court of Malaysia addressed 
the “sole question” of “whether ‘unconscionable conduct’ on the part of a 
beneficiary of a bank guarantee or a performance bond was a distinct ground, 
apart from 'fraud'”.484 This was the first time Malaysia’s “apex court” 485 dealt with the 
question directly and in so doing, held as it had a year earlier, albeit with different 
judges on the bench, that unconscionable conduct is a separate ground for 
injunction.  
                                                     
481  Sumatec (No.3), n170, 402, was an appeal confined to the question of unconscionability.  
482  Sumatec (No.2), n372, [24]. This phraseology echoes the “strong prima facie case” requirement in Singapore and 
Australia. 
483  Ibid [24]. 
484  Sumatec (No.3), n170, 410[11]. 
485  Ibid 410[12]. 
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While doing so, the Court framed the approach cautiously, first stating:  
[T]here is no simple formula that would enable the court to ascertain 
whether a party had acted unconscionably in making a call on an 
on-demand performance bond. 
The Court went on: 
[W]hether or not “unconscionability” has been made out is largely 
dependent on the facts of each case. In every case where 
“unconscionability” is made out, there would always be an element 
of unfairness or some form of conduct which appears to be 
performed in bad faith.486 
The bench noted that “abuses arising out of the contract” 487 justified an injunction 
and proposed that the purpose of the doctrine of unconscionability is to prevent 
“oppression and unfair conduct”. The issue of what constitutes subjective ‘unfair 
conduct’ was not addressed. The Bench also affirmed that determining 
unconscionability is “fact specific” and that a restraint would follow where “[a]ll the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the demands…were so lacking in good faith 
and amounted to unconscionable conduct that it warranted court intervention .” 
Civil law jurisdictions do not countenance equitable notions of ‘unfairness’. 
However, their doctrines of ‘good faith’ struggle with similar issues of assessing 
standards of behaviour. In 2016 the Court of Amsterdam heard jurisdictional 
arguments regarding the “standard for exceptions to the principle of abstraction ” in 
CKT.488 The parties “disagreed on whether the standard was that the drawing was 
[per Danish law] ‘disloyal and unfounded or – as the equivalent in Dutch 
law…obviously fraudulent or arbitrary.’”489 
  
                                                     
486  Ibid 413[17-v]. It must also be noted that, as shown in Clough (No.3)  the Plaintiff may only seek equity’s relief with 
‘clean hands’. 
487  Ibid 421[40]. This also supports the postulation that the demand-right arises out of the contract and must be 
restrained there. 
488  CKT Marine Services BV v NV Nationale Borg-Maatschappij C13/601449/KG ZA 16-85 MW/EB (Court of 
Amsterdam, February 17, 2016)[Neth.] . 
489  J Byrne, and C Byrnes (ed), Institute of International Banking Law & Practice Annual Survey  (Institute of 
International Banking Law & Practice, 2017), 481.  
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4.2. Framing and Testing Unconscionability 
The above judicial and academic commentary reflects one common theme: a 
general reluctance to attempt to constrain the boundaries of unconscionable 
conduct with any form of concise definition. Procedural unfairness can be tested, 
but it is no nearer being defined than substantive unconscionability for which there 
are few tests. 
It is posited here that a lack of an agreed-upon definition does not preclude a 
capacity to develop an elemental test for the presence of substantive 
unconscionability. There are many legal concepts that defy singular definition but 
tests have evolved to identify them. 490 
While the available generic explanations and descriptions provide guidance on the 
character of unconscionable conduct, they also demonstrate a range of views as to 
the scope of the doctrine. Similarly, there are a range of views as to how 
unconscionable conduct should be categorised491 and whether such categories 
assist with understanding unconscionability.  
Categorisation enables the Court to cluster behaviours more generally and thereby 
make links and draw “parallels between related forms of unconscionable 
conduct.”492 Identifying common elements is difficult to achieve. As Hutley JA held 
in Logue, “[t]here is no simple formula for determining when conduct or facts  
constitute equitable (constructive) fraud”.493 Loi also succinctly states: 
[T]he real difficulty…[lies] in formulating what “unconscionability” 
means in this context and how a case of unconscionability is to be 
sufficiently proved in evidential terms to trigger interlocutory 
intervention.494 
In Blomley, Fullagar J looked for commonality between the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction as a method to identify procedural unconscionability: 
The circumstances adversely affecting a party, which may induce a 
court of equity either to refuse its aid or to set a transaction aside, 
are of great variety and can hardly be satisfactorily classified. 
Among them are poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, 
                                                     
490  The existence of a constructive trust, for example. See Finn, n469, 37. 
491  See ‘Categorising Unconscionable Conduct’, §5.0. below. 
492  Parkinson, ‘Notion of Unconscionability’, in Vout, n15, 110. 
493  Logue v Shoalhaven Shire Council  [1979] 1 NSWLR 537, 553. 
494  Loi, n131, 511. 
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infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of 
education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or 
explanation is necessary. The common characteristic seems to be 
that they have the effect of placing one party at a serious 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the other.495 
Gleeson CJ stated in Berbatis(No.3) that “[t]he common characteristic of such 
circumstances is that they place one party at a serious disadvantage in dealing 
with the other.”496 
His Honour recognised commercial realities, stating: 
[A] person is not in a position of relevant [sic] disadvantage, 
constitutional, situational, or otherwise, simply because of inequality 
of bargaining power. Many, perhaps even most, contracts are 
made between parties of unequal bargaining power , and good 
conscience does not require parties to contractual negotiations to 
forfeit their advantages, or neglect their own interests. 497 
The description here frames by exclusion – it describes what unconscionability is 
not, ie an inequality of bargaining power, and what the parties are not required to 
do, ie forfeit any advantage. This contributes to the doctrine but more is required 
for consistency on what unconscionability is and what identifies it as such. 
Dziedzic and Lindgren frame the scope of unconscionability broadly by dealing 
with more general principles. They provide “four aspects to the scope of 
unconscionability” that indicate matters for the court to consider:  
1. The inequitable doctrine of unconscionability is tied to the 
requirement of special disability; 498 
2. The improvidence or rashness of a transaction does not 
warrant equity’s intervention;  
3. Inadequacy of consideration, will not of itself, establish 
unconscionable dealing; 
                                                     
495  Blomley, n322, 406. 
496  Berbatis (No.3), n382 [8]. More than this is required however to gain an understanding of the intended scope of the 
doctrine. The quantum by which to measure ‘serious’, and the extent of ‘disadvantage’, will acquire further 
clarification only through application to different factual matrices.  
497  Berbatis (No.3), n382 [11]. Emphasis added. See discussion on ‘unequal bargaining power’ in Bundy, p.113. 
498  Again, referencing only procedural unconscionability.  
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4. Unconscionable conduct does not depend on substantive 
unfairness.499 
Again, the issues of extent arise. An examination of most contractual 
arrangements would invariably reveal one party to be at some disadvantage. It is 
the dynamic of business. Finding the point at which monetising that 
advantage/disadvantage becomes unconscionable is the problematic aspect. 500 As 
McLeod points out: 
[T]he difficulty [is] in determining when commercial practices cease 
to be ‘tough but fair’ and become, instead, unconscionable. 501 
For courts, the core issue is dealing with the infinite range of human behaviours 
associated with the full gamut of commercial transactions, and to class some 
behaviours as inequitable while other quite similar behaviours as fair commercial 
practice. Looking at findings across jurisdictions over time, some appear 
anomalous. It is a given that neither unfairness itself, nor an inequality of 
bargaining power alone are sufficient to ground unconscionable conduct. 502 
It has been held that where a genuine dispute is on foot regarding the damages 
owing to a beneficiary, making a demand on the independent instrument does not 
constitute unconscionable conduct.503 Yet a force majeure clause disputably 
operating in the underlying contract was sufficient to find a demand 
unconscionable.504 
 
                                                     
499  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 440[35.9.220]. Emphasis added, recognising substantive unconscionability as 
a consideration. They do not say however whether it is their view that while unconscionability does not depend 
on substantive unfairness, whether substantive unfairness should be taken into consideration, whether it should 
only act probatively to substantiate procedural unconscionability, or whether substantive unconscionability can 
stand alone to ground an injunction. That unconscionable conduct does not depend on substantive unfairness is 
not to say that it can-not so depend. 
500  Lobb, n368, 183: “Inequality of bargaining power must anyhow be a relative concept. It is seldom in any 
negotiation that the bargaining powers of the parties are absolutely equal.”  
501  McLeod, n389, 124. 
502  Vout, n15, 118-119[35.5.220]: “Taking advantage of an inequality of bargaining power, without more, will not be 
regarded as unconscionable.” and [35.5.230] “Unfairness in trade and commerce, without more, will not 
constitute unconscionable conduct.” 
503  Minson Constructions Pty Ltd v Aquatec-Maxon Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 17 [23] (Minson): “the defendant was 
entitled to call on the security at the time it did, notwithstanding that there may be a genuine dispute between it 
and the plaintiff concerning responsibility for the defects”.  
504  See Min Thai analysis, p.150. 
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Equitable fraud or unconscionable conduct 505 remains stubbornly “amorphous and 
ambiguous”.506 The Court is restricted to applying general principles to specific 
conduct but Finn points out that a lack of definition is common in legal concepts, 
citing Trusts, Fiduciary Duty, and Agency as examples of where the Court is left to 
its own devices.507 This lack however has not constrained the Court from developing 
tests to establish their existence. 
It might be argued that the lack of specificity regarding the elements and character 
of unconscionable conduct provides opportunity for each Court to define the term 
as broadly or narrowly as it sees fit, robustly responding to each factual matrix. 
Deane J supported this approach in Verwayen, stating: 
Ultimately...the question [of what is] unconscionable must be 
resolved not by reference to some pre-conceived formula framed to 
serve as a universal yardstick but by reference to all of the 
circumstances of the case, including the reasonableness of the 
conduct of the other party…and the nature and extent of the 
detriment which he would sustain.508 
Insofar as unconscionability equates to good faith in independent instrument 
matters,509 a lack of bona fide belief in the exercise of a right has been found to 
constitute a ‘breach of faith’ in contract. 
In England, Thornton QC stated: 
The basis for a contention of a breach of faith must be established 
by clear evidence even for the purposes of interim relief. A breach 
of faith can arise in such situations as...a lack of an honest or bona 
fide belief by the beneficiary that the circumstances, such as poor 
performance, against which a performance bond has been provided, 
actually exist.510 
                                                     
505  Vout, n15, 111: “Unconscionability is otherwise known as ‘equitable fraud’ or ‘constructive fraud’…found 
particularly in older cases…[and] is a much wider concept than the ordinary meaning of the word ‘fraud’.” Also G 
Wooler, 'The 'New Asplenium Clause' - Unconscionability Unwound?' (2016) (Mar) Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 169, 171. 
506  Attorney-General of NSW v World Best Holdings [2005] NSWCA 261 [118] (World Best) 
507  Finn, n469, 37. 
508  Verwayen, n320 [21(4)]. 
509  Given the international nature of independent instruments, such comparisons are helpful to develop a mor e 
complete view of how such conduct is proscribed.  
510  TTI Team, n211 [46]. 
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If there is “a considerable degree of interchangeability between the expressions 
‘fairness’ and ‘good faith’”,511 this statement would indicate that a beneficiary’s bona 
fide belief in the exercise of a demand-right might be sufficient to avoid an 
allegation of unconscionability. 
In Kvaerner, Selvam J stated: 
In circumstances where it can be said that the buyer had no honest 
belief that the seller has failed or refused to perform his obligation, 
a demand by the defendants/buyers in my view is a dishonest act 
which would justify a restraint order. 512 
The implication from this may be that where an honest belief in the right to make a 
demand is genuinely held, no restraint order will follow unless other circumstances 
exist to ground one. Certain issues arise with this ‘innocence defence’ however. 
The presence of mala fides has never been an essential element of either form of 
unconscionable conduct513 and the court should be largely unconcerned with the 
beliefs or intentions of the defendant. Where it can be shown the benef iciary could 
have no honest belief, this can support a finding of unconscionable conduct. 
However, the holding of an honest belief (or the lack of ‘no honest belief’) does not 
on its own mean a demand is conscionable.  
4.3. Issues with Assessing Unconscionability 
Given the “inherently unstable” character of unconscionability, 514 some 
commentators have expressed concern about the consistency of judicial findings in 
this domain.515 Not all judges are familiar with the nuance of equitable principles 
and the lack of clarity in the written law exacerbates uncertainty. 516 Individual 
judges will interpret the law according to their own specialities, especially given the 
complexity of the equitable doctrines at play. This possibility is viewed with some 
caution.517 Brennan J stated in Stern: 
                                                     
511  Renard, n312, 265[B] and 265[C]. 
512  Kvaerner Singapore Pte Ltd v UDL Shipping Pte Ltd [1993] SGHC 146 [20] (Kvaerner). Emphasis added. This 
also begs the question on what constitutes a ‘dishonest act’ – what standard of dishonesty would apply to 
ground a restraint? 
513  Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932, 954: “…it is a mistake to suppose that an actual intention to chea t must 
always be proved.”  
514  Rickett, n329, 74-75. 
515  Leff, n400, 497; Baxt, n524, 396. 
516  Rickett, n329, 89: "[L]egislatures might be excused for thinking that the increased use of the term by the judges 
meant that the latter actually knew what the term [unconscionability ] meant!". 
517  Mason, n196. “There is the objection that if contracts are to be set aside on the ground that they are unfair 
judges would run some risk of deciding cases by reference to personal and subjective opinions rather than by 
reference to acceptable standards. ” 
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If unconscionability were regarded as synonymous with the judge's 
sense of what is fair between the parties, the beneficial 
administration of the broad principles of equity would degenerate 
into an idiosyncratic intervention in conveyancing transactions.518 
Similar fears have been expressed with respect to the unconscionability provisions 
in UCC §2-302. Given that ‘unconscionability’ is not defined in the Code, Shulkin 
states that it “leaves the applicability of the section solely to the discretion of the 
individual court, a factor, it is feared, which will lead to abuse, inconsistency and 
carelessness in decision making.”519 
The development and application of unconscionable conduct to commercial 
transactions is symbiotic with a general shift in western societal mores dealing with 
commercial conduct.520 Courts are now “increasingly curtailing the pursuance of 
self-interest” that once was seen as a commercial virtue which would not have 
been interfered with. 521 
Some commentators however have expressed reservations. One believes that the 
lack of specificity around definitions of unconscionable conduct has seeped into 
the Australian statutory regime as well. Rickett is vociferous in condemning the 
relevant sections of the TPA for their imprecision. His view is unequivocal:  
That legislation should push judges into such an imponderable 
situation is…quite unacceptable of the legislature. Legislatures may 
well be able to do what they want, but they do not act 
constitutionally…if they merely foist onto judges the application of 
categories of meaningless reference.522 
The full bench in World Best was firm with respect to the legislation varying 
substantive rights under the auspices of an ambiguous concept of 
unconscionability, stating: 
Over recent decades legislatures have authorised courts to 
rearrange the legal rights of persons on the basis of vague general 
standards which are clearly capable of misuse unless their 
                                                     
518  Stern, n352, 479. 
519  M Shulkin, 'Unconscionability - The Code the Court and the Consumer' (1968) 9(2) Boston College Law Review  
367, 369. 
520  Rickett, n329, 87. 
521  Vout, n15, 114. 
522  Rickett, n329, 88-89. 
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application is carefully confined. Unconscionability is such a 
standard.523 
4.4. The Issue of Moral Obloquy 
Australian unconscionability has recently seen the introduction of a new element of 
‘moral obloquy’. It originally arose as a result of “Spigelman CJ… evaluating the 
concept of statutory unconscionability as used in the Retail Leases Act.”524 His 
Honour held that the application of the statutory prohibition could only be 
conducted where “highly unethical” circumstances existed bearing “a high level of 
moral obloquy”.525 This view was expressly adopted by the Federal Court 526 and by 
Gageler J in the High Court.527 This new element has given rise to much discussion 
in judicial circles. 
As McLeod states: 
The first problem with any requirement for ‘moral obloquy’ or a 
variation thereof, then, is that the phrases themselves are arguably 
so ambiguous as to be unable to practically serve as a useful 
benchmark for what it means for conduct to be ‘unconscionable’. 528 
The adoption of this doctrine is a genuine issue for independent instrument 
unconscionability. Since World Best,529 a “weight of authority…has adopted the 
requirement for ‘moral obloquy’” in unconscionability matters. 530 If there is a 
requirement to prove moral obloquy, despite no mention of it in the statute 
whatsoever,531 then the provision would not extend to independent instrument 
matters and plaintiffs would be denied access to relief under the statute. 
One recent Australian case provided that unconscionability must be measured 
“against conscience by reference to the norms of society that is in question” , 
disregarding any need to evidence moral obloquy.532 This position, if widely 
                                                     
523  World Best, n506 [119]. Emphasis added. 
524  R Baxt, 'What place does moral obloquy have in the evaluation of statutory unconscionable conduct?' (2014 ) 88 
Australian Law Journal 396, 396. 
525  World Best, n506, [121]. P Vout, 'Unconscionability and Good Faith in Business Transactions' (2013)  National 
Commercial Law Seminar Series (Online),  [18]: maintains that ‘moral obloquy’ has “rapidly become part of an 
accepted judicial definition of the phrase “unconscionable conduct” where no statutory definition exists ”. 
526  ACCC v Woolworths Limited  [2016] FCA 1472 [131]. 
527  Paciocco v ANZ Banking Group [2016] HCA 28 [188]. 
528  McLeod, n389, 129. 
529  World Best, n506. 
530  McLeod, n389, 126. 
531  In Paciocco, n108 [305], Allsop CJ made clear that the normative enquiry into unconscionability is “tied to the 
words of the statute.” 
532  ACCC v Lux Distributors  [2013] FCAFC 90, 41. 
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adopted, would remove the need to develop a subjective test for moral obloquy.533 
Certainly it will be fatal to any independent instrument matters hoping to fall under 
the ACL’s unconscionability provisions if an element of moral obloquy needs to be 
satisfied. 
This thesis argues that the presence of ‘moral obloquy’, whatever that might be, 
may be probative but should not be definitive. In that way, the relief available 
under the ACL will extend to independent instrument plaintiffs facing abusive 
demands which, it is argued here with respect, was the intention of the Parliament.  
4.5. Summary 
The above demonstrates that framing the doctrine of unconscionable conduct can 
only be accomplished in the broadest of senses. Unconscionability and bad faith 
are said to have much in common and the authorities demonstrate that this is so  to 
some extent. The term 'unconscionable conduct' has been found to mean different 
things in different contexts. 
The doctrines of 'unconscionable conduct' are being applied to an ever-widening 
field of commercial matters. 534 Much of this widening has been in the expansion in 
the application of substantive unconscionability. Unfortunately, this wider 
application has not been accompanied by a commensurate judicial clarifica tion on 
the philosophical underpinnings to substantive unfairness. This has the potential to 
result in misapplication of the doctrine. It is possible that the lack of an historic 
jurisprudence might be the reason why a test has not yet been developed for 
substantive unconscionability. 
  
                                                     
533  McLeod, n389, 127. 
534  McCullough, n432, 785-86, ‘The Recent Rise in the Use of Unconscionability ’. 
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5.0. Categorising Unconscionable Conduct 
5.1. Rationale 
Categorisation provides the capacity to look at like cases, provides a vocabulary 
for conduct and relief, and allows hierarchical structures to be developed to aid 
with contextualisation. The following section addresses each of these.  
Categorisation enables counsel to explain how certain behaviours are 
‘unconscionable’, ie how they offend good conscience. Both courts and legislatures 
have categorically refused to define ‘unconscionability’ because of the r isk of 
exclusion by definition. 
However, as actual, unique factual matrices are examined, similarities between 
specific behaviours become evident, and it becomes easier to define and identify 
individual characteristics of the different categories of unconscionable conduct. It 
also allows visibility on what conduct is not considered unconscionable. 
By categorising the different types of matters alleging unconscionability which 
have been addressed by the court, categorisation of  new matters is eased. The 
facts of those matters can be better viewed in light of specific unconscionable 
outcomes.535 
Categorisation ought to provide the plaintiff with a context against which to assess 
their likelihood of success. From the context comes the language to connect their 
specific argument with the authorities, but this opportunity often appears missed. 
For example, analysis of independent instrument disputes often finds that the 
demand complained of as ‘unconscionable’ (in a generic sense)  is more akin to 
‘harsh or oppressive insistence on a right’. 536  
However, the opinions published by the Court rarely mention any attempt by 
counsel to categorise the conduct on which they hope to ground an injunction but 
complain of the conduct itself, leaving the court to determine whether it falls within 
an established category. 537 It appears at least that Counsel typically attempts to 
show why the alleged behaviour is vaguely ‘unconscionable’, rather than 
                                                     
535  Vout, n15, 111[35.5.40]. 
536  This has rarely been plead directly in independent instrument disputes.  
537  One exception is Clough(No.1) [78] which argued inter alia the demand was a harsh insistence on a right, which 
the Court defined as a right “used arbitrarily, or capriciously or unreasonably or in bad faith ”. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 111 of 270 
 
specifically why it is ‘harsh or oppressive’. To succeed,  a plaintiff’s argument must 
specifically identify the established category of unconscionability into which it fits. 
Categorisation provides a more concise view of a narrower band of behaviours and 
the easier it becomes to match actual conduct with doctrinal markers. The 
elements of proof required, distilled from the authorities, would consequently be 
narrowed and focussed to guide the court’s reasoning and the relief available.  
For example, ‘substantive unconscionability’ can be evidenced from the 
substantive terms of, operation of, or outcomes from a contract and what would 
reasonably be expected from that contract. ‘Oppressive rights enforcement’ might 
be evidenced by showing that a demand against an independent instrument will 
cause such an unconscionably harsh effect as to attract equity’s intervention. An 
‘exploitation’ or ‘exploitative situation’ can be demonstrated by means of the 
showing a significant differential between the bargaining position of the parties. 
Alternately, these could all be referred to generically as ‘unconscionable’ and left 
to the court to categorise, which it may decline to do.  
So vocabulary then becomes strategically important for plaintiff’s counsel. Through 
categorisation and consequent concise identification of unconscionability’s 
elements, it becomes easier to articulate how specific behaviours fit into 
categories of unconscionability. There are issues with vocabulary however. Matters 
that may once have been simply ‘equitable fraud’ might today be called ‘procedural 
unconscionability’.538 (These are “cases that, although classified as fraud, did not 
require proof of an intention to deceive”. 539) Many cases of this type are now 
broadly characterised under the doctrine of ‘unconscionability’. Meanwhile the term 
‘equitable fraud’ is still used in some specific contexts. 540 
  
                                                     
538  For example Nevill v Snelling (1880) 15 ChD 679 where a moneylender was relying on the threat of public 
humiliation to protect him from loss after extending excessive credit to a young gentleman.  
539  Dal Pont, n307, 267[8.05]. 
540  Equitable duress and fraud on a power for example.  
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5.2. Historical Categorisation 
At the most abstract level of categorisation, ‘unconscionable conduct’ or 
‘unconscionability’ arguably sweeps up all the various doctrine of fraud, estoppel, 541 
and equitable fraud, which includes ‘unconscionable dealing’, 542 unilateral mistake, 
duress, undue influence, and misrepresentation. 543 
The ‘catching bargains’ cases are an early example of a categorisation of 
unconscionable conduct cases 544 and this contributed significantly to the early 
development of the wider doctrine. In one seminal case, Chesterfield v Janssen 
(1750), Lord Hardwicke listed and discussed five types of fraud. It is from these 
that much understanding of the nature and variety of fraud and equitable fraud has 
devolved.  
The first two of the five provide that fraud is: 
1. dolus malus…actual, arising from the facts and circumstances 
of imposition;  
2. apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain 
itself; such as no man in his senses and not under delusion 
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man 
would accept on the other, which are unequitable and 
unconscientious bargains. 545 
The first of these is egregious fraud much as is applied today. The second-listed is 
the most likely basis for contemporary substantive unconscionability, 546 as it 
provides for:  
intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which can be presumed from the 
grossly unfair nature of the terms of the contract. 547 
                                                     
541  Vout, n15, 161[35.6.190] points out that estoppel itself suffers from a range of sub-categorisations, such as 
common law and equitable estoppel; promissory estoppel; etc; and categorisations that reflect “the manner by 
which the estoppel is created, such as by record, by deed”. It is beyond the scope of this paper to inve stigate 
these in any detail. 
542  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 429. 
543  For the purposes of this thesis, the historical category of ‘unconscionable dealing’ will be treated as the parent 
of ‘unconscionable conduct’ only in its procedural sense as it is also constrained to procedural 
unconscionability, ie where there is ‘special disadvantage’.  The other categories in this list are supported by a 
body of law relating to quite distinct behaviours from those concerned with deman ds against independent 
instruments. See p.84. 
544  See p.79. 
545  Chesterfield, n333, 155-56. Emphasis added. 
546  “If substantive unconscionability exists then that may be  the head of power on which it is grounded.” : Professor 
R Grantham, personal discussions with the author 08/02/2017, University of Queensland.  
547  J Murray, Contracts: Cases and Materials  (LexisNexis, 6th ed, 2006), 503-504[17]. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 113 of 270 
 
What is apparent from the literature is that much academic and judicial effort has 
been given to the question of where the doctrine of unconscionability arose, and 
how it affects our understanding of unconscionability today. Much however 
remains unclear including the judicial basis for contemporary substantive 
unconscionable conduct, under which all independent instrument disputes to date 
have fallen. 
Lord Hardwicke also provided an indication of a unifying doctrine for these various 
categories of fraud: 
The principle, on which the court has gone in these cases, is an 
unconscionable bargain, and it being contrary to public convenience 
to encourage it. Such contracts are generally founded in oppression 
by taking advantage of the borrower’s necessity. 548 
This is reflected to some extent in Lord Denning’s judgement in Bundy wherein, 
after looking at a number of unconscionability cases, his Honour stated: 
Gathering all together, I would suggest that through all these 
instances there runs a single thread. They rest on ‘inequality of 
bargaining power’. 549 
In this somewhat anomalous finding, Denning LJ held – contrary to the authorities 
at the time – an “inequality of bargaining power to be a sufficient and independent 
ground of relief.”550 In 1985 the Court of Appeal in obiter narrowed the finding in 
Bundy stating: 
In fact Lord Denning M.R.’s judgement in Lloyds Bank v Bundy 
merely laid down the proposition that where there was unequal 
bargaining power the contract could not stand if the weaker did not 
have separate legal advice. 551 
This view of the plaintiff’s access to legal advice when considering the defendant’s 
conduct remains good law.  
                                                     
548  Chesterfield, n333, 129. 
549  Bundy, n341. It should be noted that these ‘unifying themes’ have largely been rejected in most jurisdictions: 
see Berbatis (No.3), n382. Also Lord Denning’s was a minority view on the bench.  
550  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 435[35.9.230]. It is no doubt decisions of this kind that led Harman LJ in 
Campbell Discount Company v Bridge  [1961] 1 QB 445,459, to say: “…the system of equity for good or evil has 
been a very precise one, and equitable jurisdiction is exercised only on well -known principles. There are some 
who would have it otherwise and I think Lord Denning is one of them.” (Cited  in Heydon, n309, 441[fn49]).  
551  Lobb, n368, 181[H]. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 114 of 270 
 
From the legal scholar’s perspective, Bundy is valuable for Lord Denning’s 
dissertation on unconscionability. His Lordship provided a general view of the law 
of unconscionable conduct, discussing the doctrine and commenting on its 
similarity with other forms of equitable relief.  His Honour discussed the following 
five categories of conduct based on an extensive review of the authorities: 
1. Duress of Goods; 
2. Expectant Heir; 
3. Undue Influence; 
4. Undue Pressure; 
5. Salvage Agreements.552 
Since Bundy, the High Court of Australia has categorically denied any jurisdiction 
to unequal bargaining power, holding that leveraging unequal bargaining power 
does not equate to benefitting from a “special disadvantage” and therefore does 
not constitute unconscionable conduct.553 
Much work has been done both in the courts and in academia to structure 
unconscionable conduct and to provide certainty and coherence to the doctrine.  
Before discussing the scope of unconscionable conduct, the Singapore Court of 
Appeal in Dauphin echoed many similar judicial statements to the effect that it 
does: 
[N]ot think it is possible to define ‘unconscionability’ other than to 
give some very broad indications such as a lack of bona fides. What 
kind of situation would constitute unconscionability would have to 
depend on the facts of each case…There is no pre-determined 
categorisation.554 
Concern regarding the categorisation of unconscionable conduct was also 
expressed by the court when Gleeson CJ stated: 
                                                     
552  Bundy, n341, [III.Categories]. Lord Denning provides authorities with ratio in English jurisprudence for each of 
these categories of conduct. Bundy’s factual matrix is remarkably similar to the Australian case Amadio, n342. 
553  Berbatis (No.3), n382 [5]: “The doctrine [of unconscionability] does not apply simply because one party has made a 
poor bargain.” 
554  Dauphin Offshore Engineering Pte Ltd v HRH Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zayed [2000] 1 SLR 657 (Dauphin) 
[42]. Emphasis added. This statement would appear to contradict the plethora of opinion to substantiate the 
established categories of unconscionable conduct. 
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There is a risk that categories, adopted as a convenient method of 
exposition of an underlying principle, might be misunderstood, and 
come to supplant the principle. 555 
Despite this risk, categorisation does allow clustering of behaviours deemed 
unconscionable and ultimately makes newly alleged conduct easier to test.  
Wells’ attempt at categorisation drew from authorities relating to consumer law in 
the US and listed eight "circumstances in which a merchant or supplier might be 
deemed to have committed an unconscionable act or practice": 
1. Taking advantage of the inability of a consumer to protect his 
interests; 
2. Charging a price which, at the time of the transaction, grossly 
exceeds either the supplier's cost or the price at which similar 
property or services are readily obtainable; 
3. Entering into a consumer contract from which...the consumer 
will be unable to receive a substantial benefit; 
4. Entering into a consumer transaction in which...there is no 
reasonable probability of payment of the contract in full by the 
consumer; 
5. Inducing a consumer to enter into a transaction which is 
excessively one-sided against the consumer; 
6. Making a misleading statement of opinion on which the 
consumer is likely to rely; 
7. Coercing the consumer...so as to cause him to act contrary to 
his own free will or to submit to a situation or condition against 
his own volition and interest; 
8. Breaching a confidential or fiduciary relationship in a consumer 
transaction.556 
                                                     
555  Berbatis (No.3), n382 [10]. 
556  Wells, n81, 315-321. 
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Conveniently, this list takes the broadest possible scope of 'unconscionable 
conduct’, drawing on the full tableau of unconscionable behaviours, albeit from a 
consumer context.557 
Parkinson and Vout takes a different approach by referring to the “notion of 
unconscionability” being given specificity through a number of doctrines: 558 
1. Exploitation of vulnerability or weakness; 
2. Abuse of position of trust or confidence; 
3. Insistence upon legal rights in circumstances which make that 
insistence harsh or oppressive; 
4. Inequitable denial of legal obligations; 
5. Unjust retention of property. 559 
In addition to these, a final category is suggested by Gilmour J in Clough(No.1), 
affirming Legione,560 that “a party, having caused or contributed to the other party’s 
breach…cannot now purport to exercise its rights.” 561 If such causative behaviour 
can be argued as another doctrine of unconscionability, it adds another category to 
the above list, suggested as: 
6. Exercise of a right arising from a breach caused by the 
right-holder so as to trigger the exercise of that right. 
This suggested category reflects the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio.562 
UN-CIGSLC Art.19(2)(d)] also provides support for it, stating: 
A demand has no conceivable basis when…fulfilment of the 
underlying obligation has clearly been prevented by wilful misconduct 
of the beneficiary. 
Juridical foundations for this category can be found in Royal Design where 
unconscionability was “based on delays in construction that were caused by the 
beneficiary’s own default in failing to make timely payments”.563 
                                                     
557  Australian statutory unconscionability is also founded in Consumer Law.  
558  Four of these are listed and referred to as “classes of case” in Samton(No.2), n383 [47]. 
559  Parkinson, ‘Notion of Unconscionability’, in Vout, n15, 109-110. 
560  Legione, n346 [20] “equity does not intervene to grant specific performance...where the party seeking specific 
performance is in default .” 
561  Clough(No.1), n442. 
562  Holman v Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121: From a dishonourable cause an action does not ar ise. 
A court will not assist a plaintiff to pursue any legal remedy if the right to it arises in connection with the 
plaintiff’s own unlawful act.  
563  Royal Design, n148, described thus in Dauphin, n554, [46]. Emphasis added. 
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In Kvaerner, the Court held that an attempt by a beneficiary to take advantage of a 
performance guarantee after failing to fulfil a condition precedent was 
unconscionable where their failure provided the justification for making the 
demand.564  
So this additional category is a valid contribution to framing the unconscionability 
doctrine and has implications for independent instrument unconscionability.  
In Samton(No.2), the full Federal Court of Australia, referring to a specific text, 565 
provided that categories 1-4 above can be supported by the following “broad 
standards” of behaviour: 
1. That those in positions of strength or influence should not take 
advantage of another's relative weakness. 
2. That people should not, by appeal to strict legal rights, cause 
hardship to others by violating their reasonable expectations.  
3. That those in fiduciary positions should act only in the interests 
of those to whom those fiduciary duties are owed. 566 
The Bench went on to describe the equitable responses to breaches of these 
standards, which includes setting aside or rescinding contracts (procedural 
unconscionability), and preventing parties from exercising their legal rights harshly 
(substantive unconscionability). 
Flagging the relevance of materiality, the Court emphasised that “[t]here are 
different thresholds of conduct in [the] various categories, all of which may be 
described as unconscionable.”567 Calibrating these different thresholds with 
consistency is where the challenge lies. 
Getzler acknowledges that the array of contractual and non-contractual behaviours 
described as ‘unconscionable’ “cannot comprehensively be classified” but 
nevertheless proposes four categories: 
1. procuring an unconscionable bargain; 
2. exercising harsh or oppressive remedial rights;  
                                                     
564  Kvaerner, n512. The Court held at 344[6] that “ it was eminently just and convenient to restrain a party from 
taking advantage of his own wrong .” 
565  Law Book Company, Laws of Australia, Vol.35.  
566  Samton(No.2), n383 [47]. With respect, these three ‘broad standards’ appear to be little more than a descriptive 
re-statement of the first three categories (nothing on the fourth), and do not advance the general understandin g 
of the doctrine. 
567  Samton(No.2), n383 [48]. See discussion on Materiality below p.249. 
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3. causing detrimental reliance by representation or conduct;  
4. abusing a consensual relationship.568 
In TTI Team, the English Court of Appeal summarised the law with respect to 
establishing a ‘breach of faith’ sufficient to restrain a demand on an independent 
instrument. ‘Bad faith’ and ‘unconscionable conduct’ are considered 
jurisprudentially similar, although the bifurcation of ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ 
does not apply to the doctrine of good faith in contracts. 569 
The English authorities, as summarised in TTI Team amidst a broader “Summary 
of the Law”,570 provide that to establish such a breach, clear evidence must be 
adduced to show: 
1. a failure by the beneficiary to provide an essential element of 
the underlying contract on which the bond depends; or 
2. a misuse by the beneficiary of the guarantee by failing to act in 
accordance with the purpose for which it was given; or 
3. a total failure of consideration in the underlying contract; or  
4. a threatened call by the beneficiary for an unconscionable 
ulterior motive; or  
5. a lack of an honest or bona fide belief by the beneficiary that 
the circumstances, such as poor performance, against which a 
performance bond has been provided, actually exist. 571 
While this law does not apply in those jurisdictions where unconscionability has 
been applied to independent instruments, it demonstrates the desirability for cases 
to be classified. It also assists with comparative law efforts to distinguish between 
bad faith and unconscionable conduct. 
The attempt to rationalise the doctrine of unconscionability by means of case 
categorisation is so that the facts might be tested against a narrower range of like 
cases. For example, categorisation of ‘unconscionable conduct’ cases enable 
courts to better distinguish between ‘species’ applicable to independent 
                                                     
568  J Getzler, 'Unconscionable Conduct and Unjust Enrichment as Grounds for Judicial Intervention' (1990) 1 6(2) 
Monash University Law Review  283, 284. 
569  The spirit and intent of these categories of ‘bad faith’ are widely reflected in the law of unconscionability.  
570  TTI Team, n211, 5.3.[46]. 
571  TTI Team, n211, 5.3.[46(3)]. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 119 of 270 
 
instruments: the harsh insistence on a right, inappropriate conduct during 
formation, and beneficiary wilful misconduct. If argued in more general terms, 
these distinctions become harder to find and the behaviours more difficult to 
describe and prove. 
For example, it has been found that neither ‘loss of reputation’ 572 nor consequent 
financial difficulty is sufficient to found harsh or oppressive conduct in relation to a 
demand on an independent instrument. To begin, these are not behaviours – they 
are outcomes and cannot therefore be categorised as a type of conduct. They are 
descriptions of effects and the plaintiff must either show how the the behaviour 
that led to that result is unconscionable or how the outcome itself is 
unconscionable. 
It is posited here that plaintiffs might see an improved rate of successful appeals 
for relief from unconscionability if the multi-layered view of the doctrine were more 
widely understood. To this end, a model of unconscionability is offered below with 
a vocabulary to describe the relationship of the elements to each other.  
5.3. The ‘Family’ of Unconscionability 
This thesis proposes a categorisation of ‘unconscionability’ into three levels 573 – 
‘family’, ‘genus’, and ‘species’ – to assist with designing the doctrine so it can be 
better understood and the law consistently found.574 
At the peak of the hierarchy is the ‘Family’ of generic ‘Unconscionability’ which is 
the broadest categorisation. The ‘Family’ sits alongside the range of equitable 
grounds for remedy in commercial situations. ‘Fraud’ as a ‘doctrinal family’ sits at 
this level. 
‘Genus’ sub-categories are the broad doctrinal realms of unconscionability such as 
‘Undue Influence’, ‘Mistake’, ‘Duress’ and ‘Unconscionable Conduct’. ‘Species’ 
categories would be the sub-categories of the doctrine of Unconscionable Conduct 
such as ‘exploitation of vulnerability or weakness’ and ‘harsh or oppressive 
insistence on a right’. The ‘species’ categories are best plead as grounds for 
restraint because the elements to be evidenced have clearer lines of authority and 
this lack of recognition of the grounds is what appears lacking from the authorities. 
                                                     
572  Bocotra, n149 [49]. 
573  The lowest three biological major taxonomic ranks.  
574  These terms are used throughout this thesis.  
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It is at this level that specific behaviour can be identified, described and 
determined as unconscionable or not. Words such as ‘exploita tion’ and 
‘oppressive’ have better-defined meanings in law and common usage, with strong 
lines of judicial authority to support them. Applying those definitions to actual 
behaviours becomes more pedestrian within a specific context such as 
independent instruments. 
Importantly, not all ‘genus’ or ‘species’ of unconscionability will apply to 
independent instruments. 
 
 
This taxonomy575 provides a depiction of the family of conduct described under the 
umbrella term ‘Unconscionability’. This ‘laminating’of unconscionability has judicial 
support. In Berbatis(No.1), French J noted: 
The concept of unconscionability is arguably to be found at two 
levels in the unwritten law.  There is a generic level which informs 
the fundamental principle according to which equity acts.  There is 
the specific level at which the usage of “unconscionability” is  limited 
to particular categories of case.576 
This structure echoes the High Court of Australia:  
Each doctrine may be seen as a species of that genus of equitable 
intervention to refuse enforcement of or to set aside transactions 
which, if allowed to stand, would offend equity and good 
conscience.  577 
                                                     
575  P=Procedural; S=Substantive 
576  Berbatis (No.1), n360 [23]. 
577  Bridgewater, n371 [73] 
Equitable Fraud 
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Finally, Mason J in Amadio, supports such a categorisation, saying “fraud...undue 
influence and unconscionable conduct...all constitute species of unconscionable 
conduct”.578 
6.0. Independent Instruments and Unconscionability Law: Issues 
Unconscionability jurisprudence remains partly unsettled, despite the plethora of 
case law. This injects further uncertainty into the law of independent instruments. It 
is posited here that the primary reason for much of the instability and uncertainty 
surrounding unconscionable conduct, especially in relation to independent 
instruments, is the lack of recognition for, and application of the different doctrines 
of procedural and substantive unconscionability. This appears uniform across 
jurisdictions. 
Historically, “[t]he equitable doctrine of unconscionable dealing confers no power 
on courts to set aside bargains merely on the basis of their content. ”579  Because 
independent instrument matters are all content-based disputes,580 it follows that the 
power used to ground injunctions in Singapore, Malaysia and Australia could not 
have been grounded on the tenets of unconscionable dealing. This is also evident 
from the lack of special disadvantage and a general paucity of bargaining 
naughtiness where sophisticated commercial parties are involved. It must therefore 
be dealt with substantively but this has not to date been expressly recognised and 
refined. 
In Australia, “it is statute that confers upon the court the power to set aside a 
bargain on the ground that its terms are unconscionable.” 581 It is well settled that 
the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 582 prevails against the independence 
principle.583 
Consideration of both procedural and substantive issues is provided for in ss20~21 
ACL.584 Both sections are directed to equity for guidance on unconscionable 
conduct but s21 ACL is expressly not constrained to those principles. 585 However in 
                                                     
578  Amadio, n342, 460. 
579  Dal Pont, n307, 294[9.10]. 
580  See Chs.4&5 below. 
581  Dal Pont, n307, 294[9.10]. 
582  French, R, 2012, The Courts and the Parliament  (Qld Supreme Court Seminar 04/08/12), 2. 
583  Boral (No.2), n61 [74]. Emphasis added. 
584  See discussion on TPA/ACL, p.184.  
585  Vout, n15, 430[35.9.30]. Also see Section B-1.2 above. Commentators like Rickett have expressed concern 
about the basis upon which the court is meant to ground an injunction for unconscionability beyond the 
boundaries of the unwritten law.  
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no independent instrument matter has the court taken the opportunity to coherently 
explain how procedural and substantive unconscionability should be differentiated 
within that jurisdiction. 
As the majority of independent instrument matters are seeking interlocutory 
injunctions, which are an equitable relief, they are typically heard in the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction in Singapore and Malaysia. 586 It is therefore in equity that the 
jurisprudential basis for the intervention provided in Singapore/Malaysia must be 
found. However, other than acknowledging the departure from the English 
position,587 no Singaporean court has provided an analysis of the elements of 
unconscionability used to prove the conduct found unfair. The Singaporean court 
has therefore acknowledged a different position but has not yet taken the 
opportunity to explain the jurisprudential basis for the new ground. 
Such detail is vital for the purposes of laying down precedent . Without established, 
enunciated elements to put to proof, the classification of conduct as 
‘unconscionable’ might become increasingly arbitrary and subjective, which gives 
rise to the above-mentioned judicial concern. 588 
The lack of specificity on the constructive elements required to prompt judicial 
intervention for breaches of substantive unconscionability is of concern. No 
Singaporean case589 addresses the fundamental question:  
If substantive unconscionability can ground in equity a restraint on 
an otherwise lawful demand, what elements must be shown prima 
facie to exist to establish it? 
In both Raymond590 and Min Thai Chai J ventured to elaborate on the parameters of 
the notion of ‘unconscionability’, stating it: 
                                                     
586  In Australia, independent instrument matters are heard under the court’s civil jurisdiction and the power of 
injunction is provided pursuant to the s232 ACL. 
587  GHL, n21, [16]: “We accept that to that extent, Bocotra is a departure, and if we may respectfully say so, a 
conscious departure, from the English position. ” This departure from the English position equates to a reworking 
of the equitable doctrine of unconscionable conduct without a considered justification, explanati on or detailed 
analysis of the new doctrine being provided, ie why substantive unconscionable conduct is now sufficient; how 
such conduct affects contractual rights; and what elements have to be put to proof to find a prima facie case. 
588  See comment by Brennan J, p.107. 
589  GHL, n21; Eltraco, n407; Samwoh (No.2), n763 respectively. 
590  Raymond Construction Pte Ltd v Low Yang Tong and AGF Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd  [1996] SGHC 136 
(Raymond). In both these cases the beneficiary was restrained from making a demand against the independent 
instrument in question. Chai J might be described as the ‘Father of the Unconscionability Exception’ in 
Singapore and Malaysia as both these cases were persuasive in subsequent unconscionability cases concerning 
independent instruments. However, Thean JA might also claim this title as he was on the bench in Royal Design, 
Bocotra, GHL, Dauphin, Eltraco, and Samwoh, all but one of which (Dauphin) ultimately restrained the demand 
against the instrument. 
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involves unfairness, as distinct from dishonesty or fraud, or conduct 
so reprehensible or lacking in good faith that a court of conscience 
would either restrain the party or refuse to assist. 591 
With respect however, while this may be descriptive, it is not prescriptive. The 
terms used are vague and subjective for generic application, giving rise to the 
possibility of misinterpretation and misapplication. This is common among many of 
the authorities – the Bench describes behaviour as ‘unconscionable’ but does not 
indicate why it is unconscionable, other than by reference to itself. 592 
The legal stability of independent instrument is essential to their inherent integrity. 
This was noted in Civilbuild(No.1)593 where Kin JC, discussing unconscionability, 
stated: 
It is important that the law in relation to such bonds be placed on a 
clear and unambiguous footing in order that they continue to be 
accepted by beneficiary parties whether in Singapore or abroad. 594 
The law of unconscionability in relation to independent instruments cannot yet be 
said to have clarity. This is especially so with respect to the identification and 
application of the elements required to prove the conduct, despite an extensive 
line of authority. With the advent of the ‘Asplenium Clause’,595 it may never get the 
opportunity in Singapore. With the increasingly higher bar set to prove 
unconscionability in Australia under the statute, plaintiffs might seek future redress 
in other jurisdictions. 
7.0. Findings on Unconscionability 
Despite the commentary and depth of authority, ‘unconscionable conduct’ 
continues to defy accurate scoping by definition. It cannot be stated with certainty 
what behaviours will constitute unconscionable conduct, although an extensive list 
of exclusions exists.596 This lack of clarity is part of the “fundamentally messy 
character of the common law legal system”. 597 The market however requires 
certainty and it can be argued that the parameters of those ‘species’ of 
                                                     
591  Min Thai Holdings Pte Ltd v Sunlabel Pte Ltd  [1998] SGHC 395 [20]. 
592  For example, stating that unconscionable conduct is behaviour that is ‘unc onscientious’ is tautological.  
593  The findings from this court were mostly overturned on appeal.  
594  New Civilbuild Pte Ltd v Guobena Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 SLR 374 (Civilbuild (No.1)) [45]. 
595  Asplenium(No.2), n212. Also Wooler, n505. 
596  See p.251. 
597  M Kirby, Foreword to the Second Edition, Vout, n15, vii. 
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unconscionability which might affect independent instruments need further 
clarification. 
The common law is far from finding any universality with regard to 
unconscionability, or how to test its presence, or whether it is sufficiently egregious 
to attract equity’s attention. Denning MR’s view of a unifying concept of unequal 
bargaining power has not found favour. 
Insofar as the English authorities more broadly are concerned, while a contractual 
good faith doctrine exists, the concept of substantive unconscionability being 
allowed to contaminate commercial undertakings is an anathema to judicial 
policy.598 
Horowitz notes: 
one defence still lies beyond England's borders: unconscionable 
conduct…[the UK]…has not accepted that unconscionable conduct 
may be a defence to payment in respect of autonomous payment 
obligations.599 
Unconscionable conduct in the UK is founded on unconscionable dealing, and 
unconscionable dealing only provides relief to procedural unconscionability – there 
must be special disability or ‘bargaining naughtiness’. It is difficult to conceive of 
either circumstance arising in independent instrument disputes.  
Therefore the English courts have indicated a willingness to accept ‘bad faith’ as a 
defence to autonomous payment obligations given the right circumstances but not 
an unconscionability defence.600 
The behaviours that are alleged to be unconscionable in independent instrument 
disputes are substantive in nature and strictly speaking, in line with the authorities, 
cannot fall under the doctrine of unconscionable dealing. They do not apparently 
fall under any other contemporary category of unconscionability. It is for this 
reason that a special category of unconscionable conduct needs development to 
accommodate the characteristics of independent instruments. 601 
                                                     
598  D.Horowitz, n369, 130[6.02].  
599  D.Horowitz, n369, 131[6.03].  
600  The early cases are imprecisely expressed, referring to ‘breach of faith’, ‘bad faith’, “no honest belief (in the 
demand)” and similar phrases indicating an undefined form of unconscionable conduct. See inter alia, Cargill 
International SA v Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Group  [1996] 4 All ER 563 (QB) , 568: “The court will 
not grant an injunction…unless there has been a lack of good faith.”  
601  See ‘A New Category of Unconscionable Conduct’, Ch.6 below. 
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On the widening of the application of equity in commercial transactions, Kirby J 
(that “blackest of black-letter lawyers”),602  stated in Austotel: 
in particular circumstances protection from unconscionable conduct 
will be entirely appropriate. But courts should, in my view, be wary 
lest they distort the relationship of substantial, well-advised 
corporations in commercial transactions by subjecting them to the 
overly tender consciences of judges. 603 
This may be in part because unconscionable conduct will always retain an element 
of subjectivity that cannot be eliminated by any amount of precedent or legislative 
guidance. Dziedzic and Lindgren states: 
[I]t must be accepted that whether particular conduct constitutes 
unconscionable dealing will be largely a matter of opinion, that the 
scope for the operation of precedent and principle is limited and that 
much will depend on the facts of the individual case. 604 
Dal Pont notes that the issues outlined here are unlikely to become redundant any 
time soon and also notes his concern with the effect of these developments: 
[T]he impact of the concept of unconscionability in contract has 
been substantial to say the least, and shows little sign of receding. 
It marks a new flexibility, which no doubt brings justice to the 
individual, and may function to generate substantial uncertainty in 
contracting.605 
Developing a consistent and encompassing framework for unconscionability is 
complex and at times counter-intuitive, especially in relation to independent 
instruments, given the effect of their idiosyncratic character. The growth of 
substantive unconscionability alongside the doctrine of unconscionable dealing is 
difficult to accommodate within traditional equitable principles or to reconcile with 
categories of contemporary unconscionable conduct. As Rickett exclaims, 
"Standing alone, 'unconscionability' is a very slippery notion indeed." 606 
  
                                                     
602  M Kirby, Foreword to the First Edition , Vout, n15, vii. 
603  Austotel v Franklins Self Serve  (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 585-586. 
604  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 441[35.9.220].  
605  Dal Pont, n418 [83]. 
606  Rickett, n329,74. 
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Section C. Theoretical Foundations of the Unconscionability Exception 
This section reviews authorities governing and analysing the unconscionability 
exception to the independence principle of independent instruments. Consideration 
here is given to the judicial observations of courts in Australia, Singapore and 
other jurisdictions with respect to the exception. Academic discussion that 
describes and questions the existence and value of the exception is discussed with 
examples from the authorities to illustrate the development and parameters of 
independent instrument unconscionability. 
Application of the unconscionability exception is not complex per se. However the 
consistent identification of behaviour that is sufficiently unconscionable is 
problematic. This difficulty is burdened by the lack of clear jurisprudence by which 
the doctrine might develop, including consideration of the effects of substantive 
unconscionability. In addition, the unique and somewhat counter-intuitive nature of 
the independence principle itself adds difficulty.  
Only in Singapore has the Court expressly developed the unconscionability 
exception from within its equitable jurisdiction. Australian courts are required to 
exercise both their laws of statutory interpretation and the rules of equity to find 
unconscionable conduct. 
The remainder of this chapter reviews the global judicial and academic view of the 
exception and examines the lines of authority that have considered it. Matters 
considering the unconscionability exception heard in England, Canada, Malaysia, 
the US, and South Africa are also relied upon. 
1.0. Analysis of the Exception 
1.1 Introduction to the Unconscionability Exception 
This thesis does not engage in an extended analysis of the genesis of the 
unconscionability exception in Singapore as this has been completed elsewhere. 607 
An abbreviated review of the early case law is provided for contextual purposes. Of 
more salient interest are the later cases in the Singapore High Court which 
incontrovertibly established and refined the unconscionability exception, leading to 
Asplenium(No.2)608 and judicial affirmation of the ‘Asplenium Clause’.609 It is this line 
                                                     
607  See D.Horowitz, n369, 162-169. See also Ch.4 below. 
608  Asplenium(No.2), n212. 
609  Wooler, n505. 
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of cases that pollinated the Malaysian cases and threatened to spread further, a 
possibility probably arrested by the finding in Asplenium(No.2). 
Development of unconscionable conduct as an exception to the independence 
principle might be considered a jurisprudential progression from the fraud 
exception. Equitable fraud, which includes special disadvantage procedural 
unconscionability, 610 has been widened in Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia to 
incorporate substantive unconscionability in commercial matters.  
This thesis proposes the effect of unconscionability needs to be understood  in 
terms of where the contractual rights and obligations lie. Again, these independent 
instruments are unique and do not obey the usual principles of contract law, or 
equity, or even necessarily Hohfeldian reasoning. 611 
Both the fraud exception and the unconscionability exception are predicated on the 
independence principle. Immediately an independent instrument is issued, for most 
purposes it becomes independent of the contractual agreement that gave rise to it.  
No substantive dispute between the primary parties disturbs the obligation to 
honour.  
In its broadest context, the ‘exception’ to the independence principle (fraud, 
illegality, unconscionability, nullity) is a term by which to describe the Court’s use 
of a legal doctrine to ground an injunction. The injunction will restrain the agreed-
to demand-right held by the beneficiary of an independent instrument.  
To find the grounds upon which to found the doctrine, courts must lift the Veil of 
Autonomy. It looks to the contract and conduct beneath to determine whether the 
matters involved provide the necessary proof to satisfy the elements of a doctrine 
(such as unconscionable conduct) upon which to ground relief.  
One argument against this is that demand guarantees are so like letters of credit 
that the underlying contract should be similarly independent. However, the Court in 
Potton disagreed: 
                                                     
610  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 436[35.9.190].  
611  See p.22. Hohfeldian reasoning holds that an obligation that arises on one party will automatically give rise to a 
right in another person. This may not apply with independent instruments – the issuer undertakes an obligation 
to pay independent of the beneficiary (which is one basis for the argument that independent instruments are not 
contracts per se). This is one identified area of post-doctoral research. 
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[I]t would seem wrong to me if the court was not entitled to have 
regard to the terms of underlying contract…by a mere assertion that 
a performance bond is like a letter of credit.612 
Horowitz believes the instruments’ abstraction becomes threatened as a result.613 
She reasons that if the instruments are truly independent, neither lifting the veil nor 
any findings from that process should have any probative value with respect to 
determining the obligation to honour. 
However, the argument to this is that the process of considering the substantive 
issues through the veil of autonomy does not imply a determination of those 
issues.614 A strong prima facie case or its equivalent is the standard required; not 
incontrovertible evidence. The substantive issues are therefore leveraged for their 
probative value to ground a doctrine and consequently found an injunction. 
Whether this process offends the independence principle is arguable. 
It is proposed here that if the Court must look into the terms of the underlying 
contract and conduct, or their application or effect, to determine whether the 
demand-right should be restrained, it follows that, as provided in Sumatec(No.3),615 
the right to make a demand must arise expressly or impliedly from the underlying 
contract and not from the instrument itself. The independent instrument itself only 
gives rise to a Liberty616 to make a presentation and the right to sue for wrongful 
dishonour, ie the beneficiary is not obliged to do anything.617 
The following section outlines the judicial and academic support for the view that 
where an injunction restrains a beneficiary but does not curtail the issuer’s 
capacity to pay, the independence of the instrument is not affected. It follows that 
the ‘exception’ to the independence principle may be a fiction except where an 
issuer’s obligation to pay is restrained.  
 
                                                     
612  Potton, n709, 28. Emphasis added.  
613  D.Horowitz, n369, 1-3. 
614  Mount Sophia, n39 [47]: “a consideration of the disputes between the parties does not necessitate a substantive 
determination of them.” 
615  Sumatec (No.3), n170 [40(iii)]: “unconscionability is a doctrine which allows courts to deny enforcement of a 
contract because of abuses arising out of the contract”. 
616  This is equivalent to the Hohfeldian ‘incident’ of ‘Privilege’. Between the two instruments, the beneficiary has a 
right to make a complying demand, and no duty not to make a demand, and also the privilege not to make a 
demand should they so choose. See L Wenar, 'The Nature of Rights' (2005) 33(3) Online Journal of Philosophy 
and Public Affairs  223 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00032.x/full>, 224-228. 
617  See discussion on the source of demand-rights: p.22.  
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1.2. Restraint of Demand-Right and Honour Obligation 
It could be argued that an injunction restraining the beneficiary’s demand-right 
does not offend the independence principle because the issuer’s obligation to 
honour, which lies with the instrument, remains unaffected. The argument provides 
that only where the issuer is restrained that the question arises on piercing the veil 
of autonomy.  
Writing in the context of ‘breach of faith’ in the British jurisdiction, Horowitz said: 
[the injunction] did not involve any problem for the autonomy 
principle, as the injunction was to restrain the beneficiary from 
calling on the guarantee; it was not to restrain the bank from 
paying.618 
Early Singaporean cases do not accord with the view. In Brody, White619 and 
Bocotra, the Court “bestowed judicial imprimatur” 620 on the principle that “[t]here is 
no distinction between cases where an injunction is to restrain a bank or the 
beneficiary under the guarantee.” 621 
In Bocotra Karthigesu JA held: 
[i]t was irrelevant that the injunction in the present case was one 
which prevented the appellants from encashing the letter of credit, 
rather than one which restrained the bank from honouring the credit. 
The consequence would have been the same : the documentary 
credit contract between the bank and the appellants, which should 
be independent of the underlying contract between the appellants 
and the respondents, was in effect being frozen by the injunction 
obtained by the appellants. 622 
This view has become controversial. In the Victorian Court of Appeal  Callaway J 
disagreed with a statement made by the English court in Group Josi623 which 
supports the view that there is no difference between restraining the bank and the 
beneficiary: 
                                                     
618  D.Horowitz, n369, 133[6.05].  
619  Brody, White & Co v Chemet Handel Trading  (1993) 1 SLR 65 (CA). 
620  A Wong, 'Restraining A Call On A Performance Bond: Should 'Fraud Or Unconscionability' Be Th e New 
Orthodoxy' (2000) 12 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  132, 136. 
621  Bocotra, n149 [33(d)]. 
622  Ibid [34]. 
623  Group Josi, n257. 
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There is nevertheless an important difference between restraining a 
bank from honouring a guarantee and restraining the beneficiary 
from calling upon it. In the former case the moving party seeks to 
prevent the bank from performing its contract; in the latter case the 
moving party seeks to prevent the beneficiary from breaching a 
provision of the underlying contract. 624 
In Themehelp the Court went further, holding: 
[I]t does not seem...that the slightest threat is involved to the 
autonomy of the performance guarantee if the beneficiary is 
injuncted from enforcing it in proceedings to which the guarantor is 
not a party.625 
More recently in Boral(No.2), Austin J reviewed the authorities relating to the lifting 
of the veil of autonomy and found: 
[A]n injunction to restrain the beneficiary from breaching the 
underlying contract does not directly interfere with the autonomy of 
the payment obligation.626 
This view of an autonomy principle that only applies to the issuer’s obligation to 
honour was supported in the Malaysian Supreme Court of Appeal where Yusof JC 
stated: 
As between the immediate parties…[i]f there is clear evidence of 
fraud in the underlying contract, or unconscionability, the Court can 
interfere. In these two situations, the integrity and autonomy of the 
document will not be compromised, since the paying bank will not 
be directly prevented from acting on the document . It is the 
beneficiary that is prevented from making a call on the document on 
these grounds.627 
 
                                                     
624  Fletcher, n943, 27. 
625  Themehelp, n295, 99. 
626  Boral (No.2), n61 [41]. Emphasis added. His Honour added, somewhat contrarily, “the effect of intervening in this 
way is to break down the separation between the underlying contract and the independent financing contract”. 
The nature of this “break down” was not elaborated upon but superficially this description reads like a breach of 
independence. 
627  Focal Asia & Chye Heng v Raja Noraini Binti [2009] 1 LNS 913 [11: Conclusion]. Emphasis added. 
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Three years later, in Sumatec(No.3), the full bench of the Malaysian Supreme Court 
of Appeal held: 
[D]istinction must be drawn between an injunction to restrain a 
bank/issuer from making payment out on a performance bond 
(which is governed by the performance guarantee agreement) and 
an injunction to restrain a beneficiary from making a demand on the 
bond (which is governed by the underlying contract between the 
parties).628 
This statement implies that the right to make a demand arises out of the underlying 
contract. It will therefore be any unconscionable behaviour in relation to that 
underlying contract that the court will consider to answer a plea to restrain that 
right. 
The UN-CIGSLC has not provided significant guidance. It is worded such that 
either the issuer or the beneficiary can be restrained. Given a demand which has 
“no conceivable basis”, the UN-CIGSLC provides for a court to: 
issue an order to the effect that the beneficiary does not receive 
payment, including an order that the guarantor/issuer hold the 
amount of the undertaking.629 
The UN-CIGSLC therefore takes no position on the question of whether the 
independence principle is compromised by restraints against the issuer.  
1.3. Abstraction 
Another demonstrated means by which to determine the effect of various 
‘defences’ to payment such as ‘unconscionability’ is to evaluate the ‘degree of 
abstraction’ between the independent instrument and the underlying contract. 630 
Horowitz maps various exceptions to autonomy onto a “spectrum of abstraction” 
that plots the degree of abstraction between the instruments and the underlying 
contract.631  
 
                                                     
628  Sumatec (No.3), n170 [40(iii)]. Emphasis added. 
629  UN-CIGSLC [Art.20(1)(a)]  
630  This terminology is used widely in Europe. See CKT, n488. 
631  D.Horowitz, n369, 4[1.08]. The degree of abstraction represents the legal separation between the rights and 
obligations under one contract with those of another.  
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According to her theory, the degree of abstraction between the instruments decays 
as the inquiry becomes more substantive. That is, the more the court is required to 
inquire into the terms and conditions or outcomes from the operation of the 
underlying contract, the lesser the degree of abstraction, and therefore the more 
interdependent the two contracts become.  
Horowitz’ theory holds that the unconscionability exception requires too great a 
diminution of the level of abstraction, and therefore:  
English law…should not adopt a defence of unconscionable conduct 
in respect of [independent instruments]…because it would involve 
too much reference to the underlying contract.” 632 
She emphasises that it is the degree of abstraction that protects independent 
instruments: 
If the undertaking were interlinked with the underlying contract, 
there would be no protection [for the instrument] against defences 
arising under that contract, and the obligation would no longer be 
abstract.633 
In relation to the spectrum of abstraction she discusses an “ideal cut -off point [that 
is] movable for policy reasons”. 634 This ‘point’ represents the perfect degree of 
abstraction that allows for an egregious fraud defence 635 but refuses to admit 
investigations of a substantive nature. 636 This mooted “cut-off point” appears to be 
decided on the basis of an assessment of the “degree of abstraction”. 637 It may also 
be analogous to what is referred to in this thesis as the ‘Veil of Autonomy’, which 
reflects the legal separation between the independent instrument and the 
underlying contract/conduct. 
  
                                                     
632  Ibid 131[6.03]. Interestingly, Horowitz does not make a case for why the abstraction is important.  
633  Ibid 1[1.02]. With respect, the logic here does not follow. It might be better to say that ‘if the undertaking were 
interlinked, the obligation would no longer be abstract and therefore, there would be no protection against 
defences under the contract.’  
634  See the Spectrum of Abstraction in D.Horowitz, n369, 13-14[1.20]. 
635  ‘Fraud in the documents’ or ‘fraud as no honest belief’, but holds that ‘fraud in the transaction’ degrades the 
degree of abstraction too greatly to be an acceptable defence to payment. 
636  This pre-supposes that a perfect degree of abstraction is always optimal.  
637  D.Horowitz, n369, 5[1.09]: “The aim is to indicate this range broadly, rather than attempt to plot these defences 
on the spectrum as though this were an exact science.”  
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1.4. Singapore – Exception Jurisprudence 
The unconscionability exception in Singapore had an inauspicious beginning. 
Former Chief Justice Keong has stated without explanation that the doctrine was 
introduced into Singapore from Australia. 638 It is however, difficult to see how this 
view can be sustained given that Bocotra, the case widely held as seeding the 
exception, predates any significant Australian case pleading this cause of action. 639 
Also, Australian case law has rarely been referred to by the Singaporean court in 
any major unconscionability case in the line of authority. 640 
The case law indicates that the real influence in early Singaporean cases was two 
British cases Potton Homes641 and Edward Owen642 which were both mentioned in 
Singapore’s earliest successful “implicit unconscionability” 643 cases,  Royal Design644 
and Kvaerner.645 
Potton Homes is widely accepted as seeding the exception, 646 although 
unconscionability was neither found nor mentioned. Its reputed role in the 
development of the exception devolved from the following widely-quoted excerpt: 
As between buyer and seller the underlying contract cannot be 
disregarded so readily…Moreover, in principle I do not think it 
possible to say that in no circumstances whatsoever, apart from 
fraud, will the court restrain the buyer…If the contract is avoided or 
if there is a failure of consideration between buyer and seller for 
which the seller undertook to procure the issue of the performance 
bond, I do not see why…the seller should not be unable to prevent a 
call upon the bond.647 
However, this link might be considered specious given that neither British case is 
seen in its own jurisdiction as either establishing unconscionability as an exception 
to independence or even as acknowledging that one exists.  
                                                     
638  C. Keong, ‘Developments in Singapore Law 2006–2010: Trends and Perspectives’ (Speech delivered at the 
Singapore Academy of Law Conference 2011, Singapore, 24 February 2011) . 
639  S51AB and s51AC TPA were not introduced until 1992, one year prior to Kvaerner and just three years prior to 
Bocotra, which refers obliquely to “fraud and unconscionability” as exceptions to autonomy.  
640  Johns, n128, 312: “From Singapore, unconscionab ility has migrated to Australia and Malaysia, and its existence 
appears to have been acknowledged in Hong Kong.”  
641  Potton, n709. 
642  Edward Owen, n25. 
643  Johns, n128, 311. The ‘implicit cases’ are those wherein unconscionability was an implied ground for the 
injunction. 
644  Royal Design, n148. 
645  Kvaerner, n512. 
646  Johns, n128, 312. 
647  Potton, n709, 28. Emphasis added.  
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The line of precedent in Singapore can be bifurcated into the ‘pre-GHL’ cases and 
those found since where unconscionability was expressly endorsed by the Court. 
Johns and Blodgett separate the case law on the basis of whether 
unconscionability was “implicit” or “explicit” in the findings, further dividing 
“explicit” by jurisdiction.648  
In two cases immediately before GHL – Raymond Construction and Min Thai – 
there is no discussion of the autonomy of the independent instrument involved, and 
no reference to procedural or substantive unconscionability. However both were 
restrained on the basis that the demand was unconscionable. It is not until GHL 
that the Court gives prescriptive weight to the doctrine. 
GHL was a strongly worded judgement – it left no room for doubt whether the 
unconscionability exception exists in that jurisdiction. 649 The exactitude with which 
the bench dealt with a range of matters relating to unconscionability established 
characteristics of the exception. GHL is referenced frequently in subsequent 
independent instrument cases seeking to ground an injunction on unconscionable 
conduct in both Singapore and Malaysia. 650 
Soon after GHL, Tin and Thean JJA in Dauphin, devoted an entire section to the 
question “Is there a separate ‘unconscionability’ exception?” 651 
While discussing Bocotra, the Court went further than GHL, stating: 
the court in that case [Bocotra] was clearly conscious that fraud as 
a ground was quite distinct from that where you had to examine the 
circumstances surrounding the underlying contract. 652 
Ultimately Dauphin did not find the demand on the instrument unconscionable but 
provided: 
we would reaffirm…GHL v Unitrack that in Singapore 
‘unconscionability’ has been accepted as and is a separate ground 
in itself for granting injunctive relief insofar as a performance 
guarantee is concerned.653 
                                                     
648  Johns, n128, 311-320. This also reflects an equity/statute jurisdictional division in the head of power.  
649  Given its importance the case findings have been dealt with extensively elsewhere in this paper.  See GHL, 
n168; n21, and case analysis, p.151.  
650  Malaysia has developed its own line of authority on unconscionabi lity affecting independent instruments that 
mirrors the Singaporean line.  
651  Dauphin, n554 [34]. 
652  Ibid [37]. 
653  Ibid [42]. 
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The line of authority in Singapore from that point forward until Asplenium(No.2)654 
remained firmly grounded on these early cases. Other than needing to deal with a 
range of factual variables, the development of the unconscionability exception 
jurisprudence was straightforward; Bocotra, GHL and Dauphin provided sufficient 
certainty for the exception to develop organically and to be robust enough to deal 
with any variables. 655 
Before Asplenium(No.2) however, the Court heard Mount Sophia which provided an 
exhaustive review of the line of authority. As this author has stated previously: 
If it can be said that a line of authority has a denouement, a single 
seminal case that puts to rest any notion of doubt as to the 
existence and scope of a doctrine, then BS Mount Sophia is such a 
case. The full bench of the Court of Appeal addressed virtually 
every aspect of the unconscionability exception, quoted from a wide 
variety of domestic and non-Singaporean case law, statute and 
juridical commentary, and produced the magnum opus on the 
Singaporean Unconscionability Exception to the Autonomy Principle 
in Demand Guarantees and Letters of Credit. 656 
In Mount Sophia, Leong JA summarised the following seven “applicable principles” 
of the exception found previously by Pillai  J:657 
1. Whether there is unconscionability depends on the facts of 
each case. There is no pre-determined categorisation. 
2. In determining whether a call on a bond is unconscionable, the 
entire picture must be viewed, taking into account all the 
relevant factors. 
3. The concept of unconscionability involves unfairness, as 
distinct from dishonesty or fraud, or conduct of a kind so 
reprehensible or lacking in good faith that a court of 
conscience would either restrain the party or refuse to assist 
the party. 
                                                     
654  Asplenium(No.2), n212. It is essential to note that Asplenium(No.2) did not set aside the unconscionability 
exception; it provided a means by which to contractually restrain appeal to the exception.  
655  See the case analyses in Chapter 4 below.  
656  Wooler, n505, 173. 
657  Astrata (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Tridex Technologies Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 250, [73] (Astrata). 
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4. While in every instance of unconscionability there would be an 
element of unfairness, the reverse is not necessarily true. 
Unfairness per se does not constitute unconscionability.  
5. In intervening in a call on an on-demand bond/guarantee, the 
court is concerned with abusive calls on the bonds. 
6. Mere breaches of contract by the party in question would not 
by themselves be unconscionable. 
7. It is important that the courts guard against unnecessarily 
interfering with contractual arrangements freely entered into by 
the parties. The parties must abide by the deal they have 
struck.658 
With respect to unconscionability itself, Leong JA held: 
[A] finding of unconscionability is a conclusion applied to conduct 
which the court finds to be so lacking in bona fides such that an 
injunction restraining the beneficiary’s substantive rights is 
warranted. Sufficient reasons must be given to the court…and it is 
necessary that these reasons are drawn from a thorough 
consideration of the relevant facts…taking into account the parties’ 
conduct leading up to the call on the bond .659 
This is judicial support for lifting the veil of autonomy and for consideration of 
substantive unconscionability when determining whether a demand is abusive. 
The Singaporean courts have adhered to a standard of proof whereby the 
applicant must make a “strong prima facie case”, a threshold which the court has 
admitted is deliberately high. 660 
This in effect limits the risk-shift away from the account party. When the plaintiff 
prays for relief, the court is acutely aware that it is being asked to restrain a party 
“from enforcing a substantive right which he had contracted for.” 661 
                                                     
658  The first two principles are strikingly similar. Neither Court in Astrata or Mount Sophia provided additional 
explanation regarding how they found each principle nor have they provided any kind of comparative analysis. 
The first principle is almost identical to a statement in Dauphin, n554 [42]. The second is from 
Eltraco, n407 [31]. The court in Eltraco also references and affirms the finding in Dauphin. 
659  Mount Sophia, n39 [45]. 
660  Dauphin, n554 [57]. 
661  Mount Sophia, n39 [22]. 
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1.5. Australia – Exception Jurisprudence 
Unconscionable conduct in Australia took on judicial life in the early 1980s 662 and 
has widened continuously since. The head of power for the unconscionability 
exception in Australia is provided by the statute, not the general law. The statute 
requires the court to look to the general law for guidance on the nature of 
unconscionability and unconscionable conduct generally and to apply the 
principles to specific behaviours relating to a demand on an independent 
instrument.  
The possible use of unconscionable conduct to ground an injunction was first 
mentioned in Hortico where it was said “ it may be that in some cases…the 
unconscionable conduct may be so gross as to lead to" exercise of the Court's 
“discretionary power”.663 
More than ten years after Hortico unconscionable conduct as a grounds to restrain 
an independent instrument was addressed by Batt  J in Olex(No.1),664 the first of three 
Australian cases to find the exception. At first instance, counsel for the Plaintiff 
plead unconscionable conduct under the general law relying on judicial 
pronouncements in Hortico and Logue.665 
His Honour was unconvinced, finding that there was no authority for equity to 
intervene.666 If such a power existed, the Court held, “one would expect it to have 
been mentioned in the cases much earlier.” 667 
When the Court considered unconscionability under s51AA TPA, Batt J laid down 
both a general and a specific principle. His Honour held in general that the making 
of a demand, ie the “insistence” on a right “in circumstances which make that 
harsh and oppressive”, satisfied the requirements of s51AA  and could ground an 
injunction under s80(1) TPA. This was substantive unconscionability, dealing as it 
does with the outcome of a contract, and was within the ambit of the Act. 668 
                                                     
662  Finn, n469, 37. 
663  Hortico (Australia) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Australia) Pty Ltd  (1985) 1 NSWLR 545, 554 (Hortico). No 
unconscionable conduct was found.  
664  See p.189, Case Analysis for further discussion on Olex (No.1). 
665  Logue, n493. 
666  While not expressly saying so, his Honour’s reasoning suggests that of the British courts – substantive matters 
are not addressed under the general law. To date, a ll independent instrument unconscionability has been 
substantive. 
667  Olex (No.1), n38, 400.  
668  Dal Pont, n418 [75]. 
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The guarantees in question in Olex allowed part drawings. The beneficiary drew 
down the full amount of the instruments despite knowing that the liability 
guaranteed had largely been met. This was found sufficient to ground an injunction 
and is authority for the specific principle that making a demand for a sum greater 
than that which is owed, where the credit allows for partial drawings, is 
unconscionable. Neither of these were overturned in the High Court and remain 
good law.669 
Batt J famously stated: 
The effect of the statute, applying as it does to international trade 
and commerce, is to work a substantial inroad into the well -
established common law autonomy of letters of credit and 
performance bonds and other bank guarantees. 670 
However it was six years, in Boral(No.1), before another demand on an independent 
instrument was restrained under s51AA for unconscionability. 671 While the question 
properly was “whether the making of demand for the full invoice value constitutes 
unconscionable conduct”,672 this was not addressed in this matter possibly due to 
the interlocutory nature of the proceedings. 
On appeal Austin J decided that the demand for a “disputed amount” was 
unconscionable. This was based on two circumstances: first, that the certification 
giving effect to the demand was false; and second, the judicial policy that “ the 
principle of autonomy…cannot override the statute .”673  
This last statement is taken to mean that unconscionable behaviour, if sufficiently 
egregious, is sufficient for the purposes of the unconscionability provisions in the 
TPA/ACL to lift the veil of autonomy.  
The Court also finalised any discussion in relation to autonomy and its capacity to 
consider the underlying contract when it said: 
The terms of the irrevocable instrument and the underlying contract, 
properly construed, are highly relevant to the decision whether 
                                                     
669  Olex (No.3), n207: The High Court refused Olex Focas leave to appeal.  
670  Olex (No.1), n38, 404. The line of authority is overwhelmingly populated with cases alleging unconscionable 
conduct under the TPA which have failed to meet the standard of proof required.  
671  See case analysis: p.193. 
672  Boral Formwork and Scaffolding v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 557, [13] (Boral (No.1)). 
673  Boral (No.2), n61 [74]. Emphasis added. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 139 of 270 
 
conduct in connection with those arrangements is unconscionable 
for statutory or equitable purposes.674 
In Boral(No.2) the Court of Appeal referred to two equitable doctrines relied upon by 
the successful applicant. Unfortunately Austin J does not provide which influenced 
his Honour’s final determination. The two “traditional doctrines” relied upon were:  
1. Unconscientious reliance on strict legal rights;  
2. Unconscionable benefit arising from their own breach where 
they were aware of their breach. 675 
It was another six years before an Australian court, in Board Solutions,676 had the 
opportunity to review the exception. This matter is also the last occasion in 
Australia where such an injunction was granted. With respect, the reasoning 
provided in the matter is confused and inconsistent with the authorities and 
provides little new. 677 The applicant was successful however, which makes it 
noteworthy in that jurisdiction. 
In Board Solutions, the Court held that to enjoin the demand it should consider 
“whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to 
have been wrong.”678 Forrest J confirmed that the general law in Australia does not 
provide for the unconscionability exception and relief must be sought from the 
statute.679 However, his Honour notes that the “reach of s51AA” has not been 
determined by the High Court and that different views have been expressed with 
regard to it.680 This remains the case at time of writing. 
In summary, Board Solutions advances understanding of the unconscionability 
exception in no material way other than to confirm a number of matters from prior 
cases with respect to the application of the TPA. 
                                                     
674  Ibid [94]. 
675  The Court relied on Wilkinson v Feldworth Financial Services  (1998) 29 ACSR 642. 
676  Board Solutions Australia Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking  [2009] VSC 474 (Board Solutions). 
677  See the case analysis at p.207. 
678  Ibid [27(d)]. With respect, this element introduces a completely random variable into the consideration of the 
unconscionability exception and suggests the intervention (per Kirby  J in Austotel) of the “overly tender 
consciences of judges”. See p.125 above. 
679  Ibid [37]. 
680  Ibid [47]. 
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The Australian line of authority on the unconscionability exception rests on the 
ACL; the unconscionability provisions therein have been applied relatively narrowly 
in independent instrument matters.681 
It is possible to suggest that the Australian exception typically relies on equitable 
doctrines relating to the harsh or oppressive insistence on legal rights, and the 
avoidance of unjust enrichment arising from the beneficiary’s own breach or 
misconduct. It has also been found that the head of power under which an 
unconscionable demand can be enjoined is provided under s232(1) ACL. 
1.6. The Exception Under UN-CIGSLC 
A view of the broad international position is provided by the UN-CIGSLC. It does 
not mention unconscionable conduct per se. It does however deal very effectively 
with abusive demands in terms that are, for all intents, analogous to contemporary 
contractual unconscionability in common law jurisdictions.  
Under Art.19, injunctive relief is available in the absence of fraud or forgery where 
there is “no conceivable basis” for the demand, a wonderfully drafted catch -all that 
encapsulates the spirit of the equitable doctrine:  
Article 19 
(1) If it is manifest and clear that: 
(a) Any document is not genuine or has been falsified; 
(b) No payment is due on the basis asserted in the demand and 
the supporting documents; or 
(c) Judging by the type and purpose of the undertaking, the 
demand has no conceivable basis, 
the guarantor/issuer, acting in good faith, has a right, as against the 
beneficiary, to withhold payment. 
The effect of this last clause appears to provide the issuer with a role in assessing 
when a demand has “no conceivable basis” which is likely to be seen as being 
wide of their role as an evaluator of documents. 
                                                     
681  Only three matters have succeeded to restrain payment of an independent instrument in a final determination 
over a thirty-year period. 
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Art.19(2) also provides five examples of when a demand may fall under the first 
provision and these are discussed in detail below in relation to the legal construct 
of independent instrument unconscionability. 682 As Loi points out, the examples in 
Art.19(2) “clearly extend beyond fraud”683 and deal with both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability. 
1.7. The Exception – Overview and Analysis 
In the three ‘unconscionability jurisdictions’, it has been found unconscionable for 
a beneficiary to make a demand:684 
❖ for an amount greater than that which is owed: GHL685 and Olex(No.1)686 
❖ to acquire some form of advantage by devious means: Bains Harding687 
❖ where a contractual dispute settled within the terms of the underlying 
contract estopped the Beneficiary from making the claim:  Boral688 
❖ despite being unable to meet their own fiscal responsibilities under the 
contract: Raymond689 
❖ despite engaging in abus de droit: acting to obstruct the performance 
of the underlying contract and thereby to enable a claim against the 
instrument: Royal Design690 
❖ despite there being an outstanding dispute whether the contract is still 
on foot, eg whether a force majeure provision might be held to 
operate: Min Thai691 
  
                                                     
682  See p.229 and p.246. 
683  Loi, n131, 510. 
684  This paragraph and the following list, with redactions/amendments, is excerpted from this author’s published 
work. See Wooler, n505, 175-6. 
685  GHL, n21. 
686  Olex (No.1), n38. 
687  Bains Harding (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 425, 426-427. 
688  Boral (No.2), n61. 
689  Raymond, n590. 
690  Royal Design, n148. Also J Byrne, and C Byrnes (ed), Institute of International Banking Law & Practice Annual 
Survey (Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, 2008) , 243: “Although the doctrinal origins of this 
aspect of LC fraud have not been explored, most courts have assumed that such an action is fraudulent  even 
where the beneficiary’s action constitutes a breach of contract and not fraud with respect to the underlying 
transaction.”  
691  Min Thai, n591. 
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❖ despite failing to meet a major obligation under the contract terms, 
causing the performing party to default and triggering a capacity to 
make the claim - usually a failure to make or guarantee interim 
payments: Kvaerner692 
However, in the major jurisdictions of the UK and the US, unconscionability 
remains a pariah doctrine. In England, TTI Team came closest to acknowledging a 
role for unconscionability in restraining the beneficiary to an independent 
instrument. Thornton QC, after noting that a ‘breach of faith’ is sufficient to ground 
equitable relief, held: 
A breach of faith can arise in such situations as…a threatened call 
by the beneficiary for an unconscionable ulterior motive; or a lack of 
an honest or bona fide belief by the beneficiary that the 
circumstances, such as poor performance, against which a 
performance bond has been provided, actually exist.693 
However, while the English Courts do not appear ready to adopt an 
unconscionability exception any time soon, 694 the similarity between unconscionable 
conduct (which is not recognised) and contractual good faith (which is), may 
deliver much the same result. Thornton QC’s grounds are similar in some aspects 
to those grounds found unconscionable in some Singaporean cases.  
Loi addresses the criticism that the unconscionability exception is likely to 
‘undermine the commercial viability’ of independent instruments. Loi takes an 
inverted view of the matter, excoriating any defence of independence in the face of 
unconscionable conduct, pointing out: 
[C]onfidence in, and utility of, commercial instruments such as 
performance guarantees cannot possibly be promoted by habitual 
judicial enforcement of unconscionable payment demands made 
under oppressive circumstances.695 
                                                     
692  Kvaerner, n512. Characterised succinctly in Star-Trans Far East v Norske-Tech Ltd [1995] SGHC 168; [1995] 2 
SLR(R) [36]: “The  applicants  induced  the  breach  and relied on it to call on the performance bond. There was 
clear and unrefuted evidence that the applicants relied on their own wrong.”  
693  TTI Team, n211, 46[3]. Emphasis added. The reference here to unconscionability to describe a breach of faith 
creates an interesting judicial link. 
694  This author suggests that the British adherence to a narrow view of the doc trines of unconscionable dealing and 
equitable fraud whereby historically only procedural unconscionability can be enjoined, could well be 
responsible for this judicial reluctance. 
695  Loi, n131, 509. This view was noted with approbation in Mount Sophia, n39 [33]. See Dynamics quote, p.97. 
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The Malaysian Court in Focal Asia stated expressly that consideration of 
unconscionability “accord[s] with good commercial sense” 696 and this view was 
specifically endorsed three years later in Sumatec(No.3).697 
The sanctity of the independence principle has to be weighed against other 
considerations in the market – victims of an abusive demand enforced by the 
judicature are unlikely to trust such instruments again.Where the Court is seen to 
be aiding an abuse its own integrity may come under attack. It was in fact because 
of this very issue – the black-letter law of contract producing unfair outcomes – 
that the Courts of Chancery and ultimately, equity, first  found favour. 
The heart of the argument in support of the unconscionability exception stems from 
recognition of the unequal risk being shouldered by the parties once an 
independent instrument obligation arises. At all times the bearer of a demand 
instrument carries a capacity to impact significantly the financial resources of the 
applicant, which could even be fatal to their organisation if realised.  
While it is a reasonable argument to state that the parties, especially legally 
advised, well-resourced and sophisticated firms, enter into the transaction with 
their eyes open, it is of little comfort where an abuse materialises.  
It is arguable that a significant inequity in bargaining position is created where the 
value of the underlying contract is large relative to the operational size of the 
contractor providing the demand guarantee. In these conditions the contractor 
adopts a level of risk disproportionate to the likely return and carries little or no 
negotiating leverage. 698 
As found in GHL with respect to both unconscionable oppressive behaviour and 
inequitable risk: 
It should not be forgotten that a performance bond can operate as 
an oppressive instrument, and in the event that a beneficiary calls 
on the bond in circumstances, where there is prima facie evidence 
of fraud or unconscionability, the court should step in to intervene... 
It should also not be forgotten that a performance bond is basically 
a security for the performance of the main contract, and as such we 
see no reason, in principle, why it should be so sacrosanct and 
                                                     
696  Focal Asia, n627 [10: Fraud In The Underlying Contract ]. 
697  Sumatec (No.3), n170 [40]. 
698  It is unlikely that this on its own would suffice to find procedural unconscionability.  
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inviolate as not to be subject to the court’s intervention except on 
the ground of fraud.699 
With this statement, the Court provided justification for equitable intervention 
(oppression); outlined the grounds for the injunction (unconscionability); indicated 
the standard of proof (strong prima facie case); and advocated for lifting the veil of 
autonomy based on the functionality of the instrument (security, not cash 
equivalent). 
In independent instrument disputes, the courts are asked to determine on the facts 
the presence of substantive unconscionability and whether it is sufficiently 
egregious to restrain the benefit of the instrument. This is, on occasion, an 
onerous task but the courts are far better placed to make such a determination 
than the issuer.700  
Much has been written for and against the unconscionability exception and there 
are sound arguments for and against its continued application. Loi reasonably 
argues that ‘successful’ abusive calls which sometimes do irreparable harm to 
contractor applicant parties can only harm the reputation of independent 
instruments.701 Wunnicke however takes the common position that widening the 
range of exceptions to autonomy only weakens the product. 702 Whether there is 
evidence to support that assertion is unkown. It is more probable that the true 
position lies somewhere between the two points and users must rely on the courts 
to get the balance right. 703 
If unconscionable conduct continues to be plead as a “defence to payment”, 704 it is 
imperative that the required proof is clarified and substantiated to provide 
confidence. 
  
                                                     
699  GHL, n21 [24]. Emphasis added. 
700  Ellinger, n14, 325[vi]: “This leaves to the courts the responsibility for assessing the presence of 
[unconscionability], a task which, though uncertain, the courts are more equipped to perform than the issuer.”  
701  Loi, n131, 509.  
702  Ellinger, n14, 325[vi]. 
703  This is why clauses agreeing to jurisdiction over arbitration and settlement of disputes are so important.  
704  D.Horowitz, n369. 
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1.8. Table of Cross-Jurisdictional Independent Instrument 
Unconscionability Case Law 
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Chapter 4. Case Law – Unconscionability Exception: 
Singapore 
Section A. The Unconscionability Exception in Singapore 
1.0 Introduction 
In 1990 the Singapore judiciary took a “conscious departure” 705 from the English 
courts on the applicability of unconscionable conduct on the integrity of the 
independence principle. When it did so, Singapore became the first common law 
jurisdiction to expand the scope of equitable fraud into independent instruments.  
The Singapore doctrine of independent instrument unconscionability has 
progressively developed until the decision in Asplenium(No.2) put the efficacy of 
unconscionability as a defence to abusive demands on independent instruments 
into doubt.706 
What follows is a review, in approximate calendar order, of all Singaporean cases 
dealing with allegations of unconscionable conduct in relation to demands on 
independent instruments. Some matters overlap in time. 
Section B. The Unconscionability Exception in Singapore’s Courts  
1.0 Case Analyses – Singapore707 
The case analyses that follow focus on development of the unconscionability 
exception and therefore detailed explanations of the facts are avoided unless 
necessary. 
  
                                                     
705  GHL, n21 [16]: The Singapore position is “a conscious departure, from the English position. ” 
706  See case analysis p.177. 
707  Presented broadly in date order as handed down. In this section, any dollar amounts referred to are 
Singaporean Dollars unless otherwise specifically noted. 
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Royal Design Studio v Chang Development 708 
The Singaporean line of authority identified with the unconscionability exception to 
the principle of autonomy in letters of credit and demand guarantees commonly 
commences with Royal Design. The matter concerned a building contractor who 
initially provided a $165,000 bond (reduced to $120,000) to assure performance. 
After protracted disagreements between the parties, the defendant threatened to 
call on the bond but an interim injunction restrained them from doing so. The Court 
sustained the injunction, finding: 
1. while the plaintiff had substantially met its obligations, further progress 
was not possible due to the defendant’s refusal to make agreed -upon 
interim payments; 
2. the defendant held a considerable amount of money from sale of 
properties to which the plaintiff likely had equitable title under the 
contract and might therefore either be able to make claim to or, should 
the plaintiff been found in breach of contract, could be offset against 
any liability to the defendant. This, in the mind of the Court, therefore 
vitiated the defendant’s claim to the performance bond;  
3. a Director of the plaintiff company had put forward a personal 
guarantee to the amount of $1 million. 
Despite that there was no allegation or finding of fraud the Court agreed with 
Everleigh J in Potton Homes709 and that the bond was not to be considered the 
same as an irrevocable letter of credit and further held that payment could be 
enjoined until settlement of the dispute in the underly ing contract. 
The Court offered as explanation for its intervention: 
In innumerable cases, courts have, in appropriate circumstances, in 
exercise of their equitable jurisdiction granted interim injunctions 
restraining parties from enforcing their contractual provisions until 
the resolution of their disputes then pending. 710 
 
                                                     
708  Royal Design, n148. 
709  Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman Contractors Ltd  [1984] 28 BLR 19. 
710  Royal Design, n148 [22]. 
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Kvaerner Singapore v UDL Shipbuilding 711 
UDL Shipbuilding, the defendant, contracted to purchase a pumping control system 
from the plaintiff for $1,000,000. The defendant paid the agreed-upon deposit of 
$300,000 but failed to provide a required letter of credit for the balance of the 
purchase price. 
Simultaneously, the plaintiff provided a performance guarantee valued at 30% of 
the contract price to the defendant to secure its performance. When the plaintiff 
refused to ship the goods without the letter of credit, the defendant demanded 
payment under the performance bond. Maintaining the injunction, Selvam JC 
stated:  
The credit was also a condition precedent to the right to call on the 
performance bond. And it failed to fulfil the condition precedent. 
Accordingly it was eminently just and convenient to restrain a party 
from taking advantage of his own wrong. 712 
Also referencing Eveleigh LJ's obiter in Potton Homes, Selvam JC agreed that the 
fraud exception to autonomy is “not an immutable principle of universal 
application”, nor does it have any “application where the injunction is sought 
against a party to the underlying contract who seeks to take advantage of the 
performance guarantee where, by his own violation, he fails to perform a condition 
precedent.”713 
Bocotra Construction v Attorney-General714 
Bocotra is often cited as the first case to explicitly establish unconscionable 
conduct as a basis to enjoin a beneficiary from making claim on a demand 
guarantee or letter of credit. The basis for this belief is the several mentions made 
by the Court that “whether there is fraud or unconscionability is the sole 
consideration in applications for injunctions restraining payment or calls on bonds 
to be granted”.715 However: 
1. Bocotra was a failed application to restrain; and 
2. unconscionability was neither discussed nor defined in obiter; 
                                                     
711  Kvaerner, n512. 
712  Ibid 344[6]. 
713  Ibid 344[8]. 
714  Bocotra, n149. 
715  Ibid [45]. 
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3. unconscionability was never mentioned as distinct from fraud; and 
4. it was (later) stated in GHL that the case of Kvaerner716 – which 
predates Bocotra – was in part successfully founded on the 
unconscionability exception. The Court said: "Kvaerner Singapore was 
decided partly on the ground of unconscionability and did not strictly 
follow the 'fraud' exception laid down in the English cases."717 
Bocotra’s role in the line of authority was discussed by the Court of Appeal in GHL 
where it stated its view that Bocotra was the genesis of unconscionability in this 
domain: 
There is nothing in that judgment which can be said to indicate or 
suggest that the court did not decide that ‘unconscionability’ alone 
is not a separate ground as distinct from fraud. 718 
However, in Civilbuild(No.1),719 Lee JC appeared to contradict this by rightly stating 
with reference to Bocotra that “[a]t no point did the court discuss the scope of this 
concept of ‘unconscionability’...I do not understand the court as having changed 
the law without a discussion of the basis for it.”720 
Bocotra made a contribution with regard to how future courts are to consider 
applications to restrain demands. The Court in Bocotra held that “the sole 
consideration in applications for injunctions restraining payment or calls on bonds 
was whether there is fraud or unconscionability”721 and not the balance of 
convenience test as laid down by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid.722 The 
Court also noted that, with respect to the standard of proof, “mere allegations are 
insufficient”.723 
  
                                                     
716  Kvaerner, n512. 
717  GHL, n21 [20]. 
718  Ibid [16]. 
719  Civilbuild(No.1), n594. 
720  Ibid [33-35]. 
721  Bocotra, n149 [45]. 
722  American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Limited  [1975] AC 396. 
723  Bocotra, n149 [47]. 
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Raymond Construction v Low Yang Tong 724 
The line of authority was further refined in Singapore by Justice Lai Kew Chai who 
heard both Raymond and the only other non-construction independent instrument 
case pleading unconscionability in the Supreme Court, Min Thai.725 
Raymond’s importance, and the reason for the Court upholding the injunction 
based on unconscionability, stemmed from the fact that the defendant beneficiary 
who had contracted with Raymond Construction to build a house, withheld 
payment for the final stages of the construction process, which amounted to a 
considerable amount of money. While this constituted a breach of contract, such a 
breach, on its own, does not constitute unconscionability.  
The Court found that the money being withheld, but also due under the contract, 
was sufficient to offset the value of alleged defects in construction until such time 
as those substantive matters were arbitrated. Therefore, a successful claim 
against the performance bond, in addition to the monies withheld would amount to 
unconscionable conduct.  
In other words, the defendant could not both receive payment under the bond and 
simultaneously refuse to make payment for work already completed because, in 
effect this would amount to a double indemnity not originally contemplated by the 
parties. 
Min Thai Holdings v Sunlabel 726 
This is the only case in the line of authority centred around a commercial letter of 
credit for the supply of perishable goods: rice from China. The claim of 
unconscionable conduct arose from a demand made on the letter of credit despite 
the alleged operation of a force majeure clause in the underlying contract that had 
been triggered as a result of flooding in China that wiped out the supply crop.  
While the unconscionability exception was not yet firmly established, Chai  J refers 
specifically in his judgement to it being “unconscionable” for the beneficiary to  
receive payment given that there were a number of pending disputes in the 
underlying contract. His Honour also proffered that Sunlabel was:  
                                                     
724  Raymond, n590. 
725  M Aijaz, 'Unconscionability As An Exception To The Independence Principle: A Study of Singapore Caselaw' 
(2011) 1 Annual Review of International Law and Practice  19, 10, posits that the death of Chai J is likely to have 
the effect of constraining the scope of the exception, given the late Justice’s very wide view of it.  
726  Min Thai, n591. 
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perfectly entitled to make a call on the guarantee…but they should 
have in all good conscience offered to let the money remain in the 
Allied Irish Banks plc…pending the resolution of disputes. 727  
This suggestion was unlikely to be entertained by the beneficiary unless ordered to 
do so by the Court. 
Sin Kian Contractor Pte Ltd v Lian Kok Hong 728 
Finally in the ‘pre-GHL’ case line, the High Court also specifically contemplated 
unconscionability in Sin Kian Contractor v Lian Kok Hong but refused to accept the 
plaintiff’s view of the beneficiary’s behaviour, holding that they had “fallen far short 
of establishing that it would be unconscionable for the employer [beneficiary] to 
call on the guarantee”.729  
It has been argued that this case stands as the foremost precursor to the position 
now fully adopted by the Singaporean courts whereby a plaintiff must demonstrate 
a “strong prima facie case” to establish unconscionability. 730 
GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction 731 
This the first case to specifically establish unconscionability as grounds to restrain 
the benefit of an independent instrument. The Court considered the established 
grounds upon which injunctions restraining claims on bank guarantees could be 
founded.732 The Court examined several major fraud and unconscionability cases in 
Singapore and made further mention of several influential English cases.  
In GHL the Court of Appeal restrained the beneficiary “from seeking or claiming 
any payment”733 from a demand guarantee, on the basis that the beneficiary was 
making claim for an amount to which it had no claim.  
The value of the performance bond was based on 10% of the original  contract 
price of $5,781,400.00. This price had been revised down significantly but the 
                                                     
727  Ibid [28]. 
728  Sin Kian Contractor Pte Ltd v Lian Kok Hong  (1999) 3 SLR 732 (Sin Kian). 
729  Ibid 741. 
730  Loi, n131, 514. While both the Court in Dauphin, n554, and Chartered, n24, laid down the ‘strong prima facie ’ 
standard, Chartered is not generally considered an unconscionability case but rather provides guidance on the 
standard of proof required to establish fraud. It should also be noted that while Chartered was only reported in 
1999, it was in fact heard in 1992, therefore pre-dating all unconscionability cases except Royal Design, n148. 
731  GHL, n21. 
732  See Bocotra, n149 and Kvaerner, n512. 
733  GHL, n21 [1]. 
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agreed downward variations to the contract were not reflected in the amount 
guaranteed under the performance bond.  
The court held that it was reasonable for the parties to expect that with the 
reduction in the value of the underlying contract, the value of the guarantee would 
be reduced accordingly, and when GHL attempted to draw down the guarantee for 
the whole original amount, its behaviour was deemed unconscionable.  
Given that this equitable ground had only developed over a relatively short period, 
Thean and Chai JJ laid to rest the question of whether unconscionability existed as 
a separate ground. 
Referring specifically to Bocotra they stated: 
the concept of ‘unconscionability’ was adopted after deliberation, 
and was not inadvertently inserted as a result of a slip; nor was it 
intended to be used synonymously or interchangeably with ‘fraud’. 734 
The Court thereby made clear its judicial policy position.  
New Civilbuild v Guobena  735 
The High Court twice heard arguments from Civilbuild who sought to enjoin 
Guobena from seeking payment under a performance bond from The Tai Ping 
Insurance Company. Both cases were heard in the High Court by a single (albeit 
different) judge, two years apart, but each made quite different findings regarding 
the unconscionability exception. This has confused some subsequent 
commentary.736 Relevantly however, the two matters were heard on either side of 
the GHL decision in which the Court expressly took issue with the finding in the 
earlier Civilbuild case.737 
Civilbuild(No.1) was brought by Guobena under summons and sought to have a 
previously granted ex parte interlocutory injunction discharged first on the basis 
that it should have been granted inter partes, and also because: 
1. there was a lack of full and frank disclosure on the part of the plaintiff 
account party, Civilbuild, when seeking the injunction;  
2. there was no disclosed cause of action in the writ; and  
                                                     
734  GHL, n21 [16]. 
735  New Civilbuild Pte Ltd v Guobena Sdn Bhd [2000] 2 SLR 378 (Civilbuild (No.2)). 
736  Some commentators after the event appear to have missed the later appeal, eg Johns, n128, 317. 
737  GHL, n21 [20]. “…we are unable to agree with the learned judge that this court did not in Bocotra decide that 
‘unconscionability’ is a separate exception permitting injunctive relief. ” 
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3. there was no fraud alleged. 
This last point is indicative of the fact that it was heard before GHL, the case 
widely accredited with establishing unconscionability in Singaporean 
jurisprudence. Civilbuild did not plead fraud because, they claimed, the facts 
showed that it was unconscionable for Guobena to make a claim, relying on Royal 
Design738 and Potton Homes739 as authority. Guobena submitted Bocotra740 as the 
authority upon which a claim of unconscionability could be dismissed, and the 
Court agreed after an extensive review of both British and Singaporean case law.  
Kin JC held: 
unconscionability on the part of the first defendants in calling for the 
performance bond was not a defence to upholding the injunction. 
The case of Bocotra…did not suggest that apart from fraud, 
unconscionability on the part of a party was an established reason 
for upholding an injunction. It was well established that banks could 
not be restrained other than for fraud, and Bocotra did not seek to 
extend this principle further. Insofar as the court in Bocotra referred 
to unconscionability, it was used interchangeably with fraud.741 
The plaintiff’s failure in Civilbuild(No.1) brought about its financial collapse with the 
consequence that its original appeal, lodged against that finding, ultimately lapsed 
and the issuer met the demand on the instrument.  
However, Civilbuild later brought another action praying to the Court for repayment 
of the monies already paid to Guobena by Tai Ping Insurance, among other 
interpretative and compensatory matters.742 
In Civilbuild(No.2) the High Court was asked to revisit the question of 
unconscionability in a quite different jurisprudential environment. GHL had been 
decided earlier and unconscionability was now firmly established as a basis for 
enjoining a claim on a bond; a fact to which the Court  directly referred. Civilbuild’s 
only basis for its allegation of unconscionability was an assertion that “there was 
no delay on their part in the completion of the project and [therefore]…Guobena’s 
                                                     
738  Royal Design, n148. 
739  Potton, n709. 
740  Bocotra, n149. 
741  Civilbuild(No.1), n594, 376. 
742  Civilbuild(No.2), n735. It is unclear from the judgement whether the company emerged from liquidation or the 
act ion was brought by the liquidator on behalf of Civilbuild’s creditors.  
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demand under the bond was fraudulent and unconscionable.” 743 This argument was 
clearly not going to be sustainable even in the development days of the 
unconscionability exception given that the alleged behaviour did  not fall into any 
category of behaviour previously held as unconscionable and could not be found to  
establish a new category. Chiu J therefore denied the declaration sought. 
In what might appear as an attempt to justify the Court’s departure from its position 
two years earlier on the existence of unconscionability as a ground, Chiu  J stated:  
It is pertinent to note that the issue of whether the call on the bond 
was…unconscionable on the facts did not feature in either of the 
grounds on which Lee Seiu Kin JC discharged the injunction. In the 
light of his decision that…unconscionability alone could not be  a 
ground for upholding the injunction, it was not necessary…to decide 
on whether there was indeed… unconscionability on the facts of the 
case. In this regard, it cannot be said that the issue of whether 
Guobena’s call on the bond was…unconscionable was al ready 
determined.744 
With respect, it is unclear to which two grounds Chiu J is referring. Regardless, 
Civilbuild(No.2) reaffirmed unconscionability as a ground, although it was not found 
on the facts. 
Dauphin Offshore Engineering v Bin Zayed 745 
Dauphin contributes to the understanding of equitable unconscionability by:  
1. being the first case to provide substantial guidance on the 
standard of proof the Court would require to be satisfied before 
interfering with the undertakings of the parties to a demand 
guarantee; and 
2. providing some indication as to the nature of the cause of 
action.746 
                                                     
743  Ibid 379. 
744  Civilbuild(No.2), n735, 401-402. Emphasis added. 
745  Dauphin, n554. 
746  Ibid [42]. 
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The Court specifically addressed the question of whether unconscionability could 
ground an injunction, effectively extinguishing the view of the lower court judge 
that no such ground existed.747 
The finding in Dauphin was the first to posit that a “strong prima facie case of 
unconscionability had to be shown”, 748 which is the standard of proof all plaintiffs 
thereafter pleading unconscionable conduct have been required to meet. 
Subsequent courts have interpreted this standard of proof to mean that a movant is 
obliged to produce sufficient evidence to establish conclusively a fact which makes 
a contested call on a letter of credit or demand guarantee unconscionable.  
With regard to the elements of unconscionability, the Court would not be drawn 
into specifics. It noted that a finding of unconscionability is made on the facts and 
it lacks “pre-determined categorisation”, inter alia alluding to – by reference to the 
case law – oppression, abuse, unfairness and unjust enrichment as behaviours 
proscribed under this head.749 
Subsequent Singaporean case law where unconscionability was plead drew 
heavily on the Dauphin reasoning, as do cases in neighbouring Malaysia. 750 
Dauphin is however listed among the superior court cases where the plaintiff failed 
to have the beneficiary restrained for unconscionable conduct.  
Eltraco International v CGH Developments 751 
This case is difficult in part to reconcile with related case law and can be 
characterised as an example where the Singaporean Justices have taken a 
distinctly nuanced approach to the unconscionability exception. The appellate 
Court demonstrated that, insofar as the credit instrument itself will allow partial 
drawings, the all-or-nothing approach to what constitutes unconscionability may be 
gradated. 
This will depend on the factual scenario; their Honours found favour with Dauphin, 
stating: 
                                                     
747  Ibid [34]. 
748  Ibid [57]. 
749  Ibid [42-47]. 
750  For example: Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Nam Fatt Construction Sdn Bhd [2011] 7 CLJ 442. 
751  Eltraco, n407. 
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In determining whether a call on a bond is unconscionable, the 
entire picture must be viewed, taking into account all the relevant 
factors.752  
The case also saw the higher court over-ruling the original decision refusing an 
injunction on any basis. Eltraco sought to restrain the beneficiary on two grounds. 
First, that CGH was required to demonstrate a breach of the underlying contract; 
and second, that CGH’s claim was unconscionable.  
Eltraco submitted that: 
➢ CGH was holding significant ‘retention monies’, and  
➢ there was a genuine dispute as to what works had been 
completed, and  
➢ the value of works left undone or in need of rectification was 
not established.  
The Court found CGH owed no duty to prove a breach given the nature of the on -
demand (‘independent’) guarantee, but then opted to exercise its equitable 
jurisdiction.753 
Rather than simply refuse the injunction, as is the usual approach, Thean and 
Chao JJA arrived at a compromise sum that would provide sufficient security to 
CGH without acting in a manner that would reasonably be unconscionable to the 
applicant. While the Court provided explanation vis-à-vis how it arrived at the 
amount at which the claim became “clearly excessive” 754 it was at pains to point out 
that they were not “involved in an exercise in quantifying damages but only in 
ensuring that the amount of the bond called for is not unconscionable.”755  
Again, the Court recognised that while unconscionability always involves 
unfairness, it is not the case that every instance of unfairness gives rise to a 
finding of unconscionable conduct. It held that, in its equitable jurisdiction, the 
Court was empowered to “limit the restraint to only that part which is clearly 
excessive and allow the other part which would not be unconscionable .”756 In other 
words, Eltraco provided (for the first time) that a call on a bond can be partially 
                                                     
752  Eltraco, n407, 299[31]. 
753  Ibid 300[36]. 
754  Ibid 291. The amount decided on was $600,000.  
755  Ibid 301. 
756  Ibid 300. 
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unconscionable, at least to the extent of  claims for amounts beyond that which can 
be demonstrated as positively owed.  
Chew Pin Pin v AGF Insurance 757 
Chew Pin is an unusual case largely ignored in the literature wherein the account 
party was not a party to the proceedings, having gone into liquidation. The 
guarantor (AGF Insurance) resisted a complying call on the ‘clean’ performance 
bond,758 and sought to rely upon an allegation of fraud and unconscionability in the 
underlying contract to ground their dishonour.  
However the Court viewed it as an attempt by a guarantor to avoid payment on an 
unsecured guarantee in the knowledge that it was unlikely to see any return from 
the winding up of the account party. It agreed with the lower court that under the 
rules of privity, “the bondsman is a stranger to  the underlying contract” and any 
alleged unconscionable conduct on the part of the plaintiff could be pursued by the 
Official Receiver. 
Choo JC said: 
The foremost question…is whether the bondsman is entitled to refer 
to the underlying contract and the alleged unconscionable conduct 
on the part of the plaintiff…I agree entirely with the district judge, 
that the defendant as bondsman has no recourse to the underlying 
contract between the employer and the contractor. 759 
The Court held that AGF was required to meet its obligations and could not rely on 
any other matter to set aside that obligation. 
Samwoh Asphalt Premix v Sum Cheong Piling 760 
Samwoh contributed to the development of the unconscionability exception by 
suggesting yet another type of unconscionable conduct – the threat of calling on 
the guarantee to bring “pressure” to bear on the account party during unrelated 
negotiations.761 
                                                     
757  Chew Pin Pin v AGF Insurance (Sing) Pte Ltd  (2000) 2 SLR 152 (Chew Pin). 
758  E Laryea, Paperless Trade: Opportunities, Challenges and Solutions  (Kluwer Law International, 2003), 136.  
A ‘clean’ or ‘open’ performance bond can be either a demand bond or conditioned on a breach of the underlying 
contract. 
759  Chew Pin, n757, 154. 
760  Samwoh Asphalt Premix Pte Ltd v Sum Cheong Piling Private Ltd [2002] 1 SLR 1 (Samwoh (No.2)). 
761  Such behaviour has been expressly ruled out in Australian courts as being unconscionable. See Olex (No.1), n38, 
403. 
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The facts in Samwoh are complex, involving a primary employer (the Ministry of 
Defence) conducting works at Changi Airport; a primary contractor (Sum Cheong 
Piling – SCP); and a major sub-contractor (Gim Chuan – GC). Samwoh was a 
minor sub-contractor and the account party who requested Ecics-Coface 
Guarantee Company issue the performance guarantee in question. It was provided 
to the primary contractor to indemnify Samwoh’s component of the contracting 
work, distinct from any other party’s obligations. However, a demand made by SCP 
against Samwoh’s guarantee sought to use that undertaking to assure a range of 
other works that were GC’s responsibility – not Samwoh’s – but were ultimately left 
uncompleted or faulty. 
Implied from the judgement is a rancorous project environment in which disputes 
arose at various times between all three contracting parties, with GC ultimately 
being excluded from the site. The relationship between SCP and Samwoh then 
failed, with the former attempting to coerce the latter into accepting onerous 
contractual terms relating to the works left uncompleted or poorly completed by 
GC.  
The Court of Appeal found that the call on the guarantee was made in an attempt 
to force Samwoh into accepting the terms and not on the basis that there was any 
failure by Samwoh to meet their contractual obligations. As such, the claim was 
ruled unconscionable. This followed Kvaerner where it was held that “a demand 
under [a] performance guarantee can be made only when the seller has failed or 
refused to fulfil his obligations under the contract”. 762 
Samwoh was also unusual insofar as the Court of Appeal overturned the ruling of 
the High Court  763 in favour of the plaintiff account party. It found that “there was no 
evidence that Samwoh had failed to discharge their obligations” and that the claim 
on the credit was “utterly lacking in bona fides”. 764 Thean JA said: 
the call for payment by SC Piling under the performance guarantee 
was not based on any bona fide claim they had against Samwoh. The 
clear inference is that they invoked the performance guarantee as a 
bargaining chip to compel Samwoh to agree to their terms. It was an 
abusive call on the performance guarantee…SC Piling…acted 
                                                     
762  Samwoh(No.2), n760 [21] citing Kvaerner, n512, 154. 
763  Samwoh Asphalt Premix Pte Ltd v Sum Cheong Piling Private Ltd [2001] 3 SLR 447 (Samwoh (No.1)). 
764  Samwoh(No.2), n760 [21]. 
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unconscionably in calling for payment under the performance 
guarantee and should have been restrained from so doing. 765 
McConnell Dowell v Sembcorp Engineers 766 
By the time the High Court of Singapore heard McConnell, the unconscionability 
exception was fully established, as was the standard of proof required to ground 
the exception. The bank guarantee procured by the plaintiff was intended to co -
underwrite  the financial risk incurred by Sembcorp Engineers (SE) during a 
tortured process to secure funds for a massive development project in India. In 
order to facilitate the raising of several hundreds of millions of dollars in funding, 
SE was obliged to deposit $125 million into a term deposit that would attract 
penalties should the money be withdrawn before its maturity date. The bank 
guarantee McConnell provided to SE was held to have been, in essence, an 
underwriting of half any potential loss in relation to those funds. 767  
However, in the underlying contract, which was a ‘Pre-Bid Agreement’, no 
provision was made to limit any claim under the guarantee to any actual loss. 
Further, no term was introduced in either the agreement or the guarantee to 
provide that the defendant had to demonstrate a loss before making a claim under 
the guarantee. The suit put to the Court that any claim made in the absence of any 
actual loss would be unconscionable. 
Given the lack of contractual terms with regard to losses, Li  JC determined that, 
despite no loss, nor any certainty that there would ever be any loss, it was not 
unconscionable for the claim to be made for the full amount of the guarantee. To 
support this, the Court strongly affirmed the autonomy principle in saying: 
the right of SE to make a call and receive money under the BG 
[bank guarantee] depends on the terms of the BG itself and not the 
underlying contract pursuant to which the BG was issued, unless 
the terms of the BG stipulated otherwise. 768 
 
                                                     
765  Ibid [18]. It is doubtful at time of writing whether this would constitute unconscionable conduct in Australia.  
766  McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sembcorp Engineers and Constructors Pte Ltd [2002] 1 SLR 
199 (McConnell). 
767  Ibid 211[69]. The other (anonymous) party did not contest the claim against their guarantee. 
768  Ibid 208[47]. 
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Li JC then disclaimed any inequity by pointing out that “it was open to the 
parties…to agree that SE should only be compensated…for its loss up to a 
maximum of US$1.25m.”769 That McConnell had not done so was fatal to their 
appeal. 
One difficulty extended from the fact that the bank guarantee was used more in the 
nature of a chip in a high-stakes poker game than as a method to underpin some 
performance or other promise. By providing the guarantee McConnell gambled on 
SE’s funding process being realised in order to secure a large sub -contract in the 
final development but lost when the funding failed to materialise. It was found that 
McConnell did not adequately protect itself within the terms of the guarantee or the 
underlying agreement. The absence of any term requiring SE to prove a loss 
before being able to make a successful demand proved fatal to their application.  
Li JC confirmed Justice Chai’s position in Raymond770 that while the claim may be 
unfair, that by itself does not constitute unconscionability. 771 
Seng Hock Heng Contractor v Hup Seng Bee Construction 772 
The defendant HSB called on a performance bond for an amount the plaintiff 
claimed was far in excess of any outstanding work or potential liquidated damages 
under the contract. The plaintiff limited his pleading to the precedents set by 
Raymond and Sin Kian,773 proposing to the Court that Raymond suggests that such 
an exaggeration should be taken into account when considering the scope of the 
exception, while Sin Kian allows the Court to order part payment where there is 
any doubt as to the quantum.774 
Teck JC held that the plaintiff had provided “no exceptional feature” that would 
“permit [the Court] to stray from the established principles”, meaning instrument 
independence. The Court was also of the view that it was not in its purview to 
determine the validity of the claims made by the plaintiff and that the evidence was 
“inconclusive and difficult to evaluate”. The applicant therefore had failed to 
discharge the onus of proof.775 
                                                     
769  McConnell, n766, 211[69]. 
770  Raymond, n590. 
771  McConnell, n766, 212[75].  
772  Seng Hock Heng Contractor Pte Ltd. v Hup Seng Bee Constructions Pte Ltd. (2002) 4 SLR 612 (Seng Hock) 
773  Sin Kian, n728. 
774  This is a perplexing reference as the Court in Sin Kian did not overtly consider partial payment under a bond at 
all. Partial payment was considered, and applied, in Eltraco, n407 however, as it was in the subsequent case of 
Hiap Tian Soon, n776. 
775  Seng Hock, n772, 614[6]. 
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The Court did not discuss the nature of unconscionability nor conduct any review 
of other case law relating to it. The dismissal of the application was based entirely 
on the documentary evidence before the Court, leaving the facts of the dispute to 
be considered at trial. 
Hiap Tian Soon Construction v Hola Development 776 
The Hiap Tian judgement largely considers contractual matters and damages. The 
Court looked briefly at whether the claim on the performance bond by the 
beneficiary was unconscionable on the basis that the value of the underlying 
contract had, by mutual agreement, been revised downwards. 
The defendant, Hola, maintained their claim to 10% of the original contract value. 
The Court in GHL had already found similar business behaviour unconscionable 
four years earlier but Hola sought to have this element of the suit distinguished on 
the basis that the quantum of change in the contract value under consideration 
was considerably less than that considered in GHL.777  
The Court found however that the principle laid down in GHL remained applicable 
regardless of the amount of the reduction in the underlying contract sum.778 Chui J 
addressed the issue of whether revision of the performance bond needed to be 
contemplated by the parties in advance. Drawing on the reasoning in GHL, His 
Honour provided certainty with regard to such variations in value by stating:  
[T]he sum payable under the performance bond is subject to 
revision unless the parties have agreed that that amount is to be 
unaffected by any changes to the original contract sum. 779 
This finding was in response to an argument by the beneficiary/respondent that, 
because none of the parties had expressly considered a downward revision of the 
guaranteed 10% of the primary contract, then it placed the guaranteed sum beyond 
revision. 
The Court found this reasoning to be specious and in conflict with the case law. 
The principle decided therefore provides that parties must expressly fix the sum 
against revision in order for that amount to be redeemable in all circumstances. 780 
                                                     
776 Hiap Tian Soon Construction Pte Ltd v Hola Developments Pte Ltd  (2003) 1 SLR 667 (Hiap Tian). 
777  Ibid 684[61]. 
778  Ibid 684[65]. 
779  Ibid 685[66]. Original emphasis. 
780  Ibid 685[60]. 
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The Court found that the value of the guarantee is relative rather than actual, and 
unless otherwise agreed to expressly, can only be determined by reference to the 
agreed-upon value of the underlying contract as it stands from time to time. Unless 
specifically stated to the contrary, contractual value is not a quantum fixed against 
the original contract value but adjusts as the value of the underlying contract 
adjusts:  
The revision of the contract sum represents a reduction of the 
contractor’s responsibility towards the developer…[and]…the 
security held by the developer in the form of a performance bond 
must similarly be reduced.781 
The Court affirmed Dauphin and others by stating that unconscionability could not 
be defined in precise terms, reliant instead on the facts of each matter. By 
following GHL, the Court allowed that claiming an amount greater than that which 
is owed should be found unconscionable. 
Anwar Siraj v Teo Hee Lai Building Construction 782 
This case is only included here for the purposes of completeness. An ex parte 
interim injunction had been issued to enjoin the claimant from receiving money 
under the performance bond, which was subsequently set aside only to be 
reinstated by a judicial commissioner. 783 This particular appeal was by the 
beneficiary claimant to have that decision reversed. 
The Court read down the terms of the bond narrowly, followed a conservative 
reading of the case law, and could find no behaviour on the part of the claimant 
that could be made out as unconscionable. 
Newtech Engineering v BKB Engineering 784 
The dispute in this case revolved around a claim on two performance bonds issued 
by the plaintiff sub-contractor to a general contractor, BKB Engineering, as 
guarantees for the construction of certain culvert and road works for the 
Singaporean Ministry of Defence. 
                                                     
781  Ibid 684[62]. 
782  Anwar Siraj v Teo Hee Lai Building Construction Pte Ltd  (2003) 1 SLR 394 (Anwar). 
783  Singaporean "Judicial Commissioners" are persons appointed to the Supreme Court by the President of 
Singapore on the advice of the Prime Minister. JC's  have the powers of a judge in that jurisdiction and are 
appointed to "facilitate the disposal of business in the Supreme Court."  See <http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg> 
784  Newtech Engineering Constructions Pte Ltd v BKB Engineering Constructions Pte Ltd (2003) 4 SLR 73 
(Newtech). 
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Newtech successfully sought relief in part because they “produced cogent 
evidence to support their contention that they were not in default of their 
contractual obligations”, therefore demonstrating that there was “no reason to call 
on the bonds”.785 On the basis of the documentary evidence, it was contended that 
BKB could not have a belief that their claim was bona fide. 
BKB made the claim on the bonds based on a range of allegations that they could 
not support with evidence. They could not demonstrate either any breach of the 
underlying contract by the plaintiff or that certain alleged delays were caused by 
the plaintiff.  
Nor BKB could provide evidence to support an otherwise inexplicable rise in the 
cost of certain work incurred rectifying an alleged fault in the plaintiff’s work.  
By the time the claims were made, the works had “long been completed and the 
defects liability period had expired.” 786 To support this, the plaintiff established that 
all contractual obligations were satisfied by November 2000, in line with agreed -to 
extensions that were not caused by the plaintif f. 
The claim on the bonds was made some 26 months later. Also relevant to the 
unconscionability of the demand was that neither BKB, the project consultants, nor 
the Ministry of Defence made any complaint to the plaintiff about their work in the 
intervening period. 
The Court was concerned at the veracity of the claims made by BKB in support of 
their demand. The Court questioned a cost disparity for the removal of certain 
residue earth, noting that it “was difficult to see how [BKB] could have made such 
a blunder in their accounts”. The difference between the two amounts was 
“suspiciously close to the total amount payable under the bonds.” 787  
The Court appears to imply that BKB had committed a fraud in making the claim, 
stating: 
The entire circumstances of the case suggested strongly that the 
first defendants had an ulterior motive in calling on the bonds. It did 
not appear to be based on any bona fide claim they had against the 
                                                     
785  Ibid 80[27]. 
786  Ibid 78[18]. 
787  Ibid 79-80. The claimed costs ballooned from $137,000 in August 2002 to about $287,000 in January the 
following year but BKB could not produce any evidence to support the claim ed increase. 
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plaintiffs…The calls on the bonds appeared to have been made to 
ameliorate their cash flow problems.788 
The Court granted the applications for injunctions against BKB on the grounds of 
unconscionability. 
Econ Piling v Aviva General Insurance789 
Econ is mentioned in the literature in relation to unconscionability because the 
District Court initially granted an injunction based on its view of unconscionable 
behaviour. The High Court overturned the injunction. The Court of Appeal ordered 
that the bond’s beneficiary, Jurong Town Corporation, was time barred from 
making a claim under the relevant legislation. 
So, the case may assist with determining the effect of Statute of Limitations 
legislation790 as it applies to the operation of performance bonds. It does not assist 
with understanding the unconscionability exception. It is included here for 
completeness. 
Leighton Contractors (Sing) v J-Power Systems Corp791 
This case follows the established line of authority closely and contributes little to 
the development of the exception. The Court affirmed the strong prima facie case 
rule, and supported the view that no evidence of default was necessary, stating 
that “the Performance Bond was an “on demand” one and no actual proof of 
breach was required on the part of JPS.” 792 
The plaintiff Leighton Contractors (LCS) attempted to demonstrate that the 
defendant (JPS) was not a “fair and honest contractor”, but the basis for the 
allegation left the Court unmoved. The fact that several adjudications as to costs 
had gone against the defendant previously did not substantiate the plaintiff’s claim 
to unconscionability in the current circumstance in the Court’s view.  
The defendant JPS claimed that multiple breaches of contract by the plaintiff had 
caused the expenditure of monies which nearly totalled the quantum of the bond.  
In addition, JPS claimed a significant (although unstated) amount for liquidated 
damages extending from the late completion of the contract by the plaintiff. The 
                                                     
788  Ibid 80[27]. 
789  Econ Piling Pte Ltd v Aviva General Insurance Pte Ltd and Another [2006] 4 SLR 501 (SGCA 32) (Econ). 
790  Limitation Act (SGA) 1996 (Cap 163 Rev Ed). 
791  Leighton Contractors (Sing) Pte Ltd v J-Power Systems Corporations [2009] SGHC 7 (Leighton). 
792  Ibid [9] 
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Court interpreted the Contract completion terms narrowly, holding that LCS had not 
completed the contract as agreed despite that a Certificate of Substantial 
Completion had been issued to LCS and that “JPS’s claim that liquidated damages 
are payable was not mala fide.”793 
The Court determined not to follow GHL794 or Hiap Tian795 by finding 
unconscionability in an excessive claim. In the final analysis the Court decided that 
“LCS fell short of demonstrating a strong prima facie case of unconscionability on 
JPS’s part…[given the]…limited evidence and the nature of the application.”796  
Shanghai Electric Group v PT Merak Energi 797 
In Shanghai, Kin J stated that, despite making the jurisdictional finding that British 
law applies, His Honour would “for the sake of completeness” 798 discuss whether 
the defendant would have been found to have acted unconscionably in making the 
demand if Singaporean law had applied. However, it is doubtful whether Shanghai 
should be included in the line of authority, as issues relevant to both the advance 
payment bond and underlying contract were decided under British law. It is 
included here for completeness. 
In its deliberations, the Singaporean Court noted that British law does not allow for 
unconscionability as a basis “upon which the court would restrain a call on an on -
demand bond”799 and therefore did not need to address the issue of alleged 
unconscionability. Kin J reiterated the difficulty of determining “what constitutes 
“unconscionability”…[despite the]…various expositions on the concept of 
unconscionability found in the authorities.” 800 
In the Court’s view, the call was no more than the defendant, PTM, attempting to 
affect the return of the moneys it had advanced to Shanghai Electric, as it was 
lawfully required to do.801 
  
                                                     
793  Ibid [11]. 
794  GHL, n21. 
795  Hiap Tian, n776. 
796  Leighton, n791 [12]. 
797  Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd v PT Merak Energi Indonesia & Anor [2010] SGHC 2; 2 SLR 329 (Shanghai). 
798  Ibid [35]. 
799  Ibid [14]. The Court noted that English and Singaporean law “diverge” on this point.  
800  Ibid [38]. 
801  Ibid [47]. 
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JBE Properties v Gammon802 
In the first instance, the High Court in Gammon v JBE803 restrained JBE from 
receiving the benefit of what it deemed to be an on-demand performance bond 
issued by BNP Paribas, finding the demand unconscionable given that the 
beneficiary had “grossly inflated” 804 the costs of rectification for certain defects in 
the account party’s work, possibly in collusion with another sub -contractor. 
In the final appeal, the Court restated the Singaporean position that 
“unconscionability is a separate and independent ground for the court to grant an 
interim injunction restraining a beneficiary from making a call on a performance 
bond”.805 It also addressed the question whether, in relation to unconscionability 
claims, the various types of guarantees (on-demand bonds, indemnity performance 
bonds etc) should be treated with the same consideration as commercial letters of 
credit. 
The Court looked briefly at the history of the two instrument types, and their role in 
the allocation of risk. Specifically, the Court looked at whether it “would be entitled 
to interpret the performance bond as being conditioned upon facts rather than 
upon documents or upon a mere demand”,806 noting: 
The Singapore courts’ rationale in applying unconscionability as a 
separate and independent ground for restraining a call on a 
performance bond…is that a performance bond serves a different 
function from a letter of credit. The latter performs the role of 
payment by the obligor for goods shipped to it by the beneficiary.807 
The Court’s discussion of the development of the Singaporean exception is 
notable. 
The different functions referred to were explained as the primary obligation under a 
commercial letter of credit to make payment for goods shipped as opposed to the 
secondary obligation under a bond to held by the obligor “to pay damages if it 
breaches its primary contractual obligations to the beneficiary .”808 The Court 
specifically refuted the idea that a bond is the ‘lifeblood of commerce’.  
                                                     
802  JBE (No.2), n19. 
803  Gammon Pte Limited v JBE Properties Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 130 (JBE (No.1)). 
804  Ibid [11]. 
805  JBE (No.2), n19 [6]. 
806  Ibid [10]. 
807  Ibid [10]. Emphasis added. 
808  Ibid [10-12]. 
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The Court looked at Ellinger and Neo’s discussion on the different treatment of 
guarantees and letters of credit and disagreed with the authors’ view that where 
the employer-beneficiary has sacrificed a stronger position for a weaker one,809 it 
would be justifiable to apply the autonomy principle to the performance bond and 
treat it as though it were a letter of credit. 810  
Citing the case before them where the employer-beneficiary had accepted a 
performance bond in substitution for security in the form of a cash deposit, the 
Court stated:  
(a) a cash deposit is no different in principle to a guarantee (albeit 
more difficult or impossible to enjoin use of); and  
(b) the greater ease of injunction must be taken to be “a factor 
which the employer-beneficiary must…have considered and 
accepted in preferring a performance bond to a cash deposit ”.811 
To remove any doubt, the Court held: 
[T]he Singapore position on the circumstances in which the court 
may restrain a call on a performance bond is justified…The juridical 
basis for adopting unconscionability as a relevant ground…lies in 
the equitable nature of the injunction. Considerations of 
conscionability are applicable…and there is no reason why these 
considerations should not be applied for the purposes of 
determining whether a call on a performance bond should be 
restrained to achieve a fair balance between the interests of the 
beneficiary and those of the obligor. 812 
Another aspect of the case related to clause 7.6 in the unde rlying “Building 
Contract”. This term provided: 
Save in the case of fraud or unconscionability, the Management 
Contractor accepts that the Employer may call upon the banker’s 
undertaking or any other security held by it at any time and the 
                                                     
809  That is, accepting the weaker secondary obligation instrument as opposed  to the stronger cash position. 
810  Ellinger, n14, 326. 
811  Ibid [12]. 
812  Ibid [13]. 
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Management Contractor shall not seek an injunction against the 
Employer.813 
The effect of this clause was to provide Gammon with the specific right to 
intervene where an allegation of unconscionable conduct arose.  
The Court ultimately shied away from unconscionability as the ground for 
restraining the beneficiary’s claim. It ruled that the bond in question was a “true 
indemnity performance bond”814 and therefore the only basis upon which JBE could 
draw down on it was to demonstrate that it had suffered actual loss.  
It is unclear to what extent the findings of the lower court remain applicable law. 
The Court did provide that in different circumstances the demand would have been 
unconscionable “for the reasons given [in the lower court].” 815 
Astrata (Singapore) v Tridex Technologies816 
Astrata’s contribution to the unconscionability exception is unremarkable, except 
for two relatively minor points. 
First, Astrata is one of the few cases in the line where the substantive issues are 
not concerned with construction law. The performance bond in this case relates to 
the development and delivery of technology for the purposes of tracking individuals 
and vehicles by an unnamed “state”. 
Second is Justice Pillai’s review in the lower court of the case law from Bocotra817 
to Eltraco818 and his compilation of “applicable principles” harvested from those 
cases.819 This distillation was referred to in the subsequent Court of Appeal case of 
Mount Sophia820 and serves as a useful summary of principles to act as guideposts 
for the Court when considering an application to enjoin a claim on a bond on the 
basis of unconscionable behaviour by the claimant.  
On appeal, the obligor Astrata did not seek leave on the decision that Tridex’s 
demand on the performance bond was not unconscionable. 821 
                                                     
813  Ibid [15]. Emphasis added. Contrast this with the ‘Asplenium Clause’, p.176. 
814  Ibid [20]. 
815  Ibid [30]. 
816 Astrata, n657. 
817  Bocotra, n149. 
818  Eltraco, n407. 
819  Astrata, n657 [73]. 
820  Mount Sophia, n39. 
821  Astrata (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Portcullis Escrow Pte Ltd [2011] SGCA 20 
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BS Mount Sophia v Join-Aim822 
Being among the few recent cases in this line of authority where unconscionability 
was successfully argued, Mount Sophia is profoundly interesting to the 
development of the exception and both the High Court and Court of Appeal 
contribute to the law – indeed, both judgements must be read in conjunction to 
fully appreciate the contribution they make. 
The appeal provides a comprehensive analysis of the full body of case law relating 
to the unconscionability exception and described the exception. While the Court of 
Appeal affirmed the High Court’s decision to restrain the claim on the on -demand 
performance bond, it found unconscionability on more complex grounds and 
provided an extensive and, with respect, wonderfully written exposition as to why it 
did so, in a manner that echoes an exhaustive academic treatise on the subject.  
Factually, the case differs little from many of those preceding it, being a claim on a 
performance bond under circumstances where some doubt exists over the bona 
fides of the claimant beneficiary. Much of the doubt surrounded the timing of 
certain events leading to the claim, including differences of view regarding work -
completion and work-certification dates. 
Justice Kwang in the High Court refused to be drawn into the “myriad of other  
matters” with which the parties attempted to distract the Court, finding no cause to 
address these “run of the mill construction disputes which were properly the 
subject of arbitration”.823 His Honour’s role was to determine whether the call on the 
bond was unconscionable and this responsibility was echoed again in the appellate 
court which affirmed that it “was not required to decide on the substantive 
entitlements of the parties…[or]…engage in protracted consideration of the merits 
of the case.”824 
However, it is arguable whether Kwang J gave sufficient consideration to the cause 
of action, despite providing a full restatement of the unconscionability case 
principles from Astrata.825  
His Honour particularly noticed in evidence an email which provided a ‘Practical 
Completion Date’ for the contracted works that was later inexplicably pushed back, 
                                                     
822  Mount Sophia, n39. 
823  Join-Aim Pte Ltd v BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd and Another  [2012] SGHC 3 [28-29]. 
824  Mount Sophia, n39 [40]. 
825  Astrata, n657 [31]. 
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thereby creating significantly higher liquidation damages for the beneficiary (and 
therefore a basis for calling on the bond). This also invited a suspicion of collusion  
between the architect and his client and therefore possible abusive behaviour in 
making the call on the performance bond. 
However, on appeal, this email was held to be insufficient in itself, with the Court 
implying that such a basis was too narrow and that the email, “no matter how 
robust a peg it was, was not...sufficient to establish a finding of 
unconscionability.”826 
The Court of Appeal followed the dictum in Eltraco827 which provided that in order to 
determine unconscionability, all relevant factors must be taken into account. The 
Court defined unconscionability in the context of performance bonds and looked at 
the entire chronology of events leading up to the call on the bond. It is, they held, 
“only if the entire context of the case is particularly malodorous that such an 
injunction should be granted.” 828 
Tin, Leong and Rajah JA also contributed to the developing definition of 
unconscionability, stating:  
Unconscionability in the context of performance bonds is a 
conclusion applied to describe certain types of conduct in 
certain contexts in the execution of a contract . It is not a 
formulaic doctrine with definite elements and must be distinguished 
from the general contract law doctrine of unconscionability, which is 
concerned with conduct at the time of the formation of the contract, 
and which can vitiate consent to a contract on the grounds that the 
terms of the contract are unfair and the contract was entered into in 
an unfair manner.829 
This is the first occasion where the Court has clearly made out that 
unconscionable conduct in independent instruments is substantive and is not to be 
confused with the general contract law doctrine of unconscionability, which is 
procedural. 
                                                     
826  Mount Sophia, n39 [40]. 
827  Eltraco, n407, 299. 
828  Mount Sophia, n39 [21]. 
829  Ibid [41]. Original italics. Bold added. 
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During the appeal, the Court identified three “strands” to be addressed and was 
assiduous in teasing two of these out and addressing them individually with regard 
to the unconscionability question. 830  
The first strand related to the aforementioned completion dates, ie the delayed 
issuance of the Delay Certificate 831 and the chronology of events leading to the 
claim. The second strand related to the beneficiary refusing to honour a Progress 
Claim. The third strand concerned the fact that it was given to the architect to 
demand under threat that the bond be extended on the verge of its expiry.  
While explicitly stating that “no single factor was conclusive”, in finding the claim 
unconscionable, the Court first found “the complete absence of allegations of delay 
by [BS Mount Sophia] odd and, indeed, troubling”, holding that “the Appellant’s 
silence spoke volumes.”832 This silence also extended to responses by the 
contractor to proposals put by the architect which the Court believed “had, at very 
least, misled the respondent”.833 This, it felt, amounted to a lack of bona fides 
because it indicated a lack of belief in the contractor’s responsibility for the 
delays.834 
The Court also held as improper the claimant’s threat to call on the bond if the 
contractor did not extend its validity 835 and took particular exception to the fact that 
it was given to the Architect to make this demand in an Architect’s Direction.  
While holding firm that their “consideration of the disputes between the parties 
does not necessitate a substantive determination of them”,836 the final view of the 
entire matter gave the Court sufficient reason to dismiss the appeal. 
Several other highly salient points were also entered that clarify the scope of the 
unconscionability exception. Discussing the determination of a claimant’s bona 
fides, the judgement noted: 
                                                     
830  For unknown reasons, the Court disregarded the matter of the beneficiary’s failure to honour the final progress 
payment. 
831  The Delay Certificate is issued by the architect to certify the extent to which the project completion was ret arded 
by reference to any extensions that have been granted; the date by which the works were due for completion; 
and declares the contractor in default where this date has not been met. This certification is a condition 
precedent to claims for liquidated damages. In this case, the Delay Certificate was not issued until almost 
eleven months after the stated date of completion, which the Court also addressed.  
832  Mount Sophia, n39 [48]. 
833  Ibid [49]. The Court’s reasoning is interesting given the principles of contract relating to silence on the part of 
the offeree, saying: “The appellant’s silence on this point also seemed to us to constitute its acquiescence to 
those conditions.” See, inter alia, Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 142 ER 1037. 
834  Ibid [52]. 
835  Ibid [53]. 
836  Ibid [47]. 
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Even if the Appellant was mistaken in adopting this position [that the 
respondent was in breach], the call could still be legitimate if this 
position was genuinely adopted and the Appellant honestly believed 
that the respondent was in breach. 837 
This demonstrates the Court’s commitment to witnessing the claimant’s bona fides 
and being prepared to allow what may prima facie appear an unfair claim where it 
is made with an honest belief. 
The justices also discussed the need to “strike the appropriate balance between 
the conflicting positions of the obligor and beneficiary”, and connected this with the 
conflict existing between the “underlying need to preserve the raison d’être of 
performance bonds” and the use of bonds as instruments of oppression. 838 The 
Court coined the term “perennial tension” to describe the nature of this conflict and 
dedicated considerable discursive effort to it. Indicating policy, the justices stated 
that “courts should be slow to upset the status quo and disrupt the allocation of 
risk”.839  
To resolve this tension, the Court put forward the view that “unconscionability must 
be applied in a nuanced manner”. To support this, their Honours noted with 
approbation Loi’s view that: 
confidence in, and utility of, commercial instruments such as 
performance guarantees cannot possibly be promoted by habitual 
judicial enforcement of unconscionable payment demands made 
under oppressive circumstances.840 
It therefore followed that the Court was obliged to intervene where there was 
“unsatisfactory conduct tainted by bad faith.” 841 In so saying the justices rejected 
the idea that unconscionable conduct cannot be found simply because “a neat and 
tidy definition of the same is not forthcoming.” 842 
  
                                                     
837  Ibid [52]. 
838  Ibid [24]. 
839  Ibid [25]. 
840  Loi, n131, 508-509 cited in Mount Sophia, n39 [33]. This reflects the view in Dynamics, n467. 
841  Mount Sophia, n39 [36]. 
842  Ibid [35]. 
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York International v Voltas Limited 843 
The plaintiff’s action in York did not seek to take “the more far-reaching step of 
seeking a declaration that the defendant’s call on the Guarantee is invalid”,  but 
rather only to restrain the defendant’s claim “pending the outcome of arbitral 
proceedings”. The Court considered this with approbation by stating that the 
plaintiff had “taken a position that was eminently reasonable.” 844 This is an 
otherwise fairly pedestrian case. 
In a well-reasoned decision, the Court set out to determine three limbs of the 
dispute:  
1. the nature of the Guarantee (being conditional or not);  
2. whether the demand was defective; and  
3. whether the defendant’s claim comprised unconscionable behaviour.  
Unfortunately, the Court despatched the allegation of unconscionable conduct on 
the part of the defendant with alacrity, finding that the ‘strong prima facie case’ 
standard had not been met, and dismissed an implied proof that the defendant did 
not have a bona fide belief that their claim was valid. 
The majority of the Court’s judgement addressed the matter of conditionality of the 
Guarantee, ie whether the beneficiary could claim against the bond with a simple 
demand, or whether the claim was contingent upon there being a factual basis for 
it – actual breach of the purchase agreement and a consequent actual loss. 
Of interest are two points of law not previously seen in this line of authority. First is 
the Court’s specific coinage of a new principle to describe the role of performance 
bond – the ‘Expediency Principle” 845 – which is provided in conjunction with the 
established (and rule-based) independence principle as a basis for the broad view 
that “performance bonds are a type of document where the court should be 
restrained in its examination of the external context and intrinsic evidence.” 846  
Ang J stated: 
The primary role of a performance bond in commerce is to ensure 
expediency in payment. When a call is made, both the beneficiary 
                                                     
843  York International Pte Ltd v Voltas Limited  [2013] SGHC 124 (York). 
844  Ibid [15]. 
845  Ibid [19(a)]. 
846  Ibid [19]. 
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and the bank need to be able to determine quickly if the demand is 
valid simply by looking at the bond instrument itself, without having 
to cross-refer to the underlying contract…(hereinafter “the 
expediency principle”). 847 
Second, the Court invoked a variation on the contra preferentem rule by providing 
that, where there is ambiguity as to whether a bond or guarantee is independent, 
the “court is entitled to construe any ambiguity against the beneficiary”. 848 The 
application of such a rule is unique in this line of authority.  
Ultimately however, the Court ordered the beneficiary restrained, but on the basis 
that: 
1. “the Guarantee was conditional [sic] and premised on there in 
fact having been a breach of the underlying contract leading to 
loss”;849 and  
2. the demand presented by the beneficiary was faulty. 
The Court found that the defendant “could not be said to have engaged in 
unconscionable conduct”850 based on the facts adduced. 
Tech-System Design and Contract v WYWY Investments 851 
In its reasoning the Court in Tech-System relied heavily on Mount Sophia.852 It 
reaffirmed the authority that a legitimate demand against a bond or guarantee is 
not unconscionable, even if it has a seriously deleterious effect on the obligor.853 
Even where there is doubt, such a call, “would still be legitimate so long as the 
position was genuinely adopted and the beneficiary honestly believed that the 
obligor was in breach of its obligations.” 854 
The application for an injunction grounded on unconscionable conduct followed 
contractual disputes between the parties relating to delays and defects in a 
construction project. It sought to restrain the call on the bond until such time as the 
substantive contractual issues could be resolved in arbitration.855 There was no 
                                                     
847  Ibid [19(a)]. Emphasis added. 
848  Ibid [27]. 
849  Ibid [38]. 
850  Ibid [46]. 
851  Tech-System Design & Contract (S) Pte Ltd v WYWY Investments Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 57 (Tech-System). 
852  Mount Sophia, n39. 
853  Tech-System, n851 [39]. 
854  Ibid [37]. 
855  Ibid [2]. 
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argument made by the plaintiff to the effect that the performance bonds were not 
payable on demand.856 
The plaintiff’s case however, lacked sufficient evidentiary support to found a prima 
facie case of unconscionable conduct, largely relying as it did on specious 
arguments relating to personnel appointments, and hearsay evidence relating to 
inadmissible statements and conversations. 857 The plaintiff also failed to establish 
that any of the substantive contractual issues underlying the claims and counter-
claims of the parties, which the Court left to be determined in arbitration or 
litigation, constituted a strong prima facie case of unconscionable conduct.858 
Finally, the plaintiff also failed to defend the claim that the beneficiary’s accounts 
were “false or fraudulent or so obviously wrong…as to constitute unconscionable 
conduct.”859 
The plaintiff stated that a successful call against the performance bond would 
effectively ruin the company but the Court was indifferent. It stated that “a situation 
such as the present would be precisely the kind of situation envisaged when the 
parties contracted for performance bonds to be provided.” 860  
While the Court held that it was “not persuaded that the plaintiff had brought [the] 
application in bad faith”,861 it reminded the parties that any inquiry into 
unconscionable conduct must focus “on the beneficiary’s alleged unconscionable 
conduct rather than the effect on the obligor.”862 
Tech-System serves to reinforce some of the basic legal guidelines for restraining 
a demand grounded in unconscionable conduct, ie that a strong prima facie case 
must be made out in its entirety, without resort to “mere allegations and hearsay”. 863 
Further, any hardship brought about by a demand “could not be relevant ”864 in 
relation to determining the presence of unconscionable conduct.  
  
                                                     
856  Ibid [18]. 
857  Ibid [22]. 
858  Ibid [23]. 
859  Ibid [33]. 
860  Ibid [36]. 
861  Ibid [43]. 
862  Ibid [41]. Original emphasis. 
863  Ibid [2]. 
864  Ibid [39]. 
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CCM Industrial v 70 Shenton 865 
This is a pedestrian case that was quickly settled on established principles and 
unfortunately lends support to the statement made by Leow JC in Asplenium(No.1) 
that it “is apparent from the authorities that the ground of unconscionability is the 
primary port of call used by parties seeking an injunction to restrain the calling of a 
performance bond.”866 
The actual basis upon which the plaintiff alleged unconscionable conduct is 
unstated. However, only the most optimistic counsel would have sought to have 
the beneficiary enjoined for unconscionability given the factual matrix, and the 
Court swiftly despatched the matter accordingly. The matter is included here for 
completeness. 
CKR Contract Services v Asplenium Land 867 
The Asplenium Land case will have a profound and enduring effect on the 
unconscionability exception given the treatment by the Court of Appeal on 
exclusion clauses. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the findings of the lower 
court and the ultimate result strengthened the defendant’s position.  
The primary dispute rested on the existence within the underlying contract of 
Clause 3.5.8, a term agreed to as part of the main contract. It was alleged by the 
plaintiff that this clause ousted the jurisdiction of the Court by limiting to fraud 
alone the grounds upon which the account holder was able to seek to have the 
beneficiary restrained from making a demand against the performance bond.  
The relevant clause provides: 
3.5.8  In keeping with the intent that the performance bond is 
provided by the Contractor in lieu of a cash deposit, the 
Contractor agrees that except in the case of fraud, the 
Contractor shall not for any reason whatsoever be entitled to 
enjoin or restrain: 
(a)   the Employer from making any call or demand on the 
performance bond or receiving any cash proceeds 
under the performance bond; or 
                                                     
865  CCM Industrial Pte Ltd v 70 Shenton Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 75 (CCM). 
866  CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 266 [20] (Asplenium(No.1)). 
867  Asplenium(No.2), n212. 
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(b)   the obligor under the performance bond from paying any 
cash proceeds under the performance bond 
on any ground including the ground of unconscionability. 868 
In the first instance, the High Court held that any attempt under a contract to limit 
the grounds for an injunction was unenforceable on three grounds:  
1. That clause 3.5.8 was an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the court; 
2. The court’s equitable jurisdiction provided the necessary authority for 
the grant of an injunction and this authority cannot be “circumscribed 
or curtailed by contract”; and  
3. The use of unconscionable conduct to ground an injunction was legal 
policy that could not be disregarded by agreement between private 
parties. 
While this effective severance of the exclusion clause did not help the plaintiff’s 
case in the lower court, they could not make out a strong prima facie case of 
unconscionability in any event. The grounds upon which they attempted to anchor 
their allegations that the demand was unconscionable were uniformly rejected by 
the Court and demonstrated that counsel for the plaintiff was truly optimistic that 
the Court would overturn itself. 
Leow JC in the High Court cited the finding in Eltraco that unfairness per se does 
not constitute unconscionability any more than a mere breach of contract 
constitutes such behaviour. 869 Neither the plaintiff’s assertion of a lack of fiscal 
need on the part of the beneficiary870 nor the financial devastation that would be 
delivered on the person of the plaintiff swayed the Court toward a finding of 
unconscionable conduct for the demand. 871 
Both parties appealed the decision:  
CKR appealed against the Judge’s finding that Asplenium did not 
make the call unconscionably. Asplenium cross-appealed against 
the Judge’s holding that the clause was unenforceable.872 
                                                     
868  Asplenium(No.2), n212 [5]. 
869  Asplenium(No.1), n866 [27] citing Eltraco, n407, 298-299[30-32]. 
870  Such a need is not a condition precedent for making a demand on the bond.  
871  The court in Tech-Systems, n851 [39-41] made it clear that the fiscal consequences to the obligor are not to be 
considered when examining the beneficiary’s right to demand payment.  
872  Asplenium(No.2), n212 [2]. 
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The bench took an unfavourable view of the reasoning of the High Court, reviewing 
all three grounds for severing the exclusion clause and holding that Clause 3.5.8. 
was valid and enforceable.873 This finding is now essential business knowledge and 
will almost certainly guarantee the inclusion of such clauses in those contracts 
requiring one party to furnish an on-demand guarantee. 
The appellate Court first found the nature of the clause “to be more in the nature of 
an exclusion or exception clause (as opposed to a clause seeking to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court)” which “seeks to limit the right to an equitable remedy”.874 
The clause does not, in other words, deny either party access to the Court as such 
and therefore does not conflict with public policy. 
The Court also distinguished the authorities relied on given that the clauses dealt 
with therein differed in a key respect – they sought to oblige the Court to act in a 
manner dictated by the parties’ contractual agreement:  
The court cannot be obliged to exercise its discretion in a way that 
gives effect to an agreement between parties in a manner that is 
contrary to principles it would ordinarily apply to the grant of 
injunctive relief. That, however, does not preclude parties from 
agreeing to limit their right to seek certain remedies or reliefs from 
the court, which is the effect of cl.3.5.8.875 
The Court did “not think that cl 3.5.8 represents an ousting of the jurisdiction of the 
court”876 nor that the policy considerations cited by Leow JC of the lower court 
“really support[ed] his conclusion to the effect that [cl 3.5.8] is contrary to public 
policy”.877 
The Court’s clarification of the use of exclusion clauses contributes significantly 
toward the decay of the unconscionability exception by providing the means by 
which parties can agree to exempt themselves from the remedies available for an 
unconscionable demand. It is posited here that this finding has for most purposes 
rendered unconscionability, as a defence to abusive calls, nugatory.  
 
                                                     
873  Wooler, n505, 178. 
874  Asplenium(No.2), n212 [21-24]. Original emphasis. 
875  Ibid [29]. 
876  Ibid [36]. 
877  Ibid [41]. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 179 of 270 
 
JK Integrated v 50 Robinson 878 
In response to the grant of an ex parte injunction, the defendant beneficiary sought 
to have the order set aside in the High Court preventing it from making a demand 
for the full amount of a $4.7 million independent performance bond. The terms of 
the bond allowed for partial payments and its independence was not disputed.  
From the factual matrix, it is apparent that the parties were in dispute from very 
early in the construction project over a range of issues; some further exacerbated 
by the plaintiff’s alleged precarious financial position. Despite the defendant’s 
continued financial support and the implementation of additional agreements to 
assist the plaintiff, ultimately the defendant issued a “Termination Certificate” and 
made a demand against the bond.879 
The basis for the plaintiff’s claim that the demand against the bond was 
unconscionable rested on three grounds, specifically that the defendant: 
1. engaged in conduct that caused both delays to the works and 
“financial and other difficulties”;  
2. applied “unjustified” pressure on the plaintiff to meet its obligations; 
and 
3. resorted to threats of non-payment to “control” the plaintiff. 880 
The plaintiff did not attempt to allocate any of these behaviours to any of the 
established categories of unconscionable conduct. It is apparent that the plaintiff 
was attempting to frame what were “genuine contractual disputes between the 
parties”881 as the defendant’s ‘unconscionable conduct’.  
In its defence, 50 Robinson alleged inter alia that the “plaintiff did not make full 
and frank disclosure of material facts during the ex parte hearing” and sought to 
have the injunction set aside on that basis as well. 882 
The Court reviewed some of the basic tenets of unconscionability from the 
authorities, flagging the established principles on evidence and independent 
instruments, affirming neither breaches of contract nor genuine contractual 
disputes can constitute unconscionable conduct. It also affirmed that a protracted 
                                                     
878  JKI, n185. 
879  Ibid [16]. 
880  Ibid [18]. 
881  Ibid [19]. 
882  Ibid [21]. 
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consideration of the substantive issues of the case was not required to establish 
whether an injunction could be granted grounded in unconscionability. 883 
Throughout its examination of the minutia of the claims put forward by the plaintiff, 
the Court consistently found the defendant (and its agents) had acted 
appropriately, had met its obligations under the contract, and had done more than 
was reasonably necessary to assist the plaintiff meet their obligations.  
Relying on reasoning in Mount Sophia884 the Court stated that “so long as the First 
defendant had the honest but mistaken belief that the plaintiff [was in breach], the 
First defendant’s call on the Performance Bond would still have been legitimate.”885 
Accordingly the Court held that there could be no unconscionable conduct. 886 
The Court also looked to the extent of the plaintiff’s indebtedness to the defendant, 
likely rectification costs, and possible liquidated damages to find that the demand 
for “the full amount of the Performance Bond was [also] not unconscionable.” 887 
Therefore, grounds (1) and (2) above were found to be wanting as they constituted 
ordinary contractual disputes conducted in a manner that fell  short of being 
unconscionable. With regard to ground (3) above, the Court found there to be 
insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant had acted other than in a 
normal commercial manner, which it said cannot be unconscionable.  
Boustead Singapore v Arab Banking Corporation 888 
Arab Banking Corporation v Boustead Singapore 889 
At first instance it appeared that Boustead would contribute significantly to the 
unconscionability exception in Singapore. However the matter was decided on 
different grounds in the Court of Appeal. 
The matter was factually complex but in essence, Boustead Singapore plead that 
demands against a bank “Facility Agreement” were unconscionable on the basis 
that the underlying contract was frustrated and the guarantees and counter -
guarantees they were meant to indemnify had not been paid and could not be 
honoured. The High Court agreed. 
                                                     
883  Ibid [27]. 
884  Mount Sophia, n39. 
885  JKI, n185 [72]. 
886  Ibid [71]. 
887  Ibid [76]. 
888  Boustead (No.1), n160. 
889  Boustead (No.2), n159. 
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One finding by Woo J that perhaps survived appeal is the decision to broaden the 
scope of the unconscionability exception to include Financial Agreements  under 
the unconscionability exception. The Agreement was not what would usually be 
termed ‘the underlying contract’, which was a contract of sale frustrated by war. It 
was contractual in nature but the Court saw no reason to differentiate it.  
Ultimately unconscionability (equitable considerations) did not feature in the Court 
of Appeal’s decision. The Court did not disturb any of the High Court’s reasoning 
directly. It simply discounted the need to decide the matter on the basis of 
unconscionability once it found in the plaintiff’s favour on the ground of fraud in the 
reckless sense.890 
2.0 Conclusion to Singaporean Case Analyses 
Singapore was the first jurisdiction to comprehensively canvass and develop an 
unconscionability exception to the principle of autonomy in letters of credit and 
demand guarantees. The Singapore superior courts have heard more than twenty-
eight cases where unconscionable conduct has been plead to ground an action 
and, as a result, the scope of the exception has been widened and its application 
refined. The types of behaviours that have been regarded as unconscionable have 
been carefully considered and both the standard and burden of proof have been 
clarified. 
Unconscionable conduct has been found in relation to a broad range of behaviours 
relating to demands on letters of credit and demand guarantees. Many allegations 
of unconscionable conduct have been held to lack merit. Those cases where the 
applicant was successful provide guidance on how the Singaporean court is likely 
to view similar behaviours in future. Behaviours proscribed by the Court include 
where the beneficiary makes a demand:891 
❖ despite having acted to obstruct the performance of the underlying 
contract (abus de droit) and thereby to enable a claim against the 
independent instrument: Royal Design;892 
                                                     
890  Boustead (No.2), n159 [58]. Dal Pont, n307, 267[8.05] points out that such reckless misrepresentations constitute 
‘common law’ fraud on the contract which is decided in that jurisdiction before the court considers matters under 
its equitable jurisdiction. 
891  Wooler, n505, 175-176. This paragraph and a substantial part of the following list are excerpted in part or full 
from this journal article. 
892  Royal Design, n148. 
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❖ despite its failure to meet a major obligation under the contract terms, 
thereby causing the performing party to default and triggering a 
capacity to make the claim—usually a failure to make or guarantee 
interim payments: Kvaerner;893  
❖ despite being unable or unwilling to meet their own fiscal 
responsibilities under the contract: Raymond Construction;894  
❖ despite there being an outstanding dispute as to whether the contract 
is still on foot, eg whether a force majeure provision might be held to 
operate: Min Thai Holdings;895  
❖ for an amount greater than that which is owed: GHL896 and Hiap Tian;897 
❖ despite holding sufficient monies to mitigate their losses and despite 
an incapacity to quantify actual damage: Eltraco;898 
❖ in order to bring pressure to bear on the account party in unrelated 
negotiations: Samwoh(No.2);899 
❖ despite the complete absence of a bona fide claim nor any factual 
basis upon which to ground a demand: Newtech;900 
❖ despite being unable to demonstrate a bona fide belief in factual 
matrix alleged to underpin that demand: Mount Sophia;901 
Despite Singapore pioneering the unconscionability exception in relation to letters 
of credit and demand guarantees, the finding of the Court of Appeal in 
Asplenium(No.2)902 (which establishes the Asplenium Clause 903) may cause 
unconscionability as a ground for an injunction to be taken out of play. This 
partially depends on the speed at which template Asplenium clauses are adopted 
into demand guarantees and other financial services’ contracts. 904  
                                                     
893  Kvaerner, n512. 
894  Raymond, n590. 
895  Min Thai, n591. 
896  GHL, n21. 
897  Hiap Tian, n776. 
898  Eltraco, n407. 
899 Samwoh(No.2), n760. 
900  Newtech, n784. 
901  Mount Sophia, n39. 
902  Asplenium(No.2), n212. 
903  Wooler, n505. 
904  Given the finding in Boustead (No.2), n159 the adoption may need to be considered in such contracts as the 
‘Facility Agreement’ at issue in that matter.  
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 183 of 270 
 
Given that the rational user of these instruments will seek always to mitigate risk, 905 
it is less likely as a result of Asplenium(No.2) that any party requiring an independent 
instrument will contract without an exclusion clause that will allow even abusive 
calls (short of fraud) to go unchallenged.  
                                                     
905  J Linarelli, 'The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking' (2002) 49(1) The Wayne Law Review  1, 
11: The strategic choices that rational (or boundedly rational) parties make are in part determined by the 
information that they have on the possible outcomes of any l egal dispute arising from a failure to perform by the 
other party. 
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Chapter 5. Case Law – Unconscionability Exception: 
Australia 
Section A. The Unconscionability Exception in Australia 
1.0 Introduction and Context 
The original head of power in Australia the veil of autonomy to be lifted was the 
statutory prohibition against unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce under 
the now-superseded Trade Practices Act.906 The Australian Consumer Law,907 has 
replaced the relevant consumer provisions in the earlier Act.  
The Act provides that the Court should look to the meaning of the unwritten law for 
guidance.908 It also allows the Court to consider other matters, and it is here that 
some of the difficulty and confusion arises with understanding the application of 
the Act to independent instruments. The Australian line of authority lacks the 
consistency of the Singapore authorities analysed in the previous chapter. No case 
that addresses directly the question of unconscionability in relation to abusive 
demands on guarantees or bonds has been heard in the High Court of Australia. 
Both s20 and s21 ACL incorporate the words “in trade or commerce”. This has 
given the Courts scope to consider whether demands on bank guarantees or 
letters of credit could amount to unconscionable conduct. The wording of the 
section requires in practice, that the plaintiff demonstrate to the Court that a 
demand [conduct] is unconscionable as provided in the unwritten law. 
However, in the absence of a clear definition for unconscionability it falls to the 
Court to frame the scope and determine the elements of proof for the doctrine. It is 
the case law therefore which must be analysed to inform the effect of the 
unconscionability exception in Australia. 
What emerges from the following analyses is that the use of statute to ground 
unconscionability in commercial matters brings its own set of judicial challenges.  
  
                                                     
906  A consolidated discussion of Unconscionable Conduct under the statutes can be found on p.  80. 
907  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2 - The Australian Consumer Law, Ch.2, Pt. 2.2. 
908  S20(1): “A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is unconscionable, within the meaning 
of the unwritten law from time to time. ” 
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Section B. The Unconscionability Exception in Australia 
1.0 Case Analyses – Australia 
As with the analysis of the Singaporean line of authority, the following discussion 
focuses purely on the Australian development of the unconscionability exception to 
the principle of autonomy and does not detail factual matrices unless essential to 
explaining the law.  
Typically, the cases reveal that the plaintiff or applicant attempts to ground their 
application for relief on a range of grounds, including fraud and the existence of an 
implied or express negative stipulation in the underlying contract. No attempt has 
been made here to examine these grounds as they are unrelated to the 
development of the unconscionability exception or the understanding of 
unconscionable conduct with respect to letters of credit and demand guarantees.  
Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority 909 
This is the first decision from the High Court of Australia that examined the nature 
of the autonomy of credit instruments.910 
The plaintiff Wood Hall did not raise unconscionable conduct as ground for an 
injunction to restrain the demand under equity. Unconscionable conduct was not 
possible under the Trade Practices Act given that this ground was not introduced 
for another seven years.911 
Looking at the independence of the instrument, Barwick CJ stated: 
there is no basis whatever upon which the unconditional nature of 
the bank's promise to pay on demand can be qualified by 
reference to the terms of the contract between the contractor  and 
the owner.912 
Murphy J noted that, should the Court require that the bank must inquire into the 
“rights and liabilities arising from the performance of a contract ”, then: 
                                                     
909  Wood Hall, n138. 
910  Boral (No.2), n28 [37]: [Wood Hall is] “The leading statement of the principle of autonomy in Australian law ”. 
Autonomy is not addressed by the High Court again until Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing 
Corporation [2016] HCA 47. 
911  Trade Practices Revision Act No.17 of 1986 (Cth), s22, Insertion of s52A. 
912  Wood Hall, n138, 387. 
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[A]ll the legal and factual complexities of a building dispute would 
be injected into an otherwise straightforward unconditional 
undertaking.913 
Meanwhile, of interest to courts in future unconscionability cases is the mention by 
the High Court: 
There is evidence that suggests that the Authority, in making the 
demands, was acting pursuant to what it described as a "strategy" 
to put pressure on the contractor in the hope that the dispute 
between the parties might be settled more advantageously to the 
Authority.914 
Despite the mention, the Court did not clarify its view on whether such conduct is 
unconscionable. Later, in Olex(No.1), Batt J pondered the High Court’s restraint in 
not finding this behaviour unconscionable. 
His Honour stated there that the High Court in Wood Hall had allowed: 
with apparent equanimity that…in making the demands the  Authority 
was acting pursuant to what it described as a “strategy” to  put 
pressure on the contractor. 915 
Wood Hall importantly serves to describe and entrench the principle of autonomy. 
Otherwise the case only marginally advances the general development of the law 
in relation to unconscionable demands on guarantees. 
Hortico (Australia) v Energy Equipment Co916 
It is in Hortico that an Australian superior court first considers the idea that 
equitable principles of unconscionable conduct might be brought to bear on 
disputes over demands made on bank ‘guarantees’. 917  
The Court discusses the jurisprudence surrounding letters of credit, bank 
guarantees and bank bonds, and the obligational differences between them. 
Specifically, the Court sought to clarify the legal d ifference between a ‘guarantee’ 
                                                     
913  Ibid 400. 
914  Ibid 391. Notably the later Singaporean case of of Samwoh (No.2), n760 [21]  considered use of an almost identical 
‘strategy’ by a beneficiary and held that use of such a “strategy” is unconscionable . It cites the Court’s finding in 
Kvaerner, n512, 354 that demands on performance guarantees can only be made where there is clear evidence 
that the account party is in breach of its contrac tual obligations. 
915  Olex (No.1), n38, 403. Batt J appears to imply a view that such conduct should be deemed unconscionable.  
916  Hortico, n663. 
917  For context, Hortico was heard in the same year that the Trade Practices Act was amended to include section 
52A, statutorily proscribing unconscionable conduct in business practice.  
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and a ‘bond’, and discussed how the usage-in-trade terminology differs from the 
legal definitions for those same products. 
Young J affirmed: 
[T]he wide general principle of equity that whenever a person 
unconscionably makes use of a statutory or contractual power for an 
improper purpose, that equity may step in and restrain the exercise 
of that power.918 
His Honour broadly discussed an exception to autonomy grounded on 
unconscionable conduct and propounded that “it may be that in some cases…the 
unconscionable conduct may be so gross as to lead to exercise of the 
discretionary power”.919 
Unconscionability was not argued by the plaintiff so the Court only dealt with it 
vicariously. Ultimately, the plaintiff failed on all counts to have the demand 
restrained. Hortico was the first time a superior court demonstrated an inclination 
to widen the application of unconscionable conduct principles in commercial 
matters. 
Stern v McArthur920 
Stern is an important unconscionable conduct case unrelated to financial 
instruments specifically but concerns contracts more broadly. It deals with the 
circumstance of unconscionable conduct within a contractual relationship at or 
after its termination and consequent to a dispute, much as occurs with letter of 
credit and demand guarantee matters. Stern is included here for its affirmation of a 
category of unconscionable conduct later associated with unconscionable 
demands against letters of credit and demand guarantees: the harsh insistence on 
strict legal rights.921 
Reflecting on the earlier case of Legione,922 the Court held that “equity will relieve 
against an unconscionable exercise of legal rights”. 923 This principle becomes 
important for letters of credit and demand guarantees later when Batt  J in 
                                                     
918  Hortico, n663, 554. This is a re-statement of “oppressive or harsh enforcement of a right”.  
919  Ibid 554. 
920  Stern, n352. 
921  See the categorisation of unconscionable conduct in Ch.3, p.109. 
922  Legione, n346. 
923  Stern, n352, 469. 
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Olex(No.1)924 cites Stern to include harsh insistence on strict legal rights to be 
unconscionable conduct under s51AA TPA. Given that this section has been held 
to apply to demands on credits and guarantees, it follows that unconscionable 
conduct grounded on the insistence on strict legal rights also applies to those 
instruments. 
Stern does not relate directly to independent instruments; it contributes to the line 
of authority by linking an equitable remedy to the equitable prohibition against 
harsh insistence on legal rights, a doctrine discussed as grounds for relief in 
subsequent decisions. 
Inflatable Toy Company v State Bank of NSW 925 
Much as the early Singaporean cases prior to GHL flirted with the “idea” or “notion” 
of unconscionable conduct as a ground to enjoin an abusive demand, Inflatable 
Toy (primarily addressing issues of fraud in relation to a demand on a commercial 
letter of credit) also provides judicial framework for the subsequent unconscionable 
conduct cases.  
Former Chief Judge and renown equity jurist, Young J, heard both Hortico926 and 
Inflatable Toy, and used both to flag the possibility that unconscionable conduct 
would be considered as a ground should an application be made to the Court.  
It had been nine years since section 52A TPA had come into effect, and two years 
since the amendments to replace it with sections 51AA, 51AB and 51AC. 
Unconscionable conduct however was not alleged by the plaintiff. Young J 
nonetheless took advantage of the opportunity to state:  
[I]t is still wise to keep open the possibility that unconscionable 
conduct may be an exception.927 
Consequently, Inflatable Toy contributed to the development of the independent 
instrument unconscionability by signalling a willingness by the Court to address an 
injunction application based on unconscionable conduct. 
  
                                                     
924  Olex (No.1), n38, 402. 
925  Inflatable Toy, n235. 
926  Hortico, n663, 554. 
927  Inflatable Toy, n235, 251. Emphasis added. 
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Olex Focas v Skodaexport Co(No.1) 928 
Much as GHL929 contributed to the unconscionability exception in Singapore, its 
development in Australia was given a significant stimulus by Olex(No.1), heard in 
Supreme Court of Victoria.930 The matter concerned a contract for supply of 
services to a contractor involved in a major construction project in India. The 
demand against a number of ‘mobilisation guarantees’ was made after the parties 
failed to resolve prolonged disputes. 
Much of the legal consideration in Olex Focas was done in the lower court where 
Batt J took the opportunity to address: 
❖ the nature of the guarantees; 
❖ the character of “unconscionable or unconscientious behaviour” ;931 and 
❖ the application of section 51AA TPA to the autonomy of independent 
guarantees. 
Batt J affirmed the autonomy principle stating “the underlying contract is separate 
and, for this purpose, irrelevant.”932 His Honour differentiated between two different 
credit instruments on foot, their purpose, and the obligations under taken by the 
parties. The ‘guarantees’ (which were both independent) sought to protect two 
quite separate eventualities:  
1. ‘mobilisation guarantees’ to allocate the risk of non-repayment of 
‘procurement advances’; and  
2. ‘performance bonds’ to allocate the risk of non-performance of 
substantive contractual obligations. 
They were not intended to be used to interchangeably enforce the owner’s rights 933 
and therefore the Court was required to make a determination in relation to both, 
separately, as to whether the claims on them were abusive. 
This bifurcation led to quite different outcomes for each and contributed to 
clarification of the Australian unconscionability exception by laying down the 
general principle that it is unconscionable to claim a greater amount than is owed 
                                                     
928  Olex (No.1), n38. 
929  GHL, n21. 
930  The basis for the successful claims of unconscionable behaviour in both the Olex cases and GHL was found due 
to both beneficiaries making demands for greater amounts than was owed.  
931  Olex (No.1), n38, 403. 
932  Ibid 394. 
933  Olex (No.1), n38, 385: “the guarantees relate to those advances and not to performance of the work” . 
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under a financial guarantee. This breach may be aggravated by whether there is a 
capacity to make partial demands against the credit instrument and the beneficiary 
does not avail itself of that capacity, 934 demanding instead the full amount of the 
guarantee. 
Batt J found that the beneficiary was acting unconscionably, not by making a claim 
against the procurement guarantees per se, but by demanding money that had 
already been repaid, ie money no longer owed. His Honour held that this behaviour 
was not fatal to the demand-right and went on to say: 
[H]ad the first defendant simply called up an amount not exceeding 
the balance still outstanding on the advances, I do not consider that 
its conduct could have been said to be open to a serious question 
that it was unconscionable.935 
The treatment of the performance bonds on the other hand was textbook 
application of the autonomy principle and the unconscionable conduct above was 
not found to extend to them. The instruments were independent demand 
guarantees and the Court refused to disturb the risk allocation agreed to freely by 
the parties. 
His Honour stated: 
The principle is clearly established that payment by a bank and a 
demand therefore by a beneficiary under an unconditional 
performance bond or guarantee, as under a confirmed irrevocable 
letter of credit, will not be restrained except in a clear case of fraud, 
of which the bank is clearly aware at the time.936 
Of particular interest for the examination of Australian unconscionability was 
Batt J’s discussion of unconscionable conduct under the general law, as opposed 
to that under the statute: 
With regard to the passing reference in Hortico to gross 
unconscionability in an extreme case, I would not… treat gross 
unconscionability falling short of actual fraud as a ground for an 
                                                     
934  Ibid 403. 
935  Ibid 405. 
936  Ibid 395. This appears to remove unconscionable demands from the TPA/ACL unconscionability provisions. 
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injunction. If it were a ground…one would expect it to have been 
mentioned in the cases much earlier. 937 
The long-term impact of this on the general law of independent instrument 
unconscionability is unknown. However, subsequent Australian cases generally 
consider unconscionable conduct in relation to statutory consumer protection 
provisions. 
Olex Focas v Skodaexport Co(No.2)938 
The Victorian Court of Appeal refused to disturb the findings of the lower court, 
holding that “the plaintiffs here have not established any evidentiary basis…for any 
further injunctions beyond those granted by the primary judge ”.939  
It did however accept from the respondents an undertaking not to “assign, transfer 
or otherwise dispose of any moneys paid in response to demands made pursuant 
to all or any of the guarantees”940 until such time as the appeal was heard in the 
High Court. 
Olex Focas v Skodaexport Co(No.3)941 
Olex Focas applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court, but was refused. 
This was despite a strident appeal to the principle in Wilson v Church942 which 
provides that it is the paramount duty of the Court to which an application for stay 
of execution pending appeal is made to see that the appeal, if successful, is not 
nugatory. 
However, the Court found that the status quo was best protected by not disturbing 
the beneficiary’s right to make a demand for payment. It disagreed with counsel’s 
proposition that the status quo was to be found in ensuring that the beneficiary 
should be disallowed access to the benefit of the guarantees under consideration 
until such time as the substantive issues could be determined at trial.  
 
 
                                                     
937  Ibid 400. Emphasis added. 
938  Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Company Ltd (1996) VicSCA BC9604384 (Unrept) (Olex (No.2)). 
939  Ibid 3, per Charles JA. 
940  Ibid 5. 
941  Olex (No.3), n207. 
942  Wilson v Church (No.2) (1879) 12 Ch D 454, 458-459. 
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Fletcher Construction Australia v Varnsdorf 943 
Fletcher is notable for the courageous basis upon which the plaintiff sought to 
ground an injunction in unconscionability and the Court’s example of a type of 
behaviour not considered unconscionable.  
The plaintiff alleged that the claim against the guarantees – two A$2.5 million 
standby letters of credit – was unconscionable because, given the lengthy 
procedural delays leading up to the demands being made: 
[I]t would be unconscionable for the Owner to call upon the security 
at a time when the dispute would, but for its conduct, have [already] 
been determined.944 
No mention of the Trade Practices Act was made and unconscionability must be 
presumed to have been argued under the general law. 
Describing the claim as “doomed to fail”, Byrne  J rejected outright any suggestion 
that the time required to complete negotiations and mediation, being to both 
parties’ benefit, could constitute unconscionable conduct.  
Fletcher is therefore authority for the principle that causing a delay arising from the 
conduct of procedures in which the interests of both parties are represented 
cannot be taken as unconscionable conduct for the purpose of grounding an 
injunction. 
The plea to consider unconscionable conduct was abandoned in the Court of 
Appeal. 
Minson Constructions v Aquatec-Maxon945 
In Minson, Beach J refused to part from strict adherence to the law of independent 
instruments, affirming the decision in Olex Focas946 that the status quo was best left 
undisturbed. His Honour took the position because the guarantees had already 
been called up and the plaintiff’s application was in fact seeking redress rather 
than restraint. Minson’s strategy was desperate and poorly-considered, failing to 
show any behaviour as unconscionable conduct. 
                                                     
943  Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd  (1997) VSC BC9705048 (Fletcher (No.1)) and Fletcher 
Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd (1997) VSCA BC9706712 (Fletcher(No.2)). 
944  Ibid 15. 
945  Minson, n503. 
946  Olex (No.1), n38. 
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The plaintiff put to the Court that, by virtue of the beneficiary/respondent 
exercising its demand-right under the performance guarantees without informing 
the plaintiff of its intention, the beneficiary had acted unconscionably. No mention 
of the Trade Practices Act was made so it is assumed that they sought to ground 
this in the general law. It failed. 
It is settled that the exercise of a valid right in the common law will not be found 
unconscionable unless strict enforcement of the right would be “harsh and 
oppressive”.947 The Court reinforced the autonomy principle by steadfastly refusing 
to order the return of the funds “notwithstanding that there may be a genuine 
dispute between [the defendant] and the plaintiff”.948 
Boral Formwork & Scaffolding v Action Makers(No.1)949 
Boral(No.1) was the first Australian case to consider the full effect of sections 51AA 
and 51AC TPA on the independence of irrevocable standby letters of credit. 
Austin J considered a range of case law in this line of authority which provided a 
succinct judicial summary of the precedents. The case has some unusual 
characteristics. 
First, the credit instrument involved is a standby letter of credit,950 issued to assure 
against a failure to pay cash for commercial goods received by the account holder 
Boral Formwork, rather than the more straightforward commercial letter of credit 
which is more commonly used in purchase-of-goods transactions. 
Second, while the parties were still under contract the beneficiary went into 
liquidation. The demand on the letter of credit was made by the liquidators, whose 
solicitors advised Boral prior to the ex tempore hearing that from the liquidation 
process “there will be a nil dividend to unsecured creditors.”951 
Third, the substantive issue rested entirely in the common law of contract, being 
wholly concerned with a warranty claim for defective goods. In order to determine 
whether the demand on the standby was unconscionable, the Court needed to lift 
                                                     
947  Berbatis (No.1), n360, [14(iii)] citing Parkinson, The Notion of Unconscionability  Laws of Australia 35.5, 8.  
948  Minson, n503 [23]. 
949  Boral (No.1), n672. 
950  Quite likely a “Commercial Standby” letter of credit. See Byrne, n4, 31, ‘Preface to ISP98’: “A ‘Commercial 
Standby’ supports the obligations of an applicant to pay for goods or services in the event of non -payment by 
other methods.” 
951  Boral (No.1), n672 [15]. 
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the veil of autonomy and look to the terms of the underlying contract and the rights 
that arose with respect to the rectification of defective goods.  
The matter commenced on urgent application to the Court’s equ ity division for an 
interlocutory injunction. Campbell J reviewed matters briefly and, given the 
“circumstances of pressing urgency”, 952 found that a serious question existed as to 
whether the demand constituted unconscionable conduct and granted injunctions . 
Boral Formwork & Scaffolding v Action Makers (No.2)953 
In the Supreme Court before Austin J, the plaintiff sought orders requiring Action 
Makers to countermand the demand for payment of the disputed amount on three 
grounds: 
➢ First, in contract, that the respondent was bound by a negative 
stipulation in the underlying contract circumscribing any 
demand; 
➢ Second and Third, that the demand was unconscionable in 
breach of sections 51AA and 51AC TPA. 
Early in the judgement on the credit instruments in question, the Court appeared 
mistaken by describing standby letters of credit generally as requiring “documents 
which evidence money owing but unpaid by the account party to the beneficiary”. 954 
(The provision of such documents was a condition of the Boral standby.)  
However, the Court clarified this, stating that the “required documentation depends 
upon the terms of the instrument”,955 thereby recognising the effect of the conditions 
within the instrument on the payment obligation, affirming independence.  
The Court noted that the payment obligation under a standby may require only a 
“written demand”956 for payment without reference to any breach of obligation to 
support that demand.  
Austin J examined the legal character of independence and the relevant provisions 
of the TPA. Much as GHL957 provided confirmation of the existence of the 
unconscionability exception in Singapore, Boral framed the exception in Australia 
                                                     
952  Boral (No.1), n672 [16]. 
953  Boral (No.2), n61 [34]. 
954  Ibid [34]. 
955  Boral (No.2), n61 [34]. 
956  Ellinger, n14, 300. 
957  GHL, n21. 
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within the confines of the TPA. His Honour reviewed both sections 51AA and 51AC 
TPA and considered them in light of the facts. His Honour found that the elements 
of both were satisfied, but then found that section 51AA(2) exempts application of 
that section where 51AC can be found. Holding therefore that the “conduct 
impugned accompanies, goes with, or is involved with the supply of goods”,958 as 
required by the section, the Court ultimately grounded the section 80(1)(d) 
injunction959 on section 51AC. 
Austin J also pronounced that “[t]he principle of autonomy, applicable to a standby 
letter of credit, cannot override the statute.”960 
The Court’s rationale was this: 
➢ First, the autonomy principle provides that the “unconditional payment 
obligation”961 under the letter of credit is separate from the terms of the 
underlying contract. Therefore the payment obligation must be left 
untouched by any events affecting the operation of that underlying 
contract. 
➢ Next, the statute provides inter alia that a person cannot act 
unconscionably in trade or commerce. This means that even where the 
conditions of the standby allow the beneficiary to make a demand, still 
that beneficiary cannot under any circumstances act unconscionably 
when making the demand.  
To determine whether the beneficiary is in fact acting unconscionably the Court 
must look to the construction of the underlying supply agreement, which requires 
the court to lift the veil of autonomy. Specifically, the Court looked at the terms of 
payment and the terms providing the Buyer’s right to offset their costs for 
rectification work to the defective product supplied. It was the fact that  Action 
Makers claimed the amount Boral could offset that led to a finding of 
unconscionability. 
                                                     
958  Boral (No.2), n61 [85]. 
959  The Court may...(c)...grant an injunction restraining a person from engaging in conduct that constitutes or would 
constitute (d) a contravention of a provision of Part IV or V. 
960  Boral (No.2), n61 [74]. Emphasis added. 
961  Boral (No.2), n61 [32]. In fact, the payment obligation is not “unconditional” but actually ‘indepen dent’ of the 
underlying contract. There are always ‘conditions’ to payment of a credit and therefore technically they are all 
‘conditional’. 
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The Court grounded its power to interfere with the commercial relationship 
between the parties in the statute. It thereby subjugated autonomy to the necessity 
to investigate whether the demand was unconscionable.  
Philosophically, Austin J accepted that more than one doctrine of unconscionable 
conduct exists to characterise behaviours.  His Honour specifically ruled out the 
application of the perhaps better-known, Amadio-like ‘special disadvantage’ 
unconscionable conduct962 in preference to the equitable doctrine prohibiting the 
assertion or exercise of “a legal right in circumstances where the particular 
assertion or exercise of it would constitute unconscionable conduct”.963 Referring to 
the case law, Austin J held: 
[T]he word "unconscionable" in s51AC is not limited to conduct that 
would be unconscionable according to equitable principles. 964 
There were two specific behaviours by Action Makers that the Court appeared to 
find unconscionable. The first was found as evident – the beneficiary claimed an 
amount in excess of the amount owed. Although not specifically stated by the 
Court, it can be inferred that this behaviour satisfied the requirements of the TPA.  
The Court held that Action Makers: 
[B]y making a call on the letter of credit for amounts greater than was 
in fact due...and certifying incorrectly for that purpose, the 
administrative receivers caused Action Makers to act unconscionably 
for the purposes of s51AA.965 
The second related to the timing of the demands given the construction of the 
credit instrument – the demand on the guarantee was made simultaneously with a 
demand for payment from Boral. 
The Court found no negative stipulation but was persuaded that the demand 
constituted unconscionable conduct under both sections 51AA and 51AC TPA and 
the demand by Action Makers to be unconscionable. 
In its view the dispute was already resolved when the demand was made; no 
monies were owed based on the fact that the claimant’s solicitors had provided in 
                                                     
962  Amadio, n342. 
963  Boral (No.2), n61 [77]. 
964  Ibid [90]. 
965  Ibid [79]. 
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writing that the offsets for defective product claimed by Boral were in fact valid . 
Therefore, the later demand on the standby, which included a sum of monies 
already paid and for the value of the already agreed-to offsets, was 
unconscionable. 
What emerges is the principle that a demand on a credit instrument that includes 
sums that are not owing is the unconscionable assertion of a legal right in breach 
of the unconscionability provisions of sections 51AA and 51AC of the Trade 
Practices Act. 
Finally, Austin J attempted to reconcile equitable principles via the TPA in the 
workings of commercial undertakings with the general theory of autonomy, giving 
“anxious consideration”966 to the contrary logic of the two. Ultimately, Boral 
established that the Court may look to the underlying contract for assistance 
with determining whether the beneficiary has acted unconscionably, 
regardless of the tenets of the doctrine of autonomy, finding: 
The terms of the irrevocable instrument and the underlying contract, 
properly construed, are highly relevant to the decision whether 
conduct in connection with those arrangements is unconscionable 
for statutory or equitable purposes.967 
The importance of Boral cannot be overstated, given its overview of the doctrine of 
autonomy and unconscionability, the legislation, and the confluence between them.  
Ideas Plus Investments v National Australia Bank968 
The factually-convoluted allegations raised here included several causes of action. 
Among them, whether a demand on a standby letter of credit was unconscionable 
in breach of section 51AA TPA and therefore of direct (if not immediate) relevance 
to the development of the unconscionability exception.  
The credit had been honoured and paid, and the bank had “deducted from the 
plaintiff’s account”969 the full value of the instrument. The plaintiff was suing to have 
the monies paid repatriated, in part on the basis that the demand was 
unconscionable, grounded in three causes of action. 970 
                                                     
966  Ibid [94]. 
967  Ibid [94]. 
968  Ideas Plus Investments Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd  [2005] WASC 51 (Ideas Plus (No.1)). 
969  Ideas Plus (No.1), n968 [42]. 
970  The plaintiff also alleged breach of  contract, and misleading or deceptive conduct.  
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The plaintiff alleged inter alia that when the beneficiary “issued the certificate and 
made demand under the letter of credit…[it]…knew that it had not satisfied the 
conditions of draw down.”971 The veracity of that allegation relied on a construction 
of the credit terms which the beneficiary’s legal advice indicated was likely to fail. 
It was the receipt of this advice that proved influential on the Court’s.  
The other grounds claimed included that the beneficiary knew that the plaintiff 
would suffer loss if the demand was made. However, it was not stated how this 
constituted unconscionable conduct. 
Much case law had already found unconscionable conduct could restrain a 
demand. However, Commissioner Siopis did not give significant weight to this 
cause of action. He rightly rejected outright the proposition that Ideas Plus was 
under any special disadvantage given the “ordinary commercial” nature of the 
transaction.972 
The Court also found that the plaintiff’s allegation that the beneficiary knew it did  
not have the right to make a demand, and had therefore acted unconscionably, 
could not be upheld.”973 The call on the instrument was made based on legal advice 
properly received with regard to the construction of the instrument. 974 
The Court indicated (but did not state explicitly) that receipt of legal advice 
supporting such an interpretation is a sufficient defence to an allegation of 
unconscionable conduct. 
The plaintiff attempted to ground a separate unconscionability action 975 founded in 
the “special disability” category of unconscionable conduct. 976 The court is generally 
reluctant to find one-party disadvantage in corporate matters, given the 
sophisticated character of the parties, and this position prevailed. Commissioner 
Siopis stated that the “knowing exploitation by one party of the disadvantage of 
another”977 is a difficult case to make involving commercial parties. No appeal was 
lodged against his finding that there was nothing unconscionable in making the 
demand on the credit.978 
                                                     
971  Ideas Plus (No.1), n968 [48]. 
972  Ibid [85]. The Commissioner does not speculate on whether any other categories of unconscionable conduct 
might be applicable. 
973  Ibid [84]. 
974  Ibid [83]. 
975  Introduced as a late amendment to their pleadings and therefore apparently treated as a separate claim.  
976  Dziedzic & Lindgren, in Vout, n15, 437-438;441. 
977  Samton(No.2), n383 [48]. 
978  Ideas Plus Investments Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd  [2006] WASCA 215 (Ideas Plus (No.2)) [26]. 
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It is not entirely clear whether Ideal Plus Investments added to the development of 
the unconscionability exception. However, it can reasonably be argued that it lays 
down a defence to allegations of unconscionable conduct where a demand is made 
subsequent to receipt of legal advice that supports such a demand.  
Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation(No.1)979 
The matter of Clough involves four cases, all in the Federal Court of Australia, 
culminating in a hearing by the full bench of French, Jacobson and Graham JJ. As 
a whole, Clough is problematic insofar as the development of the unconscionability 
exception is concerned. The early single-bench ex parte hearings twice applied 
section 51AA TPA to ground injunctive relief but these findings were later 
convincingly overturned by the full bench of the Federal Court.  
The law in relation to the application of section 51AA TPA and unconscionable 
conduct generally on performance guarantees was extensively canvassed 
throughout.  
In the first ex parte application hearing for an injunction under section 80(d) TPA, 
Gilmour J reviewed the precedents in conjunction with the relevant sections of the 
TPA to support his reasons for granting interlocutory injunctions. His Honour set 
out the arguable matters which he felt supported Clough’s pleas, albeit with the 
caveat that the Court had no proper contradictor, which later proved significant. 980 
Holding the threshold to be “not high”, 981 the Court found that Clough had made out 
a prima facie case which, if supported by the facts, would support the relief 
claimed. 
Much of Gilmour J’s reasoning was overturned by the full bench of the Court. 
Clough claimed two causes of action:  
1. unconscionable conduct under section 51AA TPA, and  
2. breach of contract that was “closely related to the cause of action 
based on unconscionable conduct”.982 
 
                                                     
979  Clough(No.1), n442. 
980  Ibid [71]. 
981  Ibid [36]. 
982  Ibid [27]. 
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Granting the interlocutory injunctions, Gilmour J ordered that the first respondent 
be restrained from demanding or obtaining payment finding that the demand was 
“an improper exercise of power by ONGC to take advantage of the banks' 
propensity to pay.”983 
His Honour recognised an established category of unconscionable conduct by 
pointing out: 
[E]quity has traditionally exercised its jurisdiction to curtail an 
exercise of a right to terminate if that right is sought to be used 
arbitrarily, or capriciously or unreasonably or in bad faith.984 
This specifically joined the oppressive insistence on one’s rights with 
unconscionable conduct within the context of a demand guarantee matter . Relying 
on Pierce Bell,985 his Honour stated that “[e]quity operates to prevent this conduct 
on the basis that it is unconscionable conduct.” 986 
Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (No.2)987 
Heard 12 days after the original injunctions were granted, Clough(No.2) was heard 
by the same judge in response to an application by the issuing banks to set aside 
the injunctions staying them from honouring their obligations under the 
performance guarantees. This case does not advance the development of the 
unconscionability exception in any meaningful way.  
It is not entirely clear from the judgement why the banks brought this action on 
their own behalf, ie not in conjunction with the beneficiary. The plaintiff’s bank 
made no submission in relation to any unconscionable conduct on the part of the 
beneficiary.988 
In denying any change to the “status quo”, 989 the Court restated its reasons from the 
original hearing, including its belief that Clough was not in breach of its contractual 
obligations and therefore the beneficiary was not entitled to make a demand 
against the guarantees. Otherwise, Gilmour J was content for the parties to await a 
final outcome on the substantive issues.  
                                                     
983  Ibid [80]. 
984  Ibid [78]. 
985  Pierce Bell Sales Pty Ltd v Frazer [1973] HCA 13 (PBS(No.2)). 
986  Clough(No.1), n442 [78]. 
987  Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation [2007] FCA 927(Clough(No.2)). 
988  Ibid [18]. 
989  Ibid [52-53]. 
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Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (No.3)990 
For this hearing Gilmour J had the benefit of hearing the beneficiary’s submissions 
– the previous hearings both being held ex parte – and the resultant finding was 
significantly different in almost every respect.  
Clough was asking the Court to consider (a) the construction of the negative 
stipulation; (b) that ONGC caused the problem from which it sought relief; and (c) 
that ONGC’s demand was unconscionable. 991 
The onus remained on Clough to establish the existence of a serious issue to be 
tried in order for there to be a “continuation of the injunction”. 992 
The Court referred specifically to the construction of a term that constrained claims 
against the provided guarantees, except “in the event of the Contractor failing to 
honour any of the commitments entered into".993 The question then arose whether 
the breach only needed to be merely asserted or whether it needed to be proven. It 
found: 
[O]n the proper construction of the Construction Contract, the 
performance guarantees could be invoked upon the basis merely of 
an asserted failure on the part of Clough to honour its commitments 
under the Construction Contract. 994 
Affidavits from the beneficiary/respondent demonstrated that, contrary to 
submissions made in the previous hearings, Clough was itself in breach of the 
underlying contract in “two important respects”. 995 With the benefit of the additional 
evidence provided by ONGC, the Court overturned its previous ex parte finding. 
While not mentioned specifically, it is well settled that equity will not assist where a 
party has caused the problem from which it seeks relief 996 and Clough had failed to 
inform the Court fully as to the true position of the contract.  
While Clough could only allege breaches that could only be determined at a later 
time, ONGC immediately demonstrated actual breaches already committed with 
regard to (i) the obligation to extend the guarantees; and (ii) the obligation to 
                                                     
990  Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation [2007] FCA 2082 (Clough (No.3)). 
991  Ibid [4]. 
992  Ibid [15]. 
993  Ibid [23]. 
994  Ibid [53]. Emphasis added. 
995  Ibid [91]. 
996  H Gibson, Gibson's Suits in Chancery  (Gaut-Ogden, 1837), 36[§42]. 
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provide various insurance certificates – two fundamental terms.997 For this reason 
the Court refused to intervene on Clough’s behalf.  
The Court found that there was: 
[N]o…prima facie case or serious issues to be tried in respect to 
the alleged contraventions of s 51AA of the TPA…[and]…[i]t is of 
no consequence that a prima facie case and serious issues to be 
tried arose in other respects. 998 
Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (No.4)999 
The full Federal Court was emphatic and unanimous in its  rejection of Clough’s 
appeal holding that “[t]he area of contest was not beset by difficulty or novelty. ”1000 
The Court reviewed the relevant facts and the reasoning of the primary court, 
addressed each of Clough’s pleas, and affirmed Gilmour  J’s opinion at every point. 
Finding that (a) the guarantees were “unconditioned on any actual breach”; 
(b) Clough was in breach of contract; and (c) Gilmour J was correct to find section 
51AA to be inapplicable in this case, the Court went into some detail to explain its  
reasons. 
Their Honours found: 
ONGC was entitled to call upon the performance guarantees where 
it had a "bona fide belief" in its claim that Clough was in breach of 
the contract.1001 
The Court also held that it was correct for ONGC to hold such a belief 1002 given 
Clough’s breaches of the Construction Contract.  
With respect to the development of any unconscionability exception to autonomy, 
Clough does not advance matters. The principle applied was ‘equity will not come 
to a supplicant’s aid when that aid has become necessary through the supplicant’s 
own fault’.1003 Clough was in breach of its contractual obligations and it could not 
apply for relief from the consequences of that breach. 
                                                     
997  Clough(No.3), n990 [60]. 
998  Ibid [96]. 
999  Clough(No.4), n180. 
1000  Ibid 471. 
1001  Ibid 472. 
1002  Ibid 481. 
1003  See discussion at p.560. 
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The Court held that “none of the categories of unconscionable conduct…apply in 
this case.”1004  
Clough Engineering – Summary and Analysis 
Clough is often discussed as authority on independent instrument 
unconscionability. However, Clough is not in fact authority for the exception. If it is 
authority for anything, it is for the equitable pr inciple of needing ‘clean hands’ to 
seek relief. 
The early single-bench findings can be largely disregarded on the basis that they 
were ex parte, which subsequently proved significant. Neither the original judge 
nor the full bench of the Federal Court found any breach of section 51AA TPA 
once ONGC had the opportunity to respond. 
In the latter’s reasons, the justices affirmed that "the primary judge was right to 
reject the contention that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether 
there was unconscionable conduct on the part of ONGC in calling upon the 
performance bank guarantees".1005 
Orrcon Operations v Capital Steel & Pipe1006 
To the line of authority the contribution of Orrcon is significant. The case itself 
bears all the factual hallmarks of textbook letter of credit theory, including: 
❖ a single, multiple-draw, commercial letter of credit expressly issued 
subject to the UCP500; 
❖ a narrow, substantive dispute in relation to supplied defective product;  
❖ allegations of misleading and deceptive conduct, unconscionable 
conduct, and breach of a negative stipulation;  
❖ an Assignment of Proceeds, the ‘proceeds’ being remittances from the 
letter of credit; an Advising Bank which had advanced monies to the 
first defendant Capital Steel at a discount in reliance on the payments 
guaranteed by the letter of credit it held from the plaintiff, Orrcon; and  
                                                     
1004  Clough(No.4), n180, 478. 
1005  Ibid 459. 
1006  Orrcon Operations Pty Ltd v Capital Steel and Pipe Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1319 (Orrcon). 
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❖ international supplier-manufacturers holding Australian letters of credit 
for product of contested quality that appears to be the genesis of the 
entire issue. 
Orrcon alleged unconscionable conduct. The “category” of unconscionable conduct 
that they sought to rely on asserts that the harsh or oppressive insistence on the 
strict application of legal rights is unconscientious and unfair, 1007 and was also “in 
bad faith”.1008 
The account holder, Orrcon Steel, sought injunctions on multiple grounds to 
require the beneficiary to countermand their demand for payment under a letter of 
credit, including that of unconscionable conduct, stating in their plea:  
[B]y its knowing failure to deliver pipe that complied with the 
specification…in breach of its obligations under the contract but 
nevertheless making and seeking to rely on the…drawings down on 
the letter of credit…in circumstances where it lacks the financial 
capacity to repay those drawings down, Capital Steel has engaged 
and is engaging in unconscionable conduct within the meaning 
of s51AA of the Trade Practices Act.1009 
Orrcon alleged that, given Capital Steel knew or ought to have known that the 
product was delivered defective, any demand against a letter of credit as 
compensation for that product was unconscionable, aggravated by the beneficiary 
not being in a position to repay the drawings should the demand for those funds be 
found unconscionable at trial. 
To determine whether there was a question to be tried, his Honour looked to the 
provisions of the TPA and at Olex1010 and Boral,1011 concluding there to be four 
issues. The “factual elements” underpinning Orrcon’s claim concerned Capital 
Steel’s knowing supply of defective product and,  as a consequence of that 
knowledge, that their claim against the confirmed letter of credit as payment for 
that product was unconscionable. 1012 
                                                     
1007  Ibid [52]. 
1008  Ibid [59]. 
1009  Ibid [25]. Emphasis added. 
1010  Olex (No.1), n38. 
1011  Boral (No.2), n61. 
1012  Orrcon, n1006 [51]. 
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Examining the relationship between the instrument and the contract that initiated it, 
Besanko J referred to UCP500 Art.3,1013 which sets out the principle of autonomy, 
and then looked to the case law to establish how the autonomy principle had been 
purposed and applied previously. His Honour focussed on Lord Diplock’s 
reasoning in United City Merchants1014 wherein similarly, the beneficiary had already 
committed a fundamental breach of the underlying contract.  
The Court did not seem predisposed toward the unconscionability exception, 
referring to the majority view in Tanwar1015 in which the Justices describe the very 
phrase "unconscionable conduct" as misleading. 
Besanko J considered that grounding exercise of the Court’s discretion in a claim 
of unconscionable conduct was the position of last resort, referring again to the 
finding in Tanwar:  
It is wrong to suggest that “suffic ient foundation for the existence of 
the necessary 'equity' to interfere in relationships established by, for 
example, the law of contract, is supplied by an element of hardship 
or unfairness in the terms of the transaction in question, or in the 
manner of its performance.”1016 
Looking to Samton Holdings,1017 an influential unconscionable conduct case 
unrelated to financial instruments, his Honour reiterated the five categories of 
unconscionable conduct identified in that case  “in which equity will intervene under 
the rubric of unconscionable conduct”,1018 including Amadio-like1019 exploitation of a 
special disadvantage, and unconscionable departure from a representation as in 
Waltons Stores.1020 
 
                                                     
1013  [Art.3A]: “Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other contract(s) on which they 
may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such c ontract(s), even if any reference 
whatsoever to such contract(s) is included in the Credit. ” 
1014  Orrcon, n1006 [57] and United (No.4), n145. 
1015  Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi  [2003] HCA 57. 
1016  Orrcon, n1006 [60] referring to Tanwar, n1015, 365-366. 
1017  Samton(No.2), n383. 
1018  Orrcon, n1006 [61]. 
1019  Amadio, n342. 
1020  Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher  [1988] HCA 7. A leading Australian contract law case wherein 
unconscionable conduct gave rise to an estoppel restraining the defendant f rom refusing to honour undertakings 
made to the plaintiff who reasonably acted on them to their detriment. Per Mason  CJ and Wilson J: “Equity will 
come to the relief of a plaintiff who has acted to his detriment on the basis of a basic assumption in relati on to 
which the other party to the transaction has played such a part in the adoption of the assumption that it would 
be unconscionable conduct on the part of that other party to ignore the assumption. ” 
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The oppressive insistence on one’s “strict legal rights” 1021 was not included which is 
unfortunate as this may have directly linked demand guarantees to this specific 
category of unconscionable conduct. Besanko J did however allow that the list 
provided “may not be exhaustive”. 1022 His Honour considered this not to be a case in 
which equity should intervene. 
The Court posited: 
In one sense one can say that it is unconscionable or unconscientious 
to enforce legal rights oppressively or in bad faith but on one view of 
the authorities the real question is whether there is oppression or 
bad faith because the circumstances fall within one of the 
well-known cases in which equity will intervene on the ground that 
the conduct is unconscionable or unconscientious. 1023 
The Court did not indicate what “circumstances” might be applicable. It did  not 
state whether the demand by Capital Steel fell within one of the “well -known 
cases”. Besanko J reviewed Olex,1024 Boral1025 and Clough1026 before forgoing further 
analysis by declaring himself: 
prepared to proceed on the basis that such unconscionable conduct 
[non-compliance with the underlying contract] could found an order 
restraining payment under the letter of credit. 1027 
However, as Orrcon alleged that Capital’s unconscionable conduct was pursuant to 
its knowledge of the defective product, their burden was to demonst rate that 
Capital did indeed have that knowledge at the time they submitted their complying 
presentations. This Orrcon could not do and therefore could not demonstrate 
unconscionable conduct at the relevant times. 
Orrcon’s final allegation of unconscionable conduct, that Capital’s inability to repay 
drawdowns in the unlikely case that they should have to, was dealt with brusquely 
by the Court. Expressing doubt as to whether Orrcon’s assessment of the 
beneficiary’s financial health could possibly be an element for consideration, 
                                                     
1021  Stern, n352, 500. 
1022  Orrcon, n1006 [63]. 
1023  Ibid [64]. Emphasis added. 
1024  Olex (No.1), n38. 
1025  Boral (No.2), n61 [81]. 
1026  Clough(No.4), n180. 
1027  Orrcon, n1006 [70]. 
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Besanko J concluded that even if such behaviour might be considered when 
assessing conduct, “it cannot be sufficient of itself.” 1028 
His Honour also pointed out that it would not be wise for him to “attempt to 
determine the boundaries of unconscionable conduct in s51AA of the TPA on this 
interlocutory application”.1029 
Orrcon does not provide significant guidance with relation to whether or not the 
harsh or oppressive enforcement of one’s legal rights in relation to bank 
instruments fits into the general doctrine of unconscionable conduct as a separate 
category in which equity will intervene. 
The Court purposely determined the chain of events necessary to establish 
Capital’s level of knowledge. It thereby established that one element for 
determining whether behaviour falls within the unconscionability exception is that, 
at the time of making a demand, the beneficiary must not have any knowledge of 
any breach of any fundamental terms of the underlying contract . 
Board Solutions Australia v Westpac Banking Corporation 1030 
Board Solutions was an unusual and complex interlocutory hearing of an appeal 
against injunctions already in place. The first respondent was the account party’s 
own bank and issuer of the subject “banker’s undertaking”. 1031 The beneficiary of the 
guarantee was Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd (Bendigo), the contracted 
supplier’s bank and principal creditor. 1032 The rights under the underlying 
Distribution Agreement had been subrogated from the original supplier (Multiboard) 
to its sister company (Arden Way). 
The matter involved the wording of an independent, on-demand bank guarantee 
raised by Westpac Bank as issuing bank and Bendigo Bank as the ‘beneficiary 
bank’. 
To determine whether the demand was, inter alia, unconscionable, the Court 
raised the veil of autonomy and examined whether the conditions of the guarantee 
reflected the underlying formal ‘Distribution Agreement’ and representations made 
by the various parties in negotiations. 
                                                     
1028  Ibid [91]. 
1029  Ibid [70]. 
1030  Board Solutions, n676. 
1031  Ibid [1]. 
1032  Ibid [52]: In unusual circumstances, the named beneficiary was the banker for the suppl ier, a relationship which 
“places this case out of the norm.” 
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The plaintiff succeeded in making out a prima facie case that the beneficiary’s 
demand was unconscionable under ss51AA and 51AC TPA. 
In the judgement the Court did not indicate which specific conduct by the 
respondent banks it held to be unconscionable. His Honour did however indicate 
where the conduct likely occurred, saying that there was “a case to be made out 
against both Arden Way and Bendigo on the basis of a potential breach of ss51AA 
or 51AC”,1033 thereby exonerating Westpac from liability vis-à-vis any 
unconscionable conduct. 
These findings are at odds for two reasons: first, despite the case being “made out 
against them”, the Court lifted the injunction against Arden Way, who was neither 
the beneficiary nor the issuer of the instrument. They submitted that “it was a 
dispute… between the bankers and BSA”. 1034 Additionally, given that Arden Way 
was neither a party to the Distribution Agreement nor beneficiary to the guarantee, 
it was not possible for them to undertake any conduct with respect to the demand 
whatsoever, unconscionable or otherwise. Yet the Court fel t a case could be made 
out against them. 
Contrarily, Westpac (who made no submissions to the Court 1035) was the issuer of 
the instrument. They were responsible for the conditions in the instrument and, 
ultimately, the injunction against them was continued, as it was against the 
beneficiary Bank. 
However, no evidence was adduced to demonstrate any unconscionable conduct 
on Westpac’s part and Forrest J, while specifically excluding Westpac from 
allegations of unconscionable conduct, extended the injunction against them. 
It is possible that Bendigo’s unconscionable conduct was the making of a demand 
against a guarantee which the bank knew to be non-compliant with the underlying 
Agreement and other undertakings. It allegedly did so to protect its risk position 
with the supplier.1036 The Court intimated this by pointing out that both Bendigo and 
Multiboard had acknowledged BSA’s repeated insistence during negotiations and 
                                                     
1033  Ibid [52]. Emphasis added. 
1034  Ibid [31]. 
1035  Ibid [26]. 
1036  Ibid [39]. This was left to the trial to determine but the Court here alludes repeatedly to a possible conspiracy 
between John Spina at Bendigo Bank and Karl Vreko at Multiboard and is openly critical of the lack of 
information in Spina’s affidavit. NB: ‘Karl’ was spelled incorrectly in the judgement as ‘Carl’.  
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later their insistence that the conditions of the guarantee reflect the terms of the 
underlying Distribution Agreement.  
Despite this, Bendigo convinced Westpac to issue the guarantee without regard for 
the agreement.1037 Why this behaviour was found unconscionable the Court did not 
say, nor did Forrest J attempt to ascribe the behaviour to any of the established 
categories of unconscionable conduct. Again, no reference was made to the basis 
upon which the injunction against Westpac was continued. 
It is submitted that the unconscionable conduct that grounded the continuation of 
the injunctions emerged from equitable principles related to unjust enrichment. 
BSA contended that “Bendigo now seeks to recover far more than any obligation 
BSA has pursuant to its agreement with Arden Way” 1038 or in other words, was 
making a demand for payment of monies that were not owed.1039 The judge noted 
that “at the time of the demand, BSA was not (and had not been) in default of 
payments for orders placed with Arden Way”. 1040 
There was nothing Arden Way could have done with respect to the design of , or 
demand on, the guarantee and therefore it was impossible for it to have acted 
unconscionably with respect to it. The conclusion then is that Arden’s 
unconscionable conduct, alluded to twice by the Court,1041 must be with respect to 
its undertakings to BSA in relation to its negotiations with its bank, which in any 
event is irrelevant to the demand against the guarantee. 
In the final analysis, it remains unclear precisely what conduct was found 
sufficiently unconscionable to restrain the two banks from further action in respect 
of demands against the guarantee. Board Solutions again demonstrates that 
unconscionable conduct cannot be established without lifting the veil of autonomy 
and looking at the construction of the underlying contract – in this case a 
‘Distribution Agreement’. 
While the plaintiff in Board Solutions successfully restrained the beneficiary’s 
claim, the case does not advance understanding of the unconscionability exception 
significantly. This is partly because the Court did not advise much of its reasoning 
                                                     
1037  Ibid [52]. 
1038  Ibid [4]. 
1039  Such behaviour has been found unconscionable in Singapore in relation to demands on guarantees: GHL, n21. 
1040  Board Solutions, n676 [24]. 
1041  Ibid [5] & [37]. 
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on the types of conduct sufficiently material to ground an injunction to restrain a 
demand against an unconditional bank guarantee.  
FMT Aircraft Gate Support Systems v Sydney Ports 1042 
Pembroke J followed a narrow common law approach to the application seeking to 
restrain the beneficiary from claiming against a guarantee. Counsel for the plaintiff 
attempted to ground part of FMT’s applica tion in unconscionable conduct. 
No detail is given as to the legal nature of the claim, whether under the general 
law or the statute, but the Court was not of a mind to deviate far from the principles 
stemming from the freedom to contract held by “commercial parties with access to 
legal advice and resources [who] were able to look after themselves.”1043 FMT 
alleged that the failure by Sydney Ports to advise that a liquidated damages clause 
had commenced operation constituted unconscionable conduct – certainly a 
tenuous claim at best. 
Pembroke J was concerned with the commercial efficacy of the guarantee 
instrument and would not consider the application of equitable principles where to 
do so would threaten the “policy and purpose behind unconditional undertakings 
and performance guarantees”. 1044 
It is highly unlikely even the most thorough application of the unconscionability 
exception would have found the conduct alleged in this matter sufficient to restrain 
the demand-right. The Court rightly dismissed any suggestion of unconscionable 
conduct by the beneficiary because they failed to allude in correspondence to the 
commencement of a liquidated damages term well known to the plaintiff. FMT does 
not therefore advance the boundaries of the unconscionability exception.  
Redline Contracting v MCC Mining (WA) 
To fully understand Redline both cases must be read in conjunction. Many of the 
facts necessary to understand the reasons in Redline(No.1)1045 are provided and 
explained only in Redline(No.2).1046 
The matter concerns “four unconditional undertakings”, 1047 also described as 
“Unconditional Insurance Bonds” and “Performance Bonds”. Howsoever named, 
                                                     
1042  FMT Aircraft Gate Support Systems v Sydney Ports Corporation  [2010] NSWSC 1108 (FMT Aircraft). 
1043  Ibid [36] citing Summer Hill Business Estate v Equititrus t [2010] NSWSC 776 [36]. 
1044  Ibid [39]. 
1045  Redline Contracting v MCC Mining (WA) [2011] FCA 1337 (Redline(No.1)) 
1046  Redline Contracting v MCC Mining (WA) [2012] FCA 1 (Redline (No.2)) 
1047  Redline(No.1), n1045 [1]. 
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the instruments were independent, on-demand guarantees to provide a risk offset 
to the principal to protect against imperfect performance by the contractor. Also, 
the undertakings acted as security against claims for unliquidated damages.  
The substantive dispute concerned whether the beneficiary could resort to the 
benefit of the guarantees for the purposes of resolving an unliquidated damages 
claim under the primary contract arising from Redline’s breach of contract . As a 
result, judicial focus was brought on the construction of the contract, unconcerned 
with equity. 
In the first hearing, Redline sought to have alleged misleading and deceptive 
conduct by the respondent categorised analogously as a form of unconscionable 
conduct, which was a novel but ultimately overly optimistic approach by counsel.1048 
Siopis J unsurprisingly held that the claim did “not have sufficient prospects of 
success at trial to warrant granting the interlocutory injunction claimed ”1049 and 
dismissed it, along with all other claims and refused to impose any injunction 
against the right to claim under the ‘security’.  
However, in the second hearing, counsel for the plaintiff amended its claims with 
regard to unconscionable conduct. Redline claimed the beneficiary’s demand to be 
unconscionable in contravention of section 51AA TPA, and “relied upon a number 
of grounds [four] in support of its contention”.1050 They were that the demand on the 
guarantee was unconscionable because: 
1. damages were not as yet payable; 
2. the beneficiary had no need of the funds; 
3. Redline would suffer reputational harm as a result; and 
4. the demand was made for an ulterior purpose. 1051 
After dealing extensively with claims relating to the contract’s construction, the 
Court addressed the revised claims relating to “Unconscionability”. 1052 
1. Damages were not as yet payable: The Court did not state it’s view 
with regard to Redline’s strongest claim – that the demand on the 
                                                     
1048  The specific grounds for the claim in Redline(No.1) was not provided – it was dealt with in passing. Section 51AA 
was only mentioned as part of a direct quote from Reed Construction Services Pty Ltd v Kheng Seng (Aust) Pty 
Ltd (1998) NSWSC BC9806316 (Unrept). 
1049  Redline(No.1), n1045 [37]. 
1050  Redline(No.2), n1046 [57]. 
1051  Ibid [57-60]. 
1052  Ibid [56]. For clarity, these grounds will be addressed in the order that they are listed, not the order in which the 
Court addressed them. 
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instrument was unconscionable because, they alleged, damages had 
not been awarded and might never have become so.  
2. The beneficiary had no need of the funds: The Court could find no 
merit either in the argument that the beneficiary’s lack of need for 
funds made the demand unconscionable, stating that a lack of need “is 
not the point” but did not elaborate further.1053 
3. Redline would suffer ‘reputational harm’ as a result: The Court 
dispatched reputational harm quickly, citing Clough1054 where it was 
similarly dispatched. To succeed on this point the plaintiff must prove 
that the demand is harsh or oppressive because it would result in their 
suffering reputational harm for which damages would be an insufficient 
remedy. This was not a question the Court felt had merit.  
4. The demand was made for an ulterior purpose (which was “not 
identified”): The Court mentions “evidence of a failed mediation 
between the parties” and indicates an implication “that MCC Mining is 
putting commercial pressure on Redline to settle its dispute with it”. 1055 
The argument that using the demand as “part of a stratagem to put 
pressure”1056 on Redline was unconscionable also fell away given the 
authority in Olex where it was held that this exact behaviour was not 
unconscionable.1057 Further, the Court could find no bad faith in the 
exercise of a contractually agreed-to right.1058 
The Court did not provide any detailed analysis as to why it is not unconscionable 
to make a demand when there was a genuine dispute as to whether the amount 
was owed but made it clear that the default legal position was not to interfere with 
the status quo.1059  
Whatever the Court’s reasons, the outcome was correct – none of the relied-upon 
behaviours alleged by Redline fell into any of the categories of unconscionable 
conduct laid down in the authorities. Redline was unable to demonstrate a 
                                                     
1053  Ibid [67]. 
1054  Clough(No.4), n180, 494. 
1055  Ibid [60]. 
1056  Ibid [63]. 
1057  Olex (No.1), n38, 403. This is not the case in Singapore.  
1058  Redline(No.2), n1046 [65]. 
1059  The ‘true’ status quo holds autonomy to be non-negotiable. However, courts have been known, after ex parte 
interlocutory injunctions have been issued, to refer to the ‘status quo’ as the position held after the beneficiary 
has been enjoined. 
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reasonable likelihood that they could prove MCC’s demand to be harsh or 
oppressive or otherwise unfair. 
Accordingly Redline is authority for the principle that where the contract is thus 
constructed, the exercise of a right to claim against a security as payment for 
unliquidated damages arising from alleged breaches of the underlying contract  
does not constitute unconscionable conduct. 
Redline did not contribute further to the development of the unconscionability 
exception. It maintained the most constrained view of the application of the 
unconscionable provisions of the TPA/ACL and took the most conservative position 
vis-à-vis the application of the relevant equitable doctrines.  
Fabtech Australia v Laing O’Rourke Australia 1060 
In Fabtech the Federal Court of Australia acknowledged unconscionability as “a 
well-recognised basis upon which an interlocutory injunction may be granted”. 1061 
The plaintiff “relie[d] on s20 of the Australian Consumer Law” 1062 but failed to 
explain how the behaviours complained of fell within the established categories of 
behaviour already laid down in the “unwritten law”. 1063 
The applicant submitted to Besanko J that six actions by the beneficiary made the 
demand unconscionable and therefore grounds for an interlocutory injunction. 1064 
Not all matters were addressed.  
The matter revolves around a difficult factual matrix for the purposes of finding 
unconscionable conduct. Part of the underlying contractual dispute had already 
been decided in favour of the account party, Fabtech, and the beneficiary had 
already made payment pursuant to the adjudicator’s finding. The demand on the 
two independent guarantees was therefore a claim for recovery of overpayment, 
plus damages grounded in specific contractual terms allowing for such claims. 
The Court provided generally that “it would be clearly unfair and unreasonable and, 
therefore, unconscionab le”1065 for the beneficiary to receive payment. The Court did 
                                                     
1060  Fabtech Australia Pty Ltd v Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd  [2015] FCA 1371 (Fabtech). 
1061  Ibid [39]. 
1062  Ibid [41]. 
1063  ACCA, Sch.2, n907 [20]. 
1064  Fabtech, n1060 [40]. There is some confusion in the case note here – the Court recognises five complaints but 
addresses six. 
1065  Ibid [40]. 
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not address the implied definition here, nor did it acknowledge that to say an 
action is unfair and/or unreasonable, is not to say it is necessarily unconscionable. 
The six behaviours alleged as unconscionable were: 
1. That the purpose of the guarantee was to “ensure performance” and 
not to “allocate risk pending resolution of a dispute”. 1066 The Court 
found this to have little merit, preferring to find the guarantee 
completely independent irrespective of any contradictory definitional 
terms in the contract.1067 
2. The plaintiff argued that it was in full compliance with its contractual 
obligations, especially given that the respondent had certified the 
complete performance of the contract. The Court did not address this 
claim and so it can be assumed that it lacked any jurisprudential 
foundation, which was fatal to its success. 
3. The respondent had not, it was alleged, raised any claim for liquidated 
damages at any time prior to the actual demand being made. The 
Plaintiff claimed that the beneficiary’s delay in making a damages 
claim was unconscionable. This was also rejected by the Court which 
refused to grant that the beneficiary’s delay exercising their agreed -to 
rights under the guarantee was unconscionable behaviour. It cannot 
be unconscionable to reserve one’s rights, nor to exercise them at any 
time it is lawful to do so. 1068 
4. Fabtech also submitted that the respondent had “abandoned its pursuit 
of judicial review proceedings.” 1069 It is unclear from the judgement how 
this submission was reasoned to ground unconscionable conduct The 
lack of a jurisprudential base must be assumed to set the submission 
aside. 
  
                                                     
1066  Ibid [40]. 
1067  Ibid [9]. 
1068  Ibid [43]. 
1069  Ibid [40]. 
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5. Re-visiting the liquidated damages claim, Fabtech claimed that Laing 
O’Rourke had waited to make the demand on the guarantee until the 
operation of a certain contractual preclusion from disputing the claim, 
or from claiming further (unexplained) “extensions of time”. This was 
not addressed by the Court in the judgement. 
6. The applicant tried to connect an earlier adjudication decided in their 
favour and the demand on the guarantee being unconscionable. 
Besanko J noted that there remained a dispute between the parties 
with regard the adjudication but otherwise did not explain further. 
Fabtech does not advance the jurisprudence of independent instrument 
unconscionability except to support the principle that it cannot be unconscionable 
to exercise one’s rights lawfully. Most of the claims and allegations of 
unconscionability made by the applicant were vague or specious,  and never likely 
to succeed. It is unsurprising that the Court refused to allow the applicant to 
depend on s20 ACL to ground an injunction. 
Swiss Re International v Eagle Downs Coal Management 1070 
Swiss was an attempt to have the Court find a demand on a guarantee 
unconscionable and thereby ground an application for preliminary discovery under 
Federal Court Rule 7.23. The rule provides that, in order to obtain an order from 
the Court, the applicant must demonstrate its “reasonable belief” that they may 
have a “right to obtain relief in the Court from a prospective respondent”.1071 The 
ultimate ‘relief’ sought was an order for the return of some or all of the funds paid 
to the beneficiary under the guarantee. 
The account party, WDS Limited (‘WDS’), was not the plaintiff;  Swiss Re, the 
issuer of the guarantee, made the application for reasons which are  not made 
clear.  
Swiss Re alleged that they had a reasonable belief that the demand was, inter alia, 
unconscionable1072 and this belief was sufficient to ground an order for the 
respondent, Eagle Downs, to release documents that it had refused to the 
applicant. These documents, it was further claimed, would provide a basis for their 
                                                     
1070  Swiss Re International SE v Eagle Downs Coal Management  [2015] FCA 1479 (Swiss). 
1071  Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r7.23. Emphasis added. Establishing a ‘reasonable belief’ may be akin to 
establishing a strong prima facie case. 
1072  Swiss, n1070 [35]: Swiss Re also alleged fraud, misleading and deceptive conduct pursuant to s18 ACL, and the 
existence of a negative stipulation.  
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reasonable belief to obtain relief. The range of documents sought was vast, and it 
was in part due to this that the Court refused the application for access to them. 1073 
The applicant demonstrated a limited understanding of independent instrument 
unconscionability when relying on s21 ACL for relief. Neither WDS nor its 
administrators in insolvency were moved to suggest that the call on the guarantee 
was anything other than appropriate. 
Swiss Re contended that the demand on the guarantee was unconscionable 
because: 
1. a call on the guarantee could only be made conditioned upon the 
identification of “[c]osts, losses, expenses or damages which [Eagle 
Downs] claims it has incurred or might in the future incur as a 
consequence of any act or omission or negligence or default of 
WDS.”1074 This could only be proved by reference to the documents to 
which the respondent had refused the applicant access. Swiss Re 
alleged that the documents would show there were no defects of 
substance to remedy, nor any basis for claims of damages. The Court 
agreed that “[i]n some cases, a party may be required to explain or 
contradict something”.1075 This was not one of those cases and a lawful 
refusal to produce documents without a legal obligation to do so lends 
no weight to an allegation of misconduct.1076 
2. WDS (not Swiss Re) was said to be “shocked and stunned” by the 
“suddenness” of the demand.1077 The notion that this contributes to the 
defendant’s unconscionable conduct demonstrated a complete lack of 
understanding as to the nature of unconscionable conduct. Gleeson J 
observed that such suddenness “does not say anything material about 
the legality of the demand”.1078 
  
                                                     
1073  Ibid [87]. 
1074  Ibid [58]. 
1075  Ibid [73]. 
1076  Ibid [75]. 
1077  Ibid [56(d)]. Swiss Re was alleging this shock on WDS’ part, not WDS.  
1078  Ibid [70]. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 217 of 270 
 
3. The beneficiary was in breach of its own obligations under the supply 
contract in relation to periodic payments owed to WDS. This was not 
held to “cast any doubt upon Eagle Downs’ bona fides”1079 in making the 
claim. 
4. Negotiations between the contract parties being undertaken at the 
time of the demand contemplated a reduction in the contract price and 
consequently in the value of the guarantee. This claim was denied on 
the grounds of uncertainty; that no agreement had been reached (nor 
perhaps was likely to be) and that such negotiations did “not provide a 
reasonable basis for doubting Eagle Downs’ bona fides”.1080 
5. During earlier negotiations the beneficiary had made a statement to 
the effect that it would not make a demand on the guarantee, on the 
basis that the negotiations were ongoing. The Court found that the 
implication of this statement was “that the bond might be called upon if 
the contract was not successfully renegotiated” ,1081 as indeed it was, 
but held that this did not negative the beneficiary’s right to make the 
demand. 
The Court had no issue with the factual basis for any of these claims by Swiss  Re 
but would not accede to the notion that any of the behaviours constituted 
unconscionable conduct. 
Best Tech Engineering v Samsung C&T Corp1082  
The two initial hearings in this matter both dealt predominantly with how the 
construction of a particular contractual term might ground an injunction restraining 
the beneficiary from being paid under a bank guarantee. The applicant/plaintiff  was 
partly successful with the Court acceding to a temporary restraint.  
The first matter1083 was an ex parte interlocutory application in which Pritchard J 
granted an injunction until such time as the matter could be fully contested. In the 
second matter,1084 Cheney J replaced the original injunction with a limited restraint 
requiring Samsung to provide appropriate notice to the applicant commensurate 
                                                     
1079  Ibid [69]. 
1080  Ibid [66]. 
1081  Ibid [68]. 
1082  Best Tech & Engineering v Samsung C&T Corporation [2015] WASC 459 (Best Tech (No.3)). 
1083  Best Tech & Engineering v Samsung C&T Corporation [2015] WASC 355 (Best Tech (No.1)). 
1084  Best Tech & Engineering v Samsung C&T Corporation [2015] WASC 447 (Best Tech (No.2)). 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 218 of 270 
 
with its obligations under the contract. Having received the relevant notice, the 
plaintiff “applied for further orders including an interlocutory injunction, not 
materially different from that discharged by Chaney J…[and] also applied for 
orders for the urgent separate trial of an issue pursuant to…the Rules of the 
Supreme Court 1971 (WA).”1085  
Best Tech argued “that it would be unconscionable for Samsung to rely on its strict 
legal rights under the Contract”.1086 No mention of the consumer law was made; the 
claim was grounded in the common law. 
In the final hearing, Allanson J held that the claim lacked credibility in i ts entirety, 
stating that “[n]o attempt had been made to date to properly identify a suitable 
issue" and that the application had “not properly been thought through”.1087 
Samsung submitted that the attempt to re-litigate matters already settled 
constituted an “abuse of process”1088 and sought immediate dismissal of the 
application. The Court agreed with the lower court that Best Tech’s position was 
unlikely to be tenable at trial. 
Allanson J held that a “claim for relief on the basis of unconscionable dealings 
calls for a close consideration of the facts…Best Tech put forward no additional 
evidence on the issue of unconscionability, but relied solely on the fact that 
Samsung had not responded” to a relevant letter. This left the Court “unsure on 
what basis this is, or could be, asserted to be unconscionable”.1089 Holding to the 
principles of contract, his Honour held that “ the plaintiff will be prejudiced by any 
call on the guarantees.  But that is the effect of the agreement it entered. ”1090 
Best Tech did not expand further on the law already in place. 
  
                                                     
1085  Best Tech (No.3), n1082 [10]. 
1086  Ibid [34]. 
1087  Ibid [13-14]. 
1088  Ibid [32]. 
1089  Ibid [36]. 
1090  Ibid [37]. 
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2.0 Conclusion to Australian Case Analyses 
The Australian position on unconscionable conduct in independent instrument 
matters remains in flux. Only three matters have ultimately been successful in 
pleading unconscionable conduct with respect to abusive demands: Olex Focas (in 
part); Boral; and Board Solutions.1091 
The Australian Courts have never addressed substantive unconscionability in 
relation to independent instruments and have not acknowledged that the principles 
of procedural unconscionability cannot be applied to situations where substantive 
unconscionability is being alleged. These Courts have often considered 
unconscionability with the non-statutory element of ‘moral obloquy’. The elements 
of unconscionability to be put to proof, and the standard of proof required to 
establish unconscionable conduct are far from satisfactorily laid down. 
Unconscionable conduct per se has never been fully defined and matters 
concerning it are adjudged on the facts of each case. 
In addition, the guidance provided by s22 ACL struggles to provide clear direction, 
other than by isolated example, regarding the matters not related to equitable 
principles which the Court may take under consideration. “These guidelines are 
seen as helpful indicia for the court but they are not exhaustive.”1092 
Australian Courts have not yet been asked to consider whether the independence 
of primary obligation letters of credit should be treated differently to the secondary 
obligation demand guarantees and stand-by guarantees which “serve the different 
function of securing the account party's obligation to pay damages upon 
commission of a breach.”1093  
Finally, the Australian courts have not addressed, in the absence of a special 
disadvantage to be abused, if unconscionability is applicable to independent 
instruments at all. They appear to have found no issue with respect to considering 
matters on their facts as well as the documents, but have not acknowledged that 
this is contrary to the operation of the instruments themselves and in direct 
contradiction with the independence principle. 
                                                     
1091  Olex (No.2), n938941; Boral (No.2), n61; Board Solutions, n676. 
1092  Baxt, n524, 396. 
1093  Loi, n131, 506. 
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Therefore the Australian position on independent instrument unconscionability 
remains very much an incomplete jurisdiction. Many questions remain to be 
answered regarding whether the statutory protections afforded other commercial 
parties under the ACL will be, or can be, extended to victims of abusive demands 
against independent instruments. It is for this purpose that the framework 
proposed in Chapter Six looks to assist with understanding the variety of elements 
of independent instrument unconscionability that must be taken into consideration.   
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Chapter 6. The Doctrine of Independent Instrument 
Unconscionability 
Section A. A New Category of Unconscionable Conduct 
1.0 Theoretical Rationale for Independent Instrument Unconscionability 
There is a case to be made for a special category of unconscionable conduct 
specific to independent instruments. These instruments have been referred to as 
“specialty contracts”, 1094 with distinct rights and obligations. The effect of 
unconscionability in common law jurisdictions on independent instruments must be 
considered in light of their singularity. If equitable principles are to be used, those 
principles ought to be identified and refined to suit the purpose.  
Such consideration should perforce lead to the development of a new, recognised 
category of unconscionability. No existing category adequately addresses the 
range of matters which must be decided to determine whether a demand on an 
independent instrument should be restrained. 
The question then becomes: if the Court is to recognise a unique  category of 
independent instrument unconscionable conduct to ground an injunction, what 
elements of ‘conduct’ are necessary?  
To answer this, a doctrine is required that describes, in the independent instrument 
context, the behaviours which constitute conduct that is ‘unconscionable’, ‘unfair’, 
‘unconscientious’, ‘lacking in good faith’, or ‘having no conceivable basis’, 1095 and is 
sufficiently egregious to attract judicial relief. 
In Australia the court held that no power under the general law could assist with 
independent instrument matters, but that the legislative prohibition could apply to 
such disputes.1096 Under the legislation the Court is directed to inter alia principles 
of equity to guide their considerations. 1097 In addition, a well-defined category of 
independent instrument unconscionability would assist with ensuring consistent 
findings.  
                                                     
1094  McLaughlin, n89, 1197. 
1095  Renard, n312, 268[F]. 
1096  See p.189 discussion of Olex (No.1). 
1097  See discussion p.82. S20 ACL is strictly limited to equitable principles and is  generally not applied to 
independent instrument matters. S21 ACL is not limited to the principles of equity.  
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Without a framework, the existence of independent instrument unconscionable 
conduct will fall to each Court to determine on an ad hoc basis, which may be 
problematic: 
If unconscionability were regarded as synonymous with the judge's 
sense of what is fair between the parties, the beneficial 
administration of the broad principles of equity would degenerate 
into an idiosyncratic intervention in conveyancing transactions. 1098 
Unconscionable conduct, because of its foundations in equity, has only been found 
sufficient to ground an injunction against an independent instrument in three 
common law jurisdictions to date.1099 Civil law jurisdictions either have a legislated 
doctrine of contractual good faith or they reference such “soft law” as the 
UNIDROIT Principles or the Principles of European Contract Law for guidance. 1100 
In some jurisdictions a principle of contractual good faith exists but “it is difficult to 
find a clear and comprehensive statement of it.” 1101 
Contractual good faith and unconscionability have similar characteristics. 1102 Some 
jurisdictions, such as the US and Australia, utilise both. 
The US is a common law jurisdiction with a robust court of equity 1103 but issuers of 
independent instruments governed by the UCC are subject to a duty of good faith 
under §5-109(a)(2).1104 UCC §2-302 permits the Court to restrain the effect of an 
unconscionable term but only where the unconscionability is procedural, ie the 
conduct occurred when the contract was formed. Independent instrument matters 
have, based on extensive research, all been substantive disputes. An alternative 
claim is not inconceivable. 
Australia also has an equity jurisdiction with commercial unconscionability 
proscribed under statute. This is complicated with an ambiguous bifurcation 
between “the unwritten law of the states…from time to time” 1105 and an unidentified 
head of power founded outside of equity. 1106 The matters to which the court inter 
                                                     
1098  Stern, n352, 479. 
1099  Australia, Malaysia, Singapore. 
1100  L Gorton, 08 June, 2017 correspondence with this author.  
1101  H MacQueen, Good Faith in the Scots Law of Contract: An Undisclosed Principle?, Good Faith in Contract and 
Property Law (Hart, 1999), 5-37. 
1102  Kuehne, n45, 64-67. Renard, n312, 268[F]. 
1103  Shulkin, n519, 367[fn2]. 
1104  §5-102(a)(7): “’Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. ” Also Wunnicke, n30, 
6[5].  
1105  S20(1) ACL. 
1106  The grounds for this are disputed: Boral (No.2), n61 [90]. Also Rickett, n329. 
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alia may consider are provided in s22 ACL.1107 While the drafters of this guiding 
provision likely did not consider independent instruments, the section nevertheless 
assists with framing independent instrument unconscionability. 1108 
It is apposite to question why unconscionable conduct ought to interfere with 
rights, and risk allocations, agreed to in private contract. The 19 th century view of 
black-letter law is discussed above 1109 and there remains strong judicial support for 
strict enforcement except in exceptional circumstances. 1110 However, “it is generally 
recognised that a performance guarantee can be an oppressive instrument if 
abused.”1111 
Abusive conduct can be premeditated or malicious and cause unforeseeable harm. 
It cannot however, be presumed. Risk of contractual failure is certainly an element 
of any risk calculation but harm from abusive behaviour cannot be easily quantified 
or offset in advance. Indemnity may be provided for an applicant’s own failures , 
but unjustifiable enrichment of the beneficiary would be difficult to mitigate. 
Independent instrument unconscionability offsets this.  
More broadly, it would serve no purpose for the integrity of independent 
instruments to be undermined by an excessively broad application of a doctrine of 
unconscionability. Loi suggests that it is a matter of balance. 1112 It is posited here 
that, given unconscionability is already being used to ground restraint of the 
benefit of independent instruments, the best course is to establish a doctrinal 
framework so it can be applied consistently. 
When considering commercial matters courts are asked to balance commercial 
realities with the social values of a modern world. Justice Mason has highlighted 
the Court’s shift to a state where relief from commercial abuse is balanced against 
the need to ensure that unscrupulous parties are not unjustly enriched.1113 
The commercial and social need to guard against abusive demands is self -evident. 
Damages can only be awarded once the substantive issues have been litigated. 1114 
A disputed demand against an independent instrument will generally be made long 
                                                     
1107  S22(1)(a) ACL describes eleven matters “the court may have regard to” but these are descriptive, not 
prescriptive. Baxt, n1092, 369: “Helpful indicia…but not exhaustive.” See discussion p.240. 
1108  See §2.2. below. 
1109  See p.75. 
1110  Kirby, n602 [viii]: “I hold to the somewhat old-fashioned opinion that parties of full age, without any relevant 
legal disability, should ordinarily be held to the legal obligations they have assumed.”  
1111  Chartered, n24, 668[39]. 
1112  Loi, n131, 508-509. 
1113  See discussion by Mason, p.96. 
1114  If procedural unconscionability is found, different relief might follow.  
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 224 of 270 
 
before that point in the judicial process – usually immediately after the relationship 
between the parties has irretrievably broken down. It is in part this time gap 
between the two, and the consequent financial harm to the account party, that 
makes it imperative for there to be a reasonable, material alternative to common 
fraud as a basis for restraining an unconscientious demand. 
Courts have also seen the need for clarification: the existence of a category of 
unconscionability in Singapore specifically tailored to independent instruments was 
described by the Court of Appeal in Boustead(No.1). 
Li J stated: 
[U]nconscionability as an exception has been carved out specifically 
“in the context of performance bonds”, and is not to be mistaken for 
the general contractual doctrine of unconscionability. 1115  
Unfortunately, his Honour did not elaborate on the characteristics or elements of 
that “carved out” unconscionable conduct. To address tha t, a framework of 
relevant matters that ought to be considered or proven is described below.  
Rather than refer to an ‘exception’ to the independence principle however, this 
paper supports the view that a properly developed category of unconscionability 
“carved out” for independent instruments will negate the need for consideration of 
an ‘exception’.  
The autonomy principle, it is posited here, ought not be offended by an injunction 
restraining the beneficiary’s demand-right, and further, offence only occurs where 
the issuer is restrained from meeting their obligation to honour. 1116 This author 
accepts that the distinction is a fine but sufficiently clear one.  
The proposal therefore follows that one characteristic of the new category will be 
that the available relief will be limited to a restraint against the beneficiary’s 
demand-right.1117 
It has been famously said that the “categories of negligence are never closed.” 1118 
Less widely appreciated is the analogous position taken in the High Court of 
Australia where it was held “the categories of unconscionable conduct are not 
                                                     
1115  Boustead (No.1), n160 [185]. 
1116  See discussion on demand-rights p.36. 
1117  See elements table below p.252. 
1118  Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 619 per Macmillan LJ. 
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closed”.1119 His Honour qualified this strenuously, citing concerns as to the effect of 
an excessively-applied doctrine of unconscionability, but acknowledged the Court’s 
willingness to consider additional categories.  
It is proposed here that a category of unconscionability specifically designed for 
independent instruments is both relevant and necessary. There is no evidence to 
support the idea that a properly formed doctrine would open the floodgates to 
allegations of unconscionable conduct in independent instrument disputes. 1120 As 
Loi said, simply because “relief would be more readily available…is not to say that 
injunctive relief would be easily or readily available”.1121 
It is necessary that the doctrine is properly informed with regard to the unique 
elements of independent instrument unconscionability harvested from the case 
authorities. These elements assist to determine the nature of the actual 
unconscionable conduct alleged to taint a demand. This is not to say that the 
“matters the court may have regard to” provided in s22 ACL1122 have nothing to offer 
independent instrument unconscionability – some matters mentioned could 
conceivably be found in independent instrument disputes and these are 
particularised below. Case law provides the richest source of definition for 
unconscionability. 
There is broad recognition that unconscionability cannot and should not be defined 
with much specificity.1123 However, within the more confined independent instrument 
context, it is possible to acquire a much clearer view of what is required to 
establish certain conduct as unconscionable. The context narrows the range of 
behaviours which need to be considered and compared. 
For example, lacking a context it is not possible to answer the general question 
‘What is unconscionable?’ with anything other than an equally general non -
contextual answer: ‘It is unfairness. Or bad faith. Or unconscientious conduct.’ 
None of which assists with understanding the character of ‘unconscionable’.  To 
accomplish this it is necessary to witness conduct in context. 
 
                                                     
1119  Stern, n352, 479. Emphasis added.  
1120  S Rajan, 'Restraining A Call On Performance Bonds' (2016)   <http://www.skrine.com/publications/legal -
insights/707-restraining-a-call-on-performance-bonds> 
1121  Loi, n131, 508-509. Original emphasis. 
1122  Listed p.242. 
1123  Venture Cotton Coop v Freeman  435 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. 2014) , 228: “unconscionability is not a concept, but a 
determination to be made in light of a variety of factors not unifiable into a formula.” 
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The Court in Mount Sophia stated: 
Unconscionability in the context of performance bonds is a 
conclusion applied to describe certain types of conduct in certain 
contexts.1124 
Context allows grouping of behaviours into ‘species’ of unconscionable conduct 
(such as the harsh insistence on a right). Once specific, complained-of conduct 
can be properly analysed and described with reference to the character of these 
species of behaviours it becomes possible to evaluate it for materiality. The 
framework for doing so is postulated below. 1125 
A specific category of unconscionable conduct will recognise the broad social 
policy shift toward circumscribing corporate unconscionability. 1126 It has been 
acknowledged by both the courts and distinguished jurists that ruthless and 
unconscientious mercantile behaviour runs counter to contemporary thinking. 
Priestly JA pointed out: 
“a very large area of everyday contract law is now directly affected by 
statutory unconscionability provisions carrying with them broad 
remedies”…the ideas of unconscionability, unfairness and lack of good 
faith have a great deal in common. The result is that people…have 
grown used to the courts applying standards of fairness to contract 
which are wholly consistent with the existence in all contracts of a duty 
upon the parties of good faith and fair dealing in its performance…this 
is…the expected standard, and anything less is contrary to 
prevailing community expectations.1127 
Loi has argued that a system which allows abusive demands to go unchecked will 
have a far more deleterious effect on market perceptions of independent 
instruments than occasional findings that a demand is unconscionable following a 
well-thought-out doctrine of law. 1128 This view is more likely to find wider acceptance 
in a conservative user community if independent instrument unconscionability is 
                                                     
1124  Mount Sophia, n39 [41]. 
1125  See §2.4 below p.249. 
1126  B Horrigan, D Lieberman, and R Steinwall (DIISR), 'Strengthening Statutory Unconscionable Conduct and the 
Franchising Code of Conduct' (Department of the Treasury, 2010) , 1-5. 
1127  Renard, n312, 268[F]. Emphasis added. 
1128  Loi, p.142. 
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seen as a set of properly constructed elements framed around existing law and 
usage. 
Universal agreement on independent instrument unconscionability is unlikely; 
UNCITRAL has been unable to achieve it. The ICC and IIBLP have left the 
prosecution of fraud matters to local law, despite widespread acceptance of the 
fraud exception, not including articles relating to fraud in any rule set. Agreement 
would be even more difficult to achieve if it were perceived as grounded in 
common law equitable principles, given the broad lack of understanding in civil law 
jurisdictions on how equitable principles operate.1129 It will therefore fall to local law 
to provide relief from unconscionability. 
It is proposed here that for independent instrument unconscionability to operate, 
where an underlying contract requires an independent instrument, an implied 
obligation of good faith should be presumed to bind the beneficiary’s demand-
right.1130 This reflects UN-CIGSLC deeming provision Art.15(3): 
The beneficiary, when demanding payment, is deemed to certify that 
the demand is not in bad faith. 
Given that neither of these events, (a) adoption of a global agreement on 
unconscionability; nor (b) widespread acceptance of an implied good faith 
obligation, is likely to occur, the law dealing with abusive demands on independent 
instruments will remain split along jurisdictional lines. 
There are those jurisdictions which technically support the proscription of abusive 
demands; those which provide relief when it is proved; and those where, except for 
fraud, the independence principle is inviolate and the applicant party carries the 
risk until disputes can be resolved under contract law principles. 
2.0 Independent Instrument Unconscionability: A Framework 
To determine independent instrument unconscionability the facts of a matter need 
to be considered in light of a range of elements, chiefly:  
1. the timing of the conduct (§2.1). This informs whether the 
conduct is procedural (§2.2) or substantive (§2.3) in 
nature. 
                                                     
1129  Rickett, n329, 81, implies that some Australian judges may not either. 
1130  See §3.0(H)ii below p.254. 
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2. the materiality of the conduct. It must be sufficiently 
egregious to attract intervention (§2.4). 
3. the limits of unconscionability. Drawn from the case law, it 
informs on conduct already determined as not being 
unconscionable. 
Where the conduct is procedural, it will be occur during formation of the contract. 
Where the conduct is substantive, it will be found in either the terms, performance 
or demand. Analysis of the facts ought to determine whether the alleged 
unconscionable conduct falls under a recognised ‘category/species’ of 
unconscionability. 
The following analysis discusses each of these, scoping independent instrument 
unconscionability by reference to the case law and statute. 
The elements of the conduct and circumstances surrounding the demand are 
examined in light of the substantive content of the terms of the underlying contract 
or the independent instrument, or from the beneficiary’s performance of the terms 
of those documents.  
‘Performance’ can refer to the implementation or operation of the underlying 
contract, or the manner in which the demand is made. 
2.1. Effect of Timing of Alleged Unconscionable Conduct – Procedural and 
Substantive Unconscionability 
The first matter to frame alleged unconscionable conduct references the timing of 
that conduct. Specifically, it is relevant whether conduct alleged as being 
unconscionable occurs during the formation of the underlying contract, during its 
operation, or in the demand itself. That is, whether the conduct complained of is 
‘procedural’ or ‘substantive’. 1131 
Independent instrument unconscionability: 
must be distinguished from the general contract law doctrine of 
unconscionability, which is concerned with conduct at the time of 
the formation of the contract, and which can vitiate consent to a 
                                                     
1131  Leff, n400, 487. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 229 of 270 
 
contract on the grounds that the terms of the contract are unfair and 
the contract was entered into in an unfair manner. 1132 
This statement implies that independent instrument unconscionability is always 
something other than procedural unconscionability. 1133 To prove unconscionable 
conduct in the general law of contract – in consumer law for example – requires 
consideration of “special disadvantage” and /or exercise of an inequality between 
the parties from which an unconscionable outcome arises.1134 
The relevance of timing is in the relief available for each type of unconscionability. 
If the Court so orders for procedural unconscionability, the parties may be restored 
to their original positions if the offended party elects to exercise its rights to 
rescission: “contracts induced by such factors [as unconscionable dealing, duress, 
and undue influence] are said to be voidable”. 1135  
Where a dependent obligation arose from the contract, and the relevant term was 
severed from the underlying contract, it would in most circumstances be set aside 
as well. 
Whether the avoidance of the underlying contract would automatically restrain the 
demand-right against an independent instrument has never been tested but the 
view among most lawyers is that it would not, given the judicial support for a 
strong independence principle. 1136 The UN-CIGSLC attempts to link the status of the 
underlying contract with the operation of independent instruments. Gorton writes:  
The problem with the UNCITRAL Convention on Independent 
Guarantees is that it contains a rule in Art.19.2 which opens up for a 
“loose” attitude to the firm understanding of such guarantees. 1137 
His concern refers specifically to Art.19(2)(b) discussed below. 1138 
It remains uncertain what effect procedural unconscionability would have on the 
demand-right but the view proposed here is that the demand-right ought to be 
restrained while the obligation held by the issuer to honour remains intact. This 
distinction maintains the independence of the instrument but it may be too fine a 
                                                     
1132  Mount Sophia, n39 [41]. 
1133  Although it is posited here that it is quite conceivable that an allegation of procedural unconscionability could be 
brought in an independent instrument matter.  
1134  See model: p.84. 
1135  Heffey, n1139, 975. Blomley, n322, 402. 
1136  Davidson numerous discussions; and Lonegrass, 13 March, 2017 correspondence, with this author.  
1137  Gorton, 08 June, 2017 correspondence with this author.  
1138  See p.245. 
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distinction for strict non-interventionists. The question whether procedural 
unconscionability can arise where the parties are sophisticated and 
legally-informed remains untested. All independent instrument unconscionability 
matters to date have concerned substantive matters.  
In the situation where unconscionable conduct is found to exist in either the 
operation of the contract or in the ultimate demand, ie substantively, the underlying 
contract can be set aside in futuro “but not so as to discharge rights and 
obligations arising from partial performance or causes of action accruing from the 
breach.”1139  
That is, a contract set aside after breach of a fundamental term does not affect 
anything that came before the time of the breach.1140  
In the case of independent instrument disputes, breach of a fundamental term 
would typically be after the issue of the instrument and therefore the existence of 
the obligation undertaken by the issuer would not be in contention. 1141 
2.2. Potential Application of Independent Instrument Procedural 
Unconscionability1142 
Under the law, treatment of procedural and substantive unconscionability is 
significantly different, as is the relief afforded from each. Procedural 
unconscionability has evolved from the early doctrine of equitable fraud, through 
the doctrine of ‘catching bargains’, and subsequently broadened to create the 
doctrine of unconscionable dealings. 1143 These developments have resulted in the 
modern procedural unconscionability applied today.1144 
Contemporary procedural unconscionability has two limbs; the first concerns the 
character of the person disadvantaged. The second has been referred to as 
“bargaining naughtiness”;1145 because it examines any ‘bad’ behaviour of the 
                                                     
1139  P Heffey, J Paterson, and A Robertson, Contract - Cases and Materials  (Thomson, 9th ed, 2003), 975. 
Rescission also requires that restoration to the status quo is possible. 
1140  J Tarrant, 'Total Failure of Consideration' (2006) 33 University of Western Australia Law Review  132, 132: 
“Rights that accrue prior to termination of a contract survive termination and can therefore be enforced after 
termination.” This point in time differs depending on the cause of contractual termination, eg fundamental 
breach, repudiation, delay. 
1141  The issue of the independent instrument is often a condition precedent to the operation of the underlying 
contract. Where so, the instrument is typically issued soon after the contractual relationship commences and will 
pre-date any breach of a term by either party.  
1142  See discussion “Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability”, Ch.3, p. 83. 
1143  A Mason, 'The Impact of the Equitable Doctrine on the Law of Contract' (1998) 27 Anglo-American Law Review  
1, 7. 
1144  For a detailed discussion, see generally Vout, p.95, and Dal Pont, p.69. 
1145  Leff, n400, 487. 
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defendant during the formation of the contract, such as use of unfair pressure 
tactics.1146 
To evidence procedural unconscionability, courts look for evidence of “oppression” 
and “unfair surprise”: 
indicating that the transaction lacked meaningful choice on the part 
of the complaining party. The inquiry focuses on specific and 
objective indicia demonstrating that a consumer was unable to read 
and understand the terms of the agreement. 1147 
In Australia, the definitive case on the first limb of procedural unconscionability is 
Amadio wherein the age and English literacy of the plaintiffs, in conjunction with 
pressure and prevarication from a trusted son, precluded them from being able to 
protect their own interests. 1148 
The difficulty with procedural unconscionability within independent instrument 
disputes is that the parties to such disputes are sophisticated and legally-informed. 
Therefore ‘special disadvantage’, the core component of the first limb of 
procedural unconscionability (especially with any element of moral obloquy), would 
be a difficult to impute into the underlying contractual negotiations. 
However procedural unconscionability necessitates behaviour on the part of the 
beneficiary anywhere in the formation of the underlying contract to be construed as 
unconscionable. Given that there is often a significant power differential between 
the parties, it is conceivable that a factual matrix could arise to support such an 
allegation. 
Research has not revealed a case where procedural unconscionability has been 
argued in relation to independent instruments. In neither the Singapore nor 
Australian line of cases is there mention of either term specifically. However 
although at least one case alludes to a difference between special disadvantage 
(procedural) and harsh insistence on a right (substantive). 
 
                                                     
1146  M Lonegrass, 'Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism - Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability' (2012) 44 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal  1, 9: “Conversely, a merchant’s “good behaviour,” such as using simple 
and concise contractual language…militates against a finding of procedural unconscionability. ” 
1147  Ibid. 
1148  Amadio, n342. 
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In Boral, without specifically naming it, Austin J appears to avoid use of procedural 
unconscionability principles in relation to Action Makers’ demand, preferring to use 
the substantive doctrine proscribing oppressive assertion of a right 1149 to ground a 
finding of unconscionable conduct under s51AC TPA. 
Some courts in independent instrument matters have inadvertently applied the 
edicts of procedural unconscionability to the substantive issues in the contract or 
demand. The subsequent confusion about the doctrine is hardly surprising. There 
has not been recognition in any independent instrument dispute to date that the 
two categories exist, and no recognition that independent instrument disputes are 
substantive. Despite the ACL specifically providing for consideration of substantive 
matters,1150 Australian Courts have not acknowledged the different categories nor 
how they apply specifically to independent instrument unconscionable conduct. 
Applying the autonomy principle strictly would suggest that neither category of 
unconscionability should affect the sovereignty of the demand-right – for those 
purposes it should not matter if the unconscionable conduct occurs in the 
formation, content, or performance of the contract, or in the making of the demand. 
In the absence of fraud, a complying demand must be honoured. 
It is unlikely procedural unconscionability will be argued in relation to independent 
instruments. The following analysis is for completeness – to recognise the 
existence of both types of unconscionability and to demonstrate a judicial 
approach with respect to both of them. 
2.3. Nature of Independent Instrument Procedural Unconscionability 
This thesis argues that where material independent instrument unconscionability is 
prima facie found in the formation of the underlying contract (ie procedural), the 
court should ipso facto consider whether any termination or clausal severance 
ought to extend to the rights and obligations that arose from it, including the 
demand-right against an independent instrument provided pursuant to a term of 
the contract. 
 
                                                     
1149  Boral (No.2), n61 [75]: “The present case is clearly not one where the “special disadvantage” principle would be 
attracted.” 
1150  S21 ACL: “It is the intention of Parliament that…[this section]… is not limited to consideration of the 
circumstances relating to formation of the contract.” Emphasis added.  
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As noted, this view defies a strict interpretation of the independence principle 
which provides that, regardless of what happens to the underlying contract – even 
its total avoidance1151 – once the bank issues an independent instrument, the benefit 
from it should not be interfered with; that the demand-right survives the fatality of 
the contract itself.1152  
It is argued here that if the underlying contract (or relevant term thereof) is invalid 
for procedural unconscionability, this should be sufficient grounds for the demand-
right to be restrained. With respect to this, Eveleigh LJ in Potton Homes provided: 
If the seller has lawfully avoided the contract prima facie, it seems 
to me he should be entitled to restrain the buyer from making use of 
the performance bond.1153 
This is posited as not being a breach of the instrument’s independence. The 
issuer’s obligation to honour remains intact but any attempt to exercise a demand -
right against it would be a fraud, common law or equitable, depending on the facts. 
There is support for this position under UN-CIGSLC Art.19(2)(b) which provides 
that a demand has “no conceivable basis” if: 
The underlying obligation of the principal/applicant has been declared 
invalid by a court or arbitral tribunal, unless the undertaking indicates 
that such contingency falls within the risk to be covered by the 
undertaking.1154 
Notably, the UN-CIGSLC properly recognises that it is the demand-right affected 
by unconscientious conduct, not the obligation of the issuer to honour, where the 
underlying obligation is invalidated. This follows logically and provides support for 
the view that the demand-right arises in the underlying contract. Where a demand-
right arises from a contract that is subsequently rescinded, that right ought also be 
interdicted. 
                                                     
1151  Gao, n41, 25: “Even if the underlying transaction has been cancelled…the issuer has to pay”.  
1152  UN-CIGSLC Explanatory Note , n221 [17] for example states that the definition provided for ‘independence’ “is 
phrased in terms of the undertaking not being dependent upon the existence or validity of the underlying 
transaction, or upon any other undertaking.”  
1153  Potton, n709, 28. 
1154  Gorton, 08 June, 2017 correspondence with this author, implies that it is possibly the attempt to link the status 
of the underlying contract in [Art.19(2)(b)] with the efficacy of the demand -right that has resulted in a low 
adoption rate for the UN-CIGSLC. 
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This author acknowledges that this view is contrary to strict independence, 
problematic in law, and is yet to be resolved definitively. In 1965 Kozolchyk, 
discussing letters of credit, noted: 
[T]he nullity of the underlying agreement as it affects the validity of 
the letter of credit…[as one of four]…areas of…conflict created by 
the opposing rules arising from two or more countries, and by the 
inconsistencies between municipal statutory or case law and 
international banking customs.1155 
Kozolchyk cites (contemporary) Belgian case law (denying any effect) and Mexican 
statute (allowing it) as examples of conflict in this area of civil law. 1156 
The judicial policy outside of the Singapore, Malaysian, and Australian  jurisdictions 
remains that, in the absence of fraud, the Court will not look at whether the 
demand-right is being validly exercised relative to the underlying contract. Without 
specifically saying so, those courts refusing to allow the demand-right to be 
restrained by unconscionable conduct have implicitly recognised only the elements 
of procedural unconscionability to apply. 
This requires the court to look for conduct such as special disadvantage 
unconscionably leveraged, fraud, duress, or incapacity. In practical terms, 
establishing such a want of proper formation would demand an extraordinary 
factual matrix in an independent instrument matter. 
If procedural unconscionability was pleaded the applicant party would, in 
interlocutory proceedings, need to succeed in demonstrating a strong prima facie 
case of unconscionable conduct showing how the contract was formed in 
circumstances where they could not protect their own interests. A review of the 
substantive matters at the interlocutory stage is not to make a definitive 
determination of them – this will be accomplished in subsequent hearings. 1157 
At the interlocutory stage the court will lift the veil of autonomy sufficiently to make 
a determination as to the nature of the conduct complained of in the formation o f 
the contract but will not determine whether the timing of the conduct voids the 
underlying contract or terminates it. It does, by implication, indicate whether such 
                                                     
1155  Kozolchyk, n29, 420. 
1156  The legal position in both jurisdictions would no doubt be significantly different today.  
1157  Mount Sophia, n39 [47]. 
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conduct is likely to be sufficient to have the contract interfered with in other 
proceedings. If the court so finds, a restraint against the beneficiary’s demand -
right will hold until final determination of all issues.  
The court may also look to the substantive terms of the underlying contract to find 
whether they have any probative value in determining procedural 
unconscionability, ie whether the terms indicate that the defendant has taken 
advantage of any special disability claimed by the plaintiff or is otherwise guilty of 
moral obloquy in its dealings. 1158 
It could also eventuate that a court in an independent instrument dispute accepts 
that there has been unconscionable conduct at some point in the contract 
formation but then decides that it simply is not sufficiently harsh or oppressive. 
That is, the conduct is insufficiently material to ground an injunction. 
2.4. Nature of Independent Instrument Substantive Unconscionability 1159 
The doctrine of substantive unconscionability provides that “a court may refuse to 
enforce a contract if its terms are deemed sufficiently unfair .”1160 It has its critics: 
Epstein, a strong advocate for abolishing substantive unconscionability, argues 
that “[t]he doctrine should not…allow courts to act as roving commissions to set 
aside those agreements whose substantive terms they find objectionable. ”1161 His 
view is similar to that of the English courts: unconscionability can only occur during 
contractual formation as “duress, fraud or incompetence”. 1162  
The doctrine of substantive unconscionability is applied widely. In Australia and 
the US, it is embedded in statute and therefore must be properly described where 
those statutes apply to independent instruments. Substantive unconscionability 
broadly “looks to the injustice which would result if relief were not granted, 
irrespective of the conduct of the parties”. 1163 
Any attempt to find substantive unconscionability in independent instrument 
disputes requires the veil of autonomy to be lifted; the terms of the underlying 
                                                     
1158  Dal Pont, n307, 294[9.10]. 
1159  See discussion “Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability”, Ch.3, p. 83. 
1160  N Cornell, 'A Complaint-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law' (2016)  164 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review  1131, 1144. 
1161  R Epstein, 'Unconscionability - A Critical Reappraisal' (1975) 18 The Journal of Law and Economics  293, 294. 
1162  Ibid 295. 
1163  Vout, n15, 117[35.5.210]. 
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 236 of 270 
 
contract have to be examined, as does the implementation of those terms. It is not 
possible to establish the ground in any other way. 
Lonegrass states: 
Whereas procedural unconscionability targets the quality of the 
consumer’s assent to the contract, substantive unconscionability 
targets the content of the terms themselves by looking for 
unfairness in the contract’s substantive provisions. 1164 
Procedural and substantive unconscionability can operate jointly or severally – 
either can be used as evidence for the other in the right circumstances. 1165 Courts in 
the US have found that a term or a contract can be set aside on the basis of 
substantive unconscionability alone, with one court affirming its sufficiency by 
stating: 
The superior court was mistaken in assuming that the presence of 
procedural unconscionability is required to void a contract based on 
it containing unconscionable terms.1166 
One US commentator sees a growing judicial adoption of substantive 
unconscionability as the sole basis for finding contractual unconscionability. 1167 This 
trend has also been noticed in Australia, with Vout noting:  
Increasingly, there are signs that courts are justifying intervention 
on the basis of unconscionable outcomes, without requiring proof 
that the defendant has engaged in some form of unfair dealing. 1168 
  
                                                     
1164  Lonegrass, n1146, 10. Emphasis added. 
1165  A court can look at the effect of the substantive terms to support a finding of procedural unconscionability from 
exploitation, for example; alleged unconscionable conduct during formation might expl ain the inclusion of certain 
terms and support severance for unconscionability.  
1166  Glassford v BrickKicker 35 A.3d 1044 (Vt.2011), 1048-49. 
1167  Lonegrass, n1146, 19-22: “a minority of courts continue to utilize the conventional  two-prong approach to 
unconscionability, even while an opposed, but growing, minority have embraced a single -prong approach to the 
doctrine.” 
1168  Vout, n15, 117[35.5.210]. 
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A.1. Limbs to Substantive Independent Instrument Unconscionability:  
Within independent instrument transactions, substantive unconscionability can be 
found in three limbs: 
1. In the substantive terms of the contract; 
2. In the performance of the underlying contract, ie the manner in 
which the parties meet their obligations under the terms of that  
contract;1169 
3. From the nature of, or circumstances surrounding, the demand on 
the instrument.1170 
There is also the question of whether an unjust enrichment might follow and 
whether that is a relevant consideration. 
A.1.1. First Limb: Unconscionable Substantive Terms 
The first limb looks to the terms of the underlying contract and reviews the 
substantive content therein. 1171 Unconscionability can be found in the terms 
by determining whether, for example, any terms are excessively onerous, 
lacking in mutuality, or perhaps unlawful.1172 These characteristics can be 
probative of procedural unconscionability, if that is that claim, or can be 
substantively unconscionable of themselves. 
It is likely that the plaintiff would need to show how the alleged 
unconscionable terms came to be included in the contract in additional to 
how they are effectively unconscionable. 
A.1.2. Second Limb: Unconscionable Contract Performance 
The Court might then examine the beneficiary’s conduct in relation to their 
obligations under the terms, ie their performance of the contract. This is to 
determine whether that conduct might, for example, have unconscionably 
caused the account party to breach, thereby providing grounds for making 
the demand.1173 
                                                     
1169  For example, where the beneficiary fails to meet an obligation, thereby triggering the demand-right. 
1170  For example, where the demand is used to bring unconscionable pressure on the account party.  
1171  In Clough(No.4), the Court stated that in Wood Hall, n138, 598-99, Stephen J held that “the provisions of the 
contract may qualify the right to call on the undertaking contained in a performance guarantee. ” This appears to 
be a stronger version of Stephen J’s position in that matter. 
1172  Asplenium, n212 where it was falsely alleged a term ousted the court’s jurisdiction.  
1173  See for example Royal Design, n148. 
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This process is not to make a determination of the substantive issues; it is 
to find probative evidence which establishes a strong prima facie case of 
unconscionable conduct to ground an injunction. In Singapore/Malaysia, the 
injunction is a function of equity; the Australian head of power is provided 
in the ACL.1174 
The injunction, if against the beneficiary, suspends the right to make a 
demand until such time as the substantive issues are resolved – it does not 
invalidate the independent instrument but acts to postpone the benefit 
being realised.1175 
The Court will need to determine that the plaintiff seeking equitable 
intervention comes with ‘clean hands’, 1176 including whether the beneficiary 
had any knowledge of a breach of a fundamental term of the underlying 
contract.1177 The plaintiff must establish that the unconscionable 
performance falls within a recognised category of unconscionable conduct. 
This author’s analysis indicates a lack of insight among counsel litigating 
independent instrument matters of the deductive nature of 
unconscionability in commercial matters, from general principles to specific 
cases.1178 
A.1.3. Third Limb: Unconscionable Demands 
With respect to the third limb of substantive unconscionability, the nature of 
or circumstances surrounding the demand, the court may determine 
substantive unconscionability from the character of the demand itself. 
Some case examples will serve to highlight the type of conduct that falls 
under this limb. 
The first type of case is where there is “a call for payment of a sum well in 
excess of the quantum of the beneficiary’s actual or potential loss, [and] the 
beneficiary will gain more than what it has bargained for. ”1179 This type of 
                                                     
1174  S232. 
1175  Chartered, n24, 668[A] per Chan J: "A temporary restraining order does not prejudice or adversely affect the 
security; it merely postpones the realisation of the security until the party concerned is given an opportunity to 
prove his case." 
1176  Heydon, n309, 74[3-050]:“Those who seek equity must do equity.” Also Clough(No.4), n180 [5]. 
1177  Orrcon, n1006, [87]. 
1178  For example Leighton, n791, [12] Choo J implies the weakness of the plaintiff’s case stating “My opinion here 
was made on the limited evidence and the nature of the application before me ”. Opinions in both jurisdictional 
lines of authority often imply that the nature of the application lacks perspicacity.  
1179  JBE (No.2), n19 [11]. 
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abusive demand is reliant on the integrity of the independence principle to 
protect the beneficiary from allegations of impropriety. 
A harsh demand was held unconscionable in Australia in Olex Focas, 
where full payment was sought under ‘advance procurement guarantees’ 
for debts that had largely been repaid. 1180 In these cases the beneficiary 
relies on a strict interpretation of the terms of the independent instrument to 
make a demand on the basis of a sum, the quantum of which is perhaps 
disputable. Injunctions grounded on this head provide relief against the 
harsh and unconscionable insistence on a legal right given in good faith by 
restraining the beneficiary from abusing it. 
The second type of case under this head arises where the demand is made 
after the account party’s contractual obligations have been completed and 
the beneficiary could have no reasonable belief in their claim. In Newtech, 
works were completed and the defects liability period had expired but the 
performance bonds were still on foot. 1181 
The beneficiary had cashflow problems and decided to revise their invoices 
post hoc to reflect the value of the bonds, then to make a demand based on 
questionable representations of fact. While this type of behaviour might be 
found fraudulent, fraud was not plead by the applicant. 
This type of matter reflects some Court’s inclination toward allowing 
substantive unconscionability to be sufficient on its own to set aside 
agreements where the demand is “utterly lacking in bona fides”.1182 
In Boustead(No.2) the court considered that there was possible collusion 
between the banking parties to a set of guarantees and counter-
guarantees.1183 
The purpose of the demand from the issuer of the counter-guarantee, as it 
appeared but was not established, was not to reimburse for payment of 
those counter-guarantees but to unjustly enrich the ultimate beneficiary at 
the innocent expense of the account party. 1184 To avoid a finding of 
unconscionable conduct the beneficiary was required to demonstrate that 
                                                     
1180  Olex (No.3), n207. 
1181  Newtech, n784. 
1182  Kvaerner, n512 [10]. 
1183  See analysis of facts in Boustead (No.2) p.180. 
1184  Boustead (No.1), n160. 
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the ultimate beneficiary of the counter-guarantees had a legitimate claim 
and that they had been paid. For reasons unknown, neither could be made 
out.1185 
This type of conduct also falls under the umbrella of oppression but, 
depending on the facts, might conceivably fall under the ‘genus’ of Duress,  
not Unconscionable Conduct. McHugh JA expressly joined the two holding 
“economic duress” to include conduct that “amounts to unconscionable 
conduct”.1186 Boustead(No.2) therefore demonstrates that the conduct of the 
demand itself can be unconscionable for the purposes of grounding an 
injunction. 
For this limb, it is posited that to determine the character of a ‘successful’ 
demand would be to enquire whether an unjust enrichment would follow but 
for equity’s intervention.1187 If this is the case, the Court is justified in 
restraining the beneficiary’s demand-right. 
2.5. Identifying Substantive Independent Instrument Unconscionability 
Depending on jurisdiction, independent instrument unconscionability must be found 
to satisfy either the requirements for equitable relief or the elements of a statutory 
prohibition. Australian courts applying s21 ACL are not restrained by the principles 
of equity. 
Of the six recognised categories or ‘species’ of unconscionable conduct  discussed 
above,1188 only three are likely to arise in independent instrument disputes, with the 
first being procedural and unlikely. This limits the grounds available but also 
provides significantly more certainty identifying and categorising specific 
behaviours as unconscionable.  
The following examines each ‘species’ in context with independent instruments:  
1. Exploitation of vulnerability or weakness. 
➢ This is procedural unconscionability but could conceivably affect 
independent instrument matters. 1189 
                                                     
1185  The independence principle was breached in this matter because of an extraordinary factual matrix where the 
issuer was the original defendant. 
1186  Crescendo, n428 [45G]. His Honour is referr ing to the ‘family’ doctrine, not the ‘genus’ behavioural 
unconscionable conduct. Also see Dal Pont, n307, 268[8.10-8.20]. 
1187  Here the term ‘unjust enrichment’ is used in the common sense of the words and not in the doctrinal sense. 
1188  See p.116. 
1189  See p.84. 
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2. Abuse of position of trust or confidence. 
➢ This is procedural unconscionability and highly unlikely to arise as a 
matter of fact in independent instrument matters. 
3. Insistence upon legal rights in circumstances which make that insistence 
harsh or oppressive. 
➢ This is substantive unconscionability and is a likely basis for restraining 
abusive demands on independent instruments.  
4. Inequitable denial of legal obligations. 
➢ This is substantive unconscionability and is conceivably a basis for or 
element of independent instrument unconscionability.  
5. Unjust retention of property. 
➢ This is substantive unconscionability and is unlikely to arise as a matter 
of fact in independent instrument matters. 
6. Exercise of a right arising from a breach intentionally caused so as to give 
rise to that right (abus de droit).  
➢ This is substantive unconscionability and is a likely basis for restraining 
abusive demands on independent instruments. 1190 
Of these recognised categories only three might be alleged with respect to 
independent instrument disputes:  
3. Harsh or oppressive insistence on a right; 1191 
6. Abus de droit;1192 
4. Inequitable denial of legal obligations.1193 
Equity’s relief from the oppressive insistence on a right  (3) is “defined through the 
law of estoppel, especially promissory estoppel as it affects the enforcement of 
rights under existing contracts”. It follows from equity’s jurisdiction to “ensure 
harsh and oppressive outcomes do not occur”. 1194  
 
                                                     
1190  See discussion p.141. 
1191  Berbatis (No.1), n360 [14]. See different aspects of this on p.73 & p.98. 
1192  Royal Design, n148. 
1193  This might arise as a matter of fact, but could also be probative for abus de droit. 
1194  Vout, n15, 130[35.5.420]. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this outside the operation of 
independent instruments. 
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Allowing a person to benefit from their own wrong per (6) offends public policy. 
Courts of equity have found it inequitable to allow a “a man to derive advantage 
from his own wrong.”1195 As Selvam JC noted in Kvaerner, “it was eminently just and 
convenient to restrain a party from taking advantage of his own wrong”.1196 This is 
the practical application of the equitable ‘clean hands’ doctrine but it should be 
noted that the doctrine is limited in its application.  
Just as the plaintiff must show that it has met its contractual obligations before 
seeking relief, the defendant must show why its wrongdoing should not support a 
plaintiff’s prayer for equ itable relief in the form of a restraint on its demand-right.1197 
With independent instrument disputes, this wrongdoing could involve a range of 
behaviours, such as failing to meet payment obligations 1198 or falsifying costs, 1199 but 
must be substantive in nature. 
2.6. Procedural and Substantive Matters Under the ACL 
Sub-sections 22(1)-(2) ACL, provide a range of matters to which the Court may 
have regard when determining unconscionable conduct. While not intended to be 
comprehensive, the twelve matters provide a broad set of indicia to find 
unconscionable conduct, of which the following six 1200 may facilitate finding 
unconscionability in independent instrument disputes: 
Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the 
purpose of determining whether a person…has contravened section  21 in 
connection with the supply…of goods or services to a person…, the court 
may have regard to: 
(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the acquirer and 
the supplier; 
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any 
unfair tactics were used against, the acquirer/supplier…  
(i) the extent to which [one party] unreasonably failed to disclose to the 
[other party]: 
                                                     
1195  Meyers v Casey [1913] HCA 50, 124. 
1196  Kvaerner, n512 [6]. 
1197  Dal Pont, n307, 923[30.170-172]. 
1198  Raymond, n590. 
1199  Board Solutions, n676; JBE (No.2), n19. 
1200  Sections 22(1) and (2) are identical for these purposes, but distinguish between protecting the  acquirer and the 
supplier. They are amalgamated here for brevity.  
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(i) any intended conduct…that might affect the interests of the 
[other party]; and 
(ii) any risks to the acquirer/supplier arising from the 
acquirer/supplier’s intended conduct (being risks that the 
acquirer/supplier should have foreseen would not be apparent 
to the acquirer/supplier); 
(j) if there is a contract between the acquirer and the supplier for 
the acquisition of the goods or services: 
(i) the extent to which the acquirer/supplier was willing to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of the contract with the 
acquirer/supplier; and 
(ii) the terms and conditions of the contract; and 
(iii) the conduct of the acquirer and the supplier in complying 
with the terms and conditions of the contract; and 
(iv) any conduct that the acquirer or the supplier engaged in, 
in connection with their commercial relationship, after they 
entered into the contract; 
(k) without limiting paragraph (j), whether the acquirer/supplier has 
a contractual right to vary unilaterally a term or condition of a 
contract between the acquirer and the supplier for the 
acquisition of the goods or services; 
(l) the extent to which the acquirer and the supplier acted in good 
faith. 
Note: (a), (d), (i), (j)(i), above are procedural; (j)(ii)-(iv), (k), and (l) are 
substantive.1201 The likelihood of the former set ever being considered within 
independent instrument disputes is low. The focus here is on the latter set. 
The ACL dictates that these matters are considered with respect to s21(3)(a) “any 
circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the alleged 
contravention”; s21(4)(a), that it “is not limited by the unwritten law relating to 
unconscionable conduct”; the substantive terms of the contract [s21(4)(c)(i)] and 
the manner and extent “to which the contract is carried out” [s21(4)(c)(ii)].  
                                                     
1201  See discussion p.82. 
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Given this distillation of the matters provided in the ACL, independent instrument 
applicants can look to the underlying case law where the factual matrix has 
required the Court to consider the ambit of the legislation. From this, more 
certainty should emerge as to the range of conduct considered unconscionable 
under those particular sub-sections of the ACL. 
2.7. Standard of Proof 
It is moot that for an interlocutory injunction to be granted in either Australia, 
Malaysia, or Singapore, a strong prima facie case must be made out.1202 The 
plaintiff must argue that the beneficiary’s conduct in relation to its contractual 
obligations or the nature of the demand is such that allowing the independent 
instrument to be encashed would be inequitable. 
Kathigesu J, in Bocotra held that “mere allegations are insufficient” given the 
higher degree of strictness applied for unconscionability-based interlocutory 
proceedings seeking injunctive relief. 1203 
In Hortico, the Court provided procedural guidance stating: 
Where an application for an interlocutory injunction raises questions 
of law the court will ordinarily decide those questions at the 
interlocutory stage unless they should be better left until later. The 
only exceptions to this general rule are...(b) where the determination 
of the questions requires a factual matrix which is not available until 
the facts in the entire proceedings have been proved .1204 
At the interlocutory stage, to ground injunctive relief the Court seeks to determine 
whether “there is a serious question to be tried…that [the defendant’s] conduct is 
shown to be unconscientious and unconscionable”.1205 The HCA full bench in 
Beecham held that the first of two tests was to ask: 
whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense 
that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the 
trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief. 1206 
                                                     
1202  Dauphin, n554 [57]. Also n1208 below. 
1203  Bocotra, n149 [47]. This parallels the fraud standard.  
1204  Hortico, n663, 546. 
1205  Olex (No.1), n38, 404. 
1206  Beecham Group v Bristol Laboratories  [1968] HCA 1 [4]. 
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In relation to independent instruments, Gilmour J in Clough(No.3) referred to the 
Court Rules1207 (which also reflect the prima facie standard), explaining: 
Clough needs to demonstrate a prima facie case for the relief 
claimed. The threshold for demonstrating a prima facie case is not 
high. It is whether on the material before the Court, inferences are 
open which, if translated into findings of fact, would support the 
relief claimed.1208 
His Honour referred to a ‘prima facie case ’ nine times in his reasons, often in 
conjunction with the expression “or serious issue to be tried’.  
This then constitutes the appropriate standard for independent instrument 
unconscionability: a strong prima facie case that there is a serious question to be 
tried which would support the relief claimed. 
In 1996, Batt J agreed with the English authorities on the standard “in answer to 
the question of what level of proof is required for the grant of an interim injunction 
in a letter of credit case”. Using the more descriptive test provided in Group Josi,1209 
his Honour asked: 
Have the plaintiffs established that it is seriously arguable that, on 
the material available, the only realistic inference is that [the 
beneficiary] could not honestly have believed in the validity of its 
demands on the [letter of credit].1210 
It is apparent from the above that authorities across jurisdictions large ly agree on 
the required standard. 
2.8. UN-CIGSLC 
This section examines the UN-CIGSLC acknowledging that neither Singapore, 
Malaysia or Australia have ratified it. This is not to say however that there is 
nothing of value in the UN-CIGSLC to assist with informing a new doctrine of 
unconscionable conduct. Analysis reveals how certain independent instrument 
matters align with Art.19(2). 
                                                     
1207  Federal Court Rules O8, r3(2)(c). 
1208  Clough(No.3), n990 [13]. 
1209  Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1160. 
1210  Olex (No.1), n38, 398, affirming Staughton LJ’s view in Group Josi. 
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Art.15(3) provides the good faith obligation on demands, holding  “[t]he 
beneficiary…[is]…deemed to certify that the demand is not in bad faith”, ie “that 
none of the circumstances exist that would justify non-payment”.1211 
Art.19 provides for the circumstances where the payment obligation might be 
restrained1212 subject to “provisional court measures”. An amalgamated application 
of Arts.19(1)(b-c) would provide that no payment obligation arises if it is “manifest 
and clear” that “the demand has no conceivable basis” and therefore “no payment 
is due on the basis asserted”. 1213 
Art.19 is not intended to operate as a proscriptive provision but as a descriptive, 
cross-jurisdictional provision to deal with exceptions to payment. It is not 
prohibitive in nature; it provides relief from the effects of abusive demands. The 
events provided for in Arts.19(1)(a-c) rest entirely on substantive law, and the 
examples given demonstrate by their diversity the difficulty of aggregating abusive 
behaviour in independent instrument matters and identifying common elements. 
Horowitz describes the UN-CIGSLC as “far-reaching in the exceptions that it 
permits” and worries that this could affect the degree of abstraction in independent 
instruments.1214 
For the purposes of understanding independent instrument unconscionability 
however, the conclusion required by Art.19(1)(b) that “no payment is due” is a 
substantive decision that may be the result of a finding of unconscionable conduct, 
ie the “basis asserted” may be unconscionable for being oppressive, for example.  
The conclusion required by Art.19(1)(c) that “the demand has no conceivable 
basis” is one that can arise from a finding of unconscionable conduct in the 
underlying contract or the demand. 
As both of these are outcomes or conclusions or findings, they provide no 
guidance on how to reach those results. To assist with that Art.19(2) provides five 
“types of situations” that give rise to an entitlement “to provisional court 
measures”. These assist with clarifying the legal nature of substantive independen t 
instrument unconscionability. 
                                                     
1211  UN-CIGSLC Explanatory Note, n221 [40]. 
1212  Art.20(a)&(b) only provide for restraint of the issuer’s obligation to pay, breaching the independence principle.  
1213  D.Horowitz, n369, 88-89 posits that this amalgamation also “encapsulate[s] the second formulation from Edward 
Owen – where the demand is ‘made fraudulently in circumstances where there is no right to payment’.”  
1214  Ibid 89. 
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Under Art.19(2), a demand will have ‘no conceivable basis ’ if, inter alia: 
(a)  The contingency or risk against which the undertaking was 
designed to secure the beneficiary has undoubtedly not 
materialized; 
➢ This reflects the reasoning in Samwoh(No.2)1215 where the 
applicant had met all their obligations. This ‘situation’ could 
arguably have the addendum ‘…and therefore it would be 
harsh or oppressive for them to insist on the demand-right.’. It 
constitutes substantive unconscionability.  
(b) The underlying obligation…has been declared invalid by a 
court or arbitral tribunal…; 
➢ This supports the argument that a demand-right arising from an 
invalid contract ought to be a nullity. 1216 The invalidation may be 
a matter of law, or equitable relief. It constitutes procedural 
unconscionability. 1217 
(c)  The underlying obligation has undoubtedly been fulfi lled to the 
satisfaction of the beneficiary; 
➢ This is reflected in Singaporean case findings. 1218 Unjust 
enrichment would follow a successful demand – this ‘situation’ 
could arguably have the addendum ‘…and therefore it would be 
harsh or oppressive for them to insist on the demand-right.’. It 
constitutes substantive unconscionability.  
(d) Fulfilment of the underlying obligation has clearly been 
prevented by wilful misconduct of the beneficiary [abus de 
droit]; 
➢ This approach was argued unsuccessfully in Clough(No3) but 
argued successfully in Royal Design. It reflects the ex turpi 
causa doctrine1219 and the sixth category of unconscionability 
                                                     
1215  Samwoh(No.2), n760. 
1216  Lonegrass states that “under the European civil law tradition, an accessory contract depends entirely  on the 
existence or enforce[ability]  of the principal contract. This is a well -established principle in the civil law of 
obligations”: M Lonegrass, 13 March, 2017 correspondence with this author. 
1217  See p.84. 
1218  Newtech, n784. 
1219  See p.55. 
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outlined above1220 which proscribes exercising a demand-right 
arising from own breach. It constitutes substantive 
unconscionability. 
(e) In the case of a demand under a counter-guarantee, the 
beneficiary of the counter-guarantee has made payment in bad 
faith. 
➢ Prescient of Boustead which bears striking factual consistency 
with this.1221 Reflects the doctrine ex dolo malo non oritur 
actio.1222 Unjust enrichment would follow a successful demand – 
this ‘situation’ could arguably have the addendum ‘…and 
therefore it would be harsh or oppressive…’ It constitutes 
substantive unconscionability. 
2.9. Application to Demand Guarantees versus Letters of Credit 
It is posited that independent instrument unconscionability should apply to both 
commercial letters of credit and demand guarantees, but that letters of credit 
should enjoy stricter independence on the basis of the different type of transaction 
it guarantees. This view has judicial support. 
In Chartered, Chan J stated: 
A performance bond is as good as cash between buyer and seller 
only because that is the effect of the English decisions and not 
because it is the cause of such decisions. In Potton Homes v 
Coleman Contractors…Everleigh LJ did not accept that a 
performance bond was to be treated as cash between buyer and 
seller or that a performance guarantee should be treated like a letter 
of credit in all circumstances. 1223 
Chan CT points out in JBE Properties that, because of the differing obligations 
under the instruments, a less stringent standard (compared with letters of credit) 
                                                     
1220  See p.241. 
1221  Boustead (No.2), n159. There are also some differences in the facts, and misbehaviour under the counter -
guarantee in question was implied but not alleged.  
1222  No action arises from deceit.  
1223  Chartered, n24, 38[E]. Emphasis added. 
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can justifiably be adopted when determining whether a beneficiary of a 
performance guarantee should be restrained:1224 
[A] performance bond is merely security for the secondary obligation 
of the obligor to pay damages if it breaches its primary contractual 
obligations…[and]…is not the lifeblood of commerce…Thus, a less 
stringent standard (as compared to…letters of credit) can 
justifiably be adopted for determining whether a call on a 
performance bond should be restrained.1225 
His Honour recognised the different obligations inherent in the two instruments. 
Given the differences between them, it is reasonable to suggest that, where the 
Court finds the beneficiary has “no conceivable basis”  for a demand against a 
guarantee1226 the veil of autonomy can be lifted. The beneficiary ought to be 
restrained where substantive unconscionability is found in circumstances that 
might not excite equity’s attention where a letter of credit was concerned.  
The differences between performance guarantees and letters of credit are 
analysed by Debattista, who states that it is “misconceived” not to adopt a less 
stringent autonomy principle for performance guarantees than that which applies to 
commercial letters of credit. 
Debattista examines the synchronicity between letters of credit and demand 
guarantees and states that the two should be detangled and demand guarantees 
attached “to the contract to which they properly belong, namely the underlying 
contract of sale.”1227 
2.10. Degrees of Materiality in Unconscionability 
Finally there remains the issue of degree, for which the treatment of independent 
instrument fraud provides guidance. There are degrees of materia lity to fraud.1228 
The Official Comment to Revised UCC §5-109, which “makes it clear that fraud 
must be ‘material.’”, provides an example where a two -barrel deficiency from a 
thousand-barrel shipment would be “an insubstantial and immaterial breach of the 
underlying contract.” It goes on to describe material fraud as occurring:  
                                                     
1224  JBE (No.2), n19 [10]. 
1225  Ibid [10]. Emphasis added. The Court found that the instrument was not independent.  
1226  UN-CIGSLC, n10 [19(1)(c)]. 
1227  C Debattista, 'Performance Bonds and Letters of Credit: A Cracked Mirror Image' (1997) Jul Journal of Business 
Law 289, 289-290. 
1228  Descriptions of fraud include inter alia ‘material’, ‘substantial’, ‘egregious’, and ‘serious’ fraud.  
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only when the beneficiary has no colorable right to expect honor 
and where there is no basis in fact to support such a right to 
honor.1229 
This thesis posits that there are degrees of unconscionability for the court to 
consider, of which only the most egregious or “gross” should be sufficient to 
restrain the beneficiary’s right to make a demand: 
[O]ne cannot be assured that the term "unconscionable" carries with 
it identical shades of equitable wrong on each occasion in which it is 
bandied about. There may be different levels or thresholds of 
conduct all described by the word "unconscionable". 1230 
There is strong judicial support for the idea of a Continuum of Materiality with 
respect to evaluating allegations of independent instrument unconscionability.  
In Hortico Young J, referring to the unconscionable use of a “statutory or 
contractual power for an improper purpose”, stating that “it may be that in some 
cases...the unconscionable conduct may be so gross as to lead to exercise of the 
discretionary power.”1231 
In Olex(No.1) Batt J acknowledged the existence of “gross unconscionability falling 
short of actual fraud” but refused to accept it as grounds for an injunction. His 
Honour’s basis for this belief was the absence of any mention of it in the cases 
before that time. 
The Court in Samton(No.2), expressly referring to unconscionable conduct, stated 
that “[t]here are different thresholds of conduct in [the] various categories, all of 
which may be described as unconscionable”.1232 In the US, courts have found 
conduct to be “grossly unconscionable” 1233 and “grossly unfair and 
unconscionable”,1234 indicating recognition of a “sliding scale” 1235 of unconscionability. 
The authorities broadly indicate that unconscionability is not a constant and that 
varying degrees of materiality can be influential in determining whether the 
demand-right can be restrained. It might be argued that there is difficulty enough 
                                                     
1229  Byrne, n4, 246[1]. 
1230  Dal Pont, n418 [1]. 
1231  Hortico, n663, 554. Emphasis added. His Honour is referring to the discretionary power of injunction.  
1232  Samton(No.2), n383 [48]. 
1233  Niemiec v Kellmark Corp 58t N.Y.S.2d 569 (Tonawanda City Ct. 1992), 570-70. 
1234  Paragon Homes, Inc v Carter  288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup.Ct.1968), 819. 
1235  Lonegrass, n1146. 
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describing and interpreting unconscionable conduct in any context; trying to 
impose degrees of severity imputes an additional level of difficulty. In response it 
can be taken that because only the most unconscientious conduct will ground 
injunctive relief, it will be clearly evident to a court of inquiry.  
No matter to this author’s knowledge in Australia or Singapore has addressed the 
issue of materiality with respect to unconscionability in independent instruments. 
The idea of variable unconscionability egregiousness is supported by the accepted 
recognition of degrees of independent instrument fraud.1236 
Materiality is included here as an element for consideration when assessing 
independent instrument unconscionable conduct. 
2.11. Limits to Independent Instrument Unconscionability 
The scope of the ‘genus’ unconscionabil ity doctrine1237 can be clarified by what it 
has been found by reference to its exclusions, ie that conduct which the courts 
have expressly refused to sanction as unconscionable. 1238 
Conduct has been found to not be unconscionable where: 
1. Unequal bargaining positions were held;1239 
2. Harm to reputation would arise; 1240 
3. Threatening or actually making of a demand is to apply 
bargaining pressure; 1241 
4. Unfair contractual content is found; 1242 
5. Advantage is taken of financial need; 1243 
6. Inadequate consideration is provided; 1244 
                                                     
1236  See p.66. 
1237  See p.573 for the taxonomy. 
1238  These are drawn from both jurisdictions and whether they would be similarly found if tested in the other is 
improbable. 
1239  Berbatis (No.3), n382 [11]: "[A] person is not in a position of relevant [sic] disadvantage…simply because of 
inequality of bargaining power." Originally proposed in the UK by Denning MR as a ‘unifying concept’, this was 
subsequently held not to constitute unconscionability in that jurisdiction.  
1240  Bocotra, n149 [49]. 
1241  Wood Hall, n138, 391. Also see discussion at p.186. 
1242  Axelson, n404 [13]: “…where parties have agreed on the terms the court will not refuse a decree of specific 
performance on the ground of unfairness.” 
1243  Dal Pont, n307, 293[fn1] states that this is unlikely to be found unconscionable but Kitto  J in Blomley, n322, 415 
expressly states that under the doctrine of unconscionable dealing, financial need taken advantage of is 
unconscionable. 
1244  P Finn (ed), Essays in Equity - Ch.1: I Hardingham, Unconscionable Dealing  (Sweet & Maxwell, 1985), 4: 
“Inadequate consideration is not per se a ground for equitable relief, nor is  it a sine qua non [essential element] 
for relief.” 
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7. Delaying a demand while legitimate legal proceedings 
progress;1245 
8. Legal action is taken or a matter is referred to arbitration.1246 
9. A party inadvertently or purposely breaches the underlying 
contract.1247 
10. There is unfairness in trade or commerce. 1248 
11. Disobeying an order of the court not to make a demand on an 
independent instrument.1249 
The above range of behaviours contributes significantly to clarifying the extent of 
the doctrine’s scope. 
  
                                                     
1245  Fletcher, n943. 
1246  S21(2) ACL. 
1247  Body Bronze International v Soleil Tanning Oxford [2007] FCA 371 [25-33]. Mount Sophia , n39. 
1248  ABC v Lenah Game Meats [2001] HCA 63[80]: “Commercial enterprises may sustain economic harm through 
methods of competition which are said to be unfair”.  
1249  Olex (No.1), n38, 404. Contempt of court lies in the criminal jurisdiction.  
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3.0 Elements of Independent Instrument Unconscionability 
From the above analyses of the independence principle, general unconscionable 
conduct, the unconscionability exception, and both complete lines of independent 
instrument authority in Australia and Singapore, the following elemental 
considerations for determining the presence of independent inst rument 
unconscionability is proposed: 
 
Table of Elements 
Independent Instrument Unconscionability 
 
1. Jurisdiction and Head of Power 
a. Assumed jurisdictional oversight or legal equivalence.  
b. Equity, or Statute referring to equity and ‘other’ matters.  
2. Specific Treatment – Instruments  
a. The independence of Commercial Letters of Credit are subject to 
a less porous independence principle. 1250 
b. The independence of all types of independent demand 
guarantees and standby letters of credit is subject to a less rigid 
enforcement and can be reviewed on the facts and on the 
documents. 
3. Genus of Unconscionable Conduct 
a. Whether the conduct is more likely to constitute Unconscionability 
or Undue Pressure or another category. 1251 
  
                                                     
1250  Unconscionability can still be found: see Min Thai, n591. 
1251  It is possible to conceive a factual matrix where undue pressure might also be plead in relation to an abusive 
demand on an independent instrument.  
Garth C. Wooler   s4069771   Doctoral Dissertation 
Page 254 of 270 
 
4. Type of Unconscionable Conduct: Procedural or Substantive 
a. If procedural, is the conduct found in: 
➢ the taking advantage of a special disadvantage; or 
➢ the behaviour of the beneficiary during pre-contractual negotiations. 
b. If substantive, is the conduct found in: 
➢ the terms; or 
➢ the performance of the contract; or 
➢ making of the demand. 
5. Species of Unconscionability  
a. If unconscionable conduct, then the category of unconscionable 
conduct is either: 
➢ exploitation of disadvantage (P); 
➢ harsh/oppressive insistence on a right (S);  and/or 
➢ wilful misconduct giving rise to a demand-right (S).1252 
6. Materiality 
a. If substantive in the conduct/operation of the underlying matter, is 
the conduct sufficiently egregious?1253 
b. If substantive in the demand on the instrument, is the conduct 
sufficiently egregious?1254 
7. Standard of Proof 
a. A mere allegation of unconscionable conduct is insufficient. 
b. Independent instrument unconscionability has a high threshold for 
conduct where gross or egregious unconscionability only is 
sufficient. 
  
                                                     
1252  (P)=Procedural; (S)=Substantive 
1253  This a matter of degree. 
1254  This a matter of degree. 
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8. Proofs 
a. The applicant must satisfy the court regarding its own bona fides; 
that it seeks relief from unconscionable conduct with ‘clean 
hands’. 
b. Where the alleged conduct is procedural, the applicant must 
demonstrate that the contract was improperly formed for want of 
agreement.1255 
c. Where unconscionability is alleged in the terms, the applicant 
must establish at the interlocutory stage, a strong prima facie 
case that they will be able to successfully plead this in a full 
hearing where the substantive issues are heard inter partes. 
d. Where unconscionability is argued to be in conduct relating to 
operationalising the contract, the applicant must demonstrate a 
prima facie case showing that the conduct satisfies the elements 
of either of the two acknowledged categories of substantive 
unconscionable conduct.1256 
e. Where unconscionability in the demand is argued, the applicant 
must demonstrate that the conduct satisfies the elements of 
either of the two acknowledged categories of substantive 
unconscionable conduct.1257 
f. Where the conduct satisfies the elements of either of the two 
acknowledged categories of substantive unconscionable conduct, 
the effect must be to demonstrate that the demand is utterly 
lacking in bona fides; that there could be no conceivable basis for 
the demand.1258 
  
                                                     
1255  Where advantage was taken of a person’s special disadvantage.  
1256  This is expected to be ‘wilful misconduct’ most frequently.  
1257  This is expected to be ‘harsh insistence on a right’ most frequently.  
1258  This would include such cases as Newtech, n784, in which the demand was found unconscionable where the 
underlying obligation had been substantially fulfilled.  
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9. Evidentiary Matters 
a. Independent instrument unconscionability is found on the facts, 
and on the documents; 
b. There is an implied term to act in good faith with respect to 
exercising a demand-right on an independent instrument. 1259 
c. A special disadvantage is not necessary but can be probative;  
d. No moral obloquy need be present; 
e. Mala fides is not a necessary element; 
f. The terms of the contract may be probative to procedural 
unconscionability. 
10. Unconscionability Exclusions 
a. Unfairness by itself. All unconscionability is unfair; not everything 
unfair is unconscionable. 
b. Those behaviours already found or stated as not being 
unconscionable.1260 
11. Remedies Possible 
a. If the unconscionable conduct is procedural: 
➢ whether the contract is void ab initio per the doctrine of 
restitutio in integrum, or  
➢ the term relating to the independent instrument (or any other 
relevant term) ought to be severed, or 
➢ whether the contract is voidable by the plaintiff. 1261 
  
                                                     
1259  This does not extend to the underlying contract. It is purely for the purposes of determining whether the demand 
has been made in good faith.  
1260  See list p.251. 
1261  Termination will not act retrospectively.  
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b. If the unconscionable conduct is substantive: 
➢ an injunction to restrain the demand-right on an independent 
instrument;  
➢ an order to restrain the beneficiary dealing with funds already 
received; 
➢ the severance or severability of any relevant terms, and/or 
➢ Damages. 
c. The Issuer is typically not to be restrained from honouring.  
 
 
3.1. Finalé  
It should be noted that the obligations of the banks remains the same on the strict 
proviso that the injunction issued only restrains the demand-right of the 
beneficiary. Given that this proviso is met, nothing in the above interferes with the 
independence principle nor any of the international rule sets. It is unlikely to be 
incumbent upon the issuer to determine the presence of unconscionable conduct in 
the formation or operation of the contract, or in the demand itself. They will 
continue to operate behind the veil of autonomy and to base their decisions on the 
documents alone.  
This framework for independent instrument unconscionability reflects the main 
points in relation to this type of conduct. The stakes are high – large amounts are 
involved. 
The market prefers certainty and can accommodate higher transactional risk it has 
identified. If substantive unconscionability, without more, grounds relief against 
abusive demands on independent instruments the range of elements to be found 
must be fully scoped. The above framework represents a strong formulation with 
which to commence that process. 
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4.0 Summary of the Characteristics of Independent Instrument 
Unconscionability 
This analysis provides legal and academic foundations for establishing 
independent instrument unconscionability as a separate and structured doctrine for 
treating abusive demands that fall short of fraud but are sufficiently egregious to 
attract injunctive relief. 
Some from the independent instrument user community might argue that the 
integrity of the independence principle would be undermined by 
unconscionability. 1262 This would be a distraction and a contradiction 1263 that can be 
resolved within the law. The integrity of the independence principle is one of many 
relatively important factors that the court must consider. The fact that abusive 
demands can cause considerable economic disruption brings into play socio-
economic factors that are arguably equal in weight to the integrity of a doctrine of 
lex mercatoria.  
The court, as the final arbiter of these matters, must balance the interests of all 
stakeholders including, but not exclusively, those of the commercial parties 
concerned. This is not to downplay the significance of the independence of the 
instruments. The independence principle provides much benefit to the lawful 
beneficiary, as it was designed to do; it also provides solace to the unscrupulous.  
This would be addressed and remedied by a well-framed doctrine of independent 
instrument unconscionability.  
Reservations about the doctrine generally have been expressed. Cornell states:  
The difficult question with unconscionability is not whether it works 
towards a legitimate end, but whether its application comes at too 
great a price.1264 
The doctrinal conflict with respect to unconscionability has been described as “ the 
intensifying tussle between classical contract principles and developments such as 
good faith, unconscionability and estoppel”.1265 Mason J has said, “there are [some] 
                                                     
1262  Debattista, n1227, 291. 
1263  The Official Comment to UCC-Revd.5, n11, §5-109 specifically instructs the court to lift the veil of autonomy in 
relation to fraud: “The courts must examine the underlying transaction  when there is an allegation of fraud”. 
Emphasis added. 
1264  Epstein, n1161, 303. 
1265  Kuehne, n45, 64[fn7]. 
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who think that unconscionability has gone, if not too far, just about as far as it can 
go.”1266 
However, if the Court will not look further at the substantive elements of a dispute 
to found the doctrine, properly applied unconscionability as a ground to injunction 
is foreclosed to any independent instrument matter and abusive calls will go 
unchecked. Therefore, substantive unconscionability needs to be adopted as an 
element of ‘independent instrument unconscionability’.  
By restraining unconscionable conduct to procedural unconscionability, which is 
unlikely to be raised in an independent instrument dispute, the underlying contract 
essentially becomes impervious to unconscionability as a defence to abusive 
demands. 
This is, in itself, an unconscionable outcome that perhaps ought to be remedied.  
 
  
                                                     
1266  Mason, n196, [Forward]. 
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